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DECONSTRUCTING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE
MECHANICS OF TRUSTING
BY RENÉ REICH-GRAEFE*
ABSTRACT
The phenomenon of trust among firm participants is a much neglected
academic inquiry in corporate governance research and the theory of the
firm. This Article elaborates on the comparatively small sample of existing
legal research on the intersection of trust and corporate governance and
tries to interrupt the selective (in-)attention given to the philosophical,
psychological, political, sociological, economic, and legal phenomenon that
is our individual as well as collective, everyday trust (or distrust) in the
functionality and explainability of the world tomorrow in accordance with
our preferences of today and our experiences of the past. Trust—as a
phenomenon—is a concrete but severely underappreciated reality for the
success of corporate investments and the accountability of corporate
management. It constitutes part of a complex solution for encouraging
investor confidence in the face of absolute decision-making power of
corporate directors. Trust efficiently combines and balances otherwise
unrestricted managerial power with a robust measure of accountability of
corporate management—an entirely elusive measure within the realm of
corporate governance law. It thereby provides a sophisticated, yet poorly
understood, remedy to the most significant but unresolved academic
dilemma in corporate governance theory—namely, the lack of predictive
ability of existing microtheoretical models of the firm. This Article primarily
discusses trust (and trustworthiness) as a mechanism, not as a virtue. By
focusing on the procedural and substantive mechanics of trusting as a
phenomenon, this Article explains the cohesive power and low-transaction
cost functionality which is built into successful exercises of trusting for
purposes of encouraging and establishing pervasive corporate investments
as the rational-choice baseline for voluntary firm participants.
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Vertrauen ist gut, Kontrolle is besser.
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I. OPENING SKETCHES
In (economic) cooperation, trust ranks second to none.1 Trust—as a
commodity and productive resource2—constitutes the magical "lubricant"3

**
"Trust is good, control is better." (translation by author). The proverb may have
originated from a similar Russian aphorism: "Trust but verify" (which itself is sometimes attributed
further to a 1914 essay by Lenin). See TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA'S
BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD 50 (Oxford Univ. Press, Inc. 2006); Michael Day, Toward
Distributed Infrastructures for Digital Preservation: The Roles of Collaboration and Trust, 3 INT'L
J. DIGITAL CURATION 15, 21 & n.3 (2008).
1
See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 23 (1974) ("[Trust] is
extremely efficient; it saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people's
word."); EMANUELA TODEVA, BUSINESS NETWORKS: STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE 166 (2006)
("The values of interpersonal trust and affinal reciprocity are universal, and many other people and
nations have recognised the practical advantage of reciprocal obligations, against fears of reprisal
and of losing functional ties."); Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Trusting and Trustworthiness,
81 B.U. L. REV. 523, 523 (2001) ("The need to decide whether to trust another party is ubiquitous in
business dealings."); John Child, Trust—The Fundamental Bond in Global Cooperation, 29 ORG.
DYNAMICS 274, 277 (2001) ("Trust is a fundamental component of human relationships throughout
the world."); Partha Dasgupta, Trust as a Commodity, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 49, 51 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) ("Trust is of much importance
precisely because its presence or absence can have a strong bearing on what we choose to do and in
many cases what we can do."); William A. Galston, Trust—But Quantify, PUB. INTEREST, Winter
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and "glue"4 which, among (corporate) firm participants, efficiently
manipulates and controls opportunistic post-investment behavior in order to
concentrate and achieve adequate levels of commitment, stability, and
autopoietic cohesion within the black-box production function5 of the
modern (corporate) firm. That being said, the phenomenon of trust, as well
as its place and function within current models of corporate governance and
the firm,6 are relatively recent subjects of academic interest and inquiry by
1996, at 129, 129 ("[T]he modern market economy rests on associations of production and
exchange . . . . [which] requires, in turn, trust, widely distributed.") (reviewing FRANCIS
FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY (1995)); Lynn A.
Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407, 408 (2002) [hereinafter Stout,
Investor Confidence] ("Investor trust provides the foundation on which the American securities
market has been built. Without investor trust, our market would be a thin shadow of its present
self."); see also Rafael La Porta et al., Trust in Large Organizations, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 333, 337
(1997) ("Trust promotes cooperation, especially in large organizations.").
2
ARROW, supra note 1, at 23 ("Trust and similar values, loyalty or truth-telling, . . . are
goods, they are commodities . . . ."); Karen S. Cook et al., Trust Building via Risk Taking: A CrossSocietal Experiment, 68 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 121, 122 (2005) ("[A] trust relation in which one person
can expect trustworthy behavior from another becomes a highly valuable commodity."); Dasgupta,
supra note 1, at 51 ("[T]rust is not dissimilar to commodities such as knowledge or information.").
3
ARROW, supra note 1, at 23 ("Trust is an important lubricant of a social system."); John
Ermisch et al., Measuring People's Trust, 172 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y (SERIES A: STAT. SOC'Y) 749,
749 (2009) (stating the same); Diego Gambetta, Foreword to TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS ix, x (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) [hereinafter Gambetta, Foreword]
("[I]n the social sciences . . . scholars . . . allude to [trust] as a fundamental ingredient or lubricant . .
. ."); Toko Kiyonari et al., Does Trust Beget Trustworthiness? Trust and Trustworthiness in Two
Games and Two Cultures: A Research Note, 69 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 270, 270 (2006).
4
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425, 425
(1993) [hereinafter Mitchell, Fairness and Trust] ("Trust is the glue that binds corporate
relationships."); Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 553 (2001) ("Trust is a kind
of social glue that allows people to interact at low transaction costs."); see also Robert C. Ellickson,
Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537, 540 (1998) ("Much of the
glue of a society comes not from law enforcement, as the classicists would have it, but rather from
the informal enforcement of social mores by acquaintances, bystanders, trading partners, and
others."); René Reich-Graefe, Deconstructing Corporate Governance: Director Primacy Without
Principle?, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 465, 485-87 (2011) (describing so-called "protolegal
variables"—among them, prominently, trust—as "hidden catalysts").
5
See, e.g., TODEVA, supra note 1, at 47 ("The structural perspective [of business network
analysis] treats inter-firm relationships very much in an instrumental way – as a 'black box'
representing a connection of some sort without specifying what takes place between the connected
parties."); Charles R.T. O'Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the Theory of the Modern Corporation, 31
J. CORP. L. 753, 757 (2006) (stating the firm is a "black box" in classical and neoclassical perfect
competition theory); Walter W. Powell, Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of
Organization, 12 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 295, 296 (1990) (describing the paradigm shift developed by
Ronald Coase in his groundbreaking 1937 article, R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386 (1937), conceiving of the firm as a governing structure, thus, "breaking with
orthodox accounts of the firm as a 'black box' production function").
6
The four main models of corporate governance in today's academic discussion can be
labeled as "shareholder primacy," "contractarian," "team production," and "director primacy." See,
e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate, 16
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corporate theoreticians.7 Though the notion of trust—including its
foundational ingredients (trustfulness, trustworthiness, and the dichotomous
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 45, 47-53 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder] (discussing
shareholder-primacy and director-primacy models); John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of
Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are U.S. Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 837-43 (1999)
(discussing team production models); George W. Dent, Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team
Production and Director Primacy Models of Corporate Governance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213,
1216-21 (2008) (discussing team-production and director-primacy models); Jill E. Fisch, Measuring
Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 646-50 (2006)
(discussing shareholder-primacy models); Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About
Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 537-41 (2006) (discussing shareholder primacy and
team production theory); René Reich-Graefe, Deconstructing Corporate Governance: Absolute
Director Primacy, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 341, 361-95 (2011) (discussing and
critiquing all four models in detail); J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes
Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 315-26 (2010) (discussing all four
models as well as "agency theory" and "progressive corporate law theory"). For a more general
discussion of those firm models, see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the
Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 832-34
(1999); O'Kelley, supra note 5, at 772-76; Steven M.H. Wallman, Understanding the Purpose of a
Corporation: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 807, 809-14 (1999).
7
The beginnings of the law of corporate governance—as a discrete subset of corporate law
(or of the law of business organizations more generally) and as an area of research and
scholarship in corporate legal theory—can be traced back to two, now classical works: Adolf Berle
and Gardiner Means' The Modern Corporation and Private Property in 1932 and Frank Knight's
Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, in 1921. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND
PROFIT (1921). See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 4-5 (2008) (describing Berle and Means' The Modern Corporation and
Private Property as "what still may be the most influential book ever written about corporations");
Alice Belcher, The boundaries of the firm: the theories of Coase, Knight and Weitzman, 17 LEGAL
STUD. 22, 24-25 (1997) (explaining the problem of firm governance under "Knightian uncertainty");
O'Kelley, supra note 5, at 756 (describing Knight's Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit as "[t]he foremost
description of the classic entrepreneur, immediately prior to the Great Depression and now");
Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 923 (1984)
(describing Berle and Means' treatise as the "last major work of original scholarship" in corporate
governance). On the legacy of Berle and Means and their groundbreaking research, see generally
Kelli A. Alces, Revisiting Berle and Rethinking the Corporate Structure, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
787, 787-90 (2010) (describing how "Berle's work is relevant nearly eighty years after its
publication"); William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century's Turn, 26 J.
CORP. L. 737, 738 (2001) ("Berle and Means retain an enviable place at the forefront of policy
discussion in a field where even a highly successful academic contribution rarely has a shelf life
exceeding ten years."); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy's
Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 101 (2008)
[hereinafter Bratton & Wachter, Corporatist Origins] (describing the "Berle-Dodd debate" as the
"famous, precedent-setting debate of the 1930s"); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter,
Tracking Berle's Footsteps: The Trail of The Modern Corporation's Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 849, 849-50 (2010) (discussing The Modern Corporation and Private Property's "most
famous sequence, its last chapter"); Charles R. T. O'Kelley, Berle and the Entrepreneur, 33
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1141, 1141-44 (2010) (discussing both the works of Berle and Knight);
Harwell Wells, The Birth of Corporate Governance, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1247, 1248 (2010)
(stating that "whatever came before, corporate governance really began with Berle and Means").
In contrast thereto, sporadic academic interest in the intersection of corporate governance
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processes of trusting and entrusting)—appears to provide an immensely
important contribution to solving the fundamental principal-agent problem8
of efficient (and maybe even just)9 governance of the modern Berle-Means
and trust has, for the most part, been an integral part of the so-called "law and norms" literature
which fully emerged in legal academia in the 1990s after Robert Ellickson's groundbreaking study,
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). See,
e.g., Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability in
Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 121 (2006). For a discussion of the "law and norms"
literature, see, e.g., id. at 121-24; Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation
of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 343-51 (1997); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Understanding Norms, 49
U. TORONTO L.J. 177, 193-96 (1999). For a more precise overview of the academic literature on
law (including corporate law and, included therein, corporate governance) and social norms
(including trust), see infra notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
8
By this, I mean the fundamental agency problem of managerial primacy (i.e., the allocation
of control with, and the resultant discretion of, corporate decision makers) and
shareholder/stakeholder primacy (i.e., the allocation of controlling property and/or contract rights
with, and the resultant accountability to, specific firm participants). See, e.g., STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 75 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW];
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 207 (2002) [hereinafter
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business
Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 84-85 (2004); Margaret M. Blair &
Lynn A. Stout, Team Production in Business Organizations: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743,
743 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Introduction]; Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate
Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461, 524-25 (1992); Darian M. Ibrahim, Individual or Collective
Liability for Corporate Directors?, 93 IOWA L. REV. 929, 947-48 (2008); Lawrence E. Mitchell,
Trust. Contract. Process., in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 185, 188-89 (Lawrence E. Mitchell
ed., 1995) [hereinafter Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process.]; Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A
Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 740-48 (1997); see also Rudolf Richter, The New
Institutional Economics: Its Start, Its Meaning, Its Prospects, 6 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 161, 174
75, 179 (2005) (discussing transaction cost economics and stating that its central problem is ex-post
opportunism).
9
Macrotheoretical concerns of social costs, distributive justice, and political legitimacy in
the governance of the corporate endeavor are inevitable. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman,
Clark's Treatise on Corporate Law: Filling Manning's Empty Towers, 31 J. CORP. L. 599, 604 n.21
(2006) (discussing "the [supposedly] ugly problem of political legitimacy" in corporate law); Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW:
A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 18 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2004) ("As a
normative matter, the overall objective of corporate law—as of any branch of law—is presumably to
serve the interest of society as a whole."); Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the
Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1, 22 (2001) ("More than one commentator has
speculated that the disappearance of limits in macroeconomics serves as a theoretical expedient to
avoid difficult questions of distribution."); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in
Post-Capitalist Society, 24 J. CORP. L. 869, 870 (1999) [hereinafter Mitchell, Trust and Team
Production] (describing the understanding of corporate organization in terms of team production not
only as a "tale . . . of economics alone" but also as "to conceive of the corporation as a political
institution" and "as a social institution"); Randall S. Thomas, What is Corporate Law's Place in
Promoting Societal Welfare?: An Essay in Honor of Professor William Klein, 2 BERKELEY BUS.
L.J. 135, 135 (2005) ("It strikes me that the overall goal of good corporate law should be to assist
private parties to create wealth for themselves and the economy in a manner that does not inflict
uncompensated negative externalities upon third parties."); Wallman, supra note 6, at 809-10
(concluding that corporate governance must be aimed at maximizing "societal wealth over the long
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corporation,10 corporate law scholarship, which addresses—explicitly and
squarely—the crucial, central relevance and functionality of trust
relationships within the academic field of corporate governance law, can still
be counted on the fingers of two hands (and, thus, be collected and
"anthologized" within a single footnote).11
term"); Lord Wedderburn, F.B.A., Trust, Corporation and the Worker, 23 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 203,
204 (1985) ("Property and power cannot avoid the problem of legitimacy."); see also Reich-Graefe,
supra note 4, at 488-501 (analyzing the macrotheoretical realm of corporate governance in detail).
10
The legal and economic nature of the publicly held corporation, with widely disbursed
share ownership and an almost complete separation of ownership and control, was first thoroughly
analyzed and established as a distinct subject of corporate law study by Adolf Berle and Gardiner
Means. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at 84-90, 119-25. But see KNIGHT, supra note 7, at 291
("T[he] typical form of business unit in the modern world is the corporation. Its most important
characteristic is the combination of diffused ownership with concentrated control."). Hence the
moniker "Berle-Means corporation" was established in order to designate such type of public
corporation, as well as the term "Berle-Means Paradigm" in order to describe the intellectual
framework that has informed the study of large publicly-held corporations ever since. See, e.g.,
Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered, supra note 7, at 737; O'Kelley, supra note 5, at 759; David
A. Skeel, Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1325, 1329 (1998).
11
Corporate law scholarship that is explicitly and squarely on topic is found in Alice
Belcher, Trust in the Boardroom, 16 GRIFFITH L. REV. 151, 161 (2007); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn
A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U.
L.Q. 403, 433, 436 (2001) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Director Accountability]; Margaret M. Blair
& Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1780-1807 (2001) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations]; Sarah
Helene Duggin & Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate Directors: The Disney
Standard and the "New" Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 211, 255-73 (2006); Joan MacLeod
Heminway, Sex, Trust, and Corporate Boards, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 173, 187-92 (2007);
Mitchell, Fairness and Trust, supra note 4, at 430-36; Michael R. Siebecker, Trust & Transparency:
Promoting Efficient Corporate Disclosure Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U. L.
REV. 115, 136-61 (2009); Stout, Investor Confidence, supra note 1, 415-20.
Additional (corporate) legal scholarship that, at least, explicitly explores certain aspects of
the intersection of trust and corporate governance—in particular, trust and the fiduciary duties of
corporate directors—can also be found, for example, in Eli Bukspan, The Notion of Trust as a
Comprehensive Theory of Contract and Corporate Law: A New Approach to the Conception that
the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contract, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 229, 245-58 (2006); Bruce
Chapman, Trust, Economic Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary Obligation, 43 U. TORONTO
L.J. 547, 550-53 (1993); Ronald J. Colombo, Trust and the Reform of Securities Regulation, 35
DEL. J. CORP. L. 829, 856-65 (2010); Janice Dean, Trust and Corporate Communications, 4 J.
CORP. L. STUD. 465, 476-83 (2004); Richard A. Epstein, Contract and Trust in Corporate Law:
The Case of Corporate Opportunity, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 9-13 (1996); Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann
O'Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1717, 1785-95 (2006); R. William Ide
III & Douglas H. Yarn, Public Independent Fact-Finding: A Trust-Generating Institution for an
Age of Corporate Illegitimacy and Public Mistrust, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1113, 1132-41 (2003);
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance of Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 591, 614-17 (2001)
[hereinafter Mitchell, Being Trusted]; Mitchell, Trust and Team Production, supra note 9, at 876
87; Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., supra note 8, at 190-96; Ribstein, supra note 4, at 577-85;
Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 38-42, 45-46 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988);
Frederick Tung, The Puzzle of Independent Directors: New Learning, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1175, 1175
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This current status quo of rather absent corporate law scholarship,12
which embraces the inextricably "diffuse,"13 "fuzzy,"14 "messy,"15 "soft and
mushy,"16 "muddy,"17 and "slippery"18 intersecting tissue of trust and
corporate governance, is quite surprising19 in, at least, seven different
dimensions.
77 (2011); Wedderburn, supra note 9, at 212-32. For a complete schematic overview of the
academic literature on law (including corporate law and, included therein, corporate governance) and
social norms (including trust), see infra notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
12
As a (rather crude, since over- as well as under-inclusive) means for comparison of
academic interest in corporate law scholarship, a law review title search of HeinOnline's Law
Journal Library database, conducted on Nov. 16, 2012 and searching for "((title:(corporate) AND
title:(governance))" resulted in 1,116 articles. Additional title searches of the same database on the
same day, searching for "((title:(corporate) AND title:(law))", "((title:(corporation) AND
title:(law))", "((title:(corporations) AND title:(law))", "((title:(company) AND title:(law))", and
"((title:(companies) AND title:(law))" netted 1,555, 734, 429, 778, and 262 matching articles,
respectively.
13
Epstein, supra note 11, at 10 ("At some point concrete rules will have to give way, or at
least share the stage, with other rules of a more general and diffuse nature."); Oliver E. Williamson,
Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J.L. & ECON. 453, 469 (1993) ("If
calculative relations are best described in calculative terms, then diffuse terms, of which trust is one,
that have mixed meanings should be avoided when possible."). See also J. David Lewis & Andrew
Weigert, Trust as a Social Reality, 63 SOC. FORCES 967, 972 (1985).
14
Mitchell, supra note 7, at 203 ("Norms are fuzzy because people are fuzzy and life is
fuzzy."); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699
(1996) ("Norms are fuzzy."); see also Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts,
82 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 333 (1999); Denise M. Rousseau et al., Not So Different After All: A CrossDiscipline View of Trust, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 393, 394 (1998).
15
Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 11, at 436 ("As a solution to the
contracting problems associated with team production, the mediating board is obviously messy.");
Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and
Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 651, 652 (2002) [hereinafter Rock & Wachter,
Dangerous Liasions] ("An 'ordinary prudence' or 'reasonable person' duty of care, if taken seriously,
creates an impossible mess for corporate law."); Tung, supra note 11, at 1178 ("[S]ocial incentives
[motivating, for example, independent directors] are messy; they are hard to measure or analyze
rigorously.").
16
Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1759.
17
Siebecker, supra note 11 at 148; see also Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral
Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1607 (2000). Cf. ELLICKSON, supra note
7, at 147 & n.46 (noting that Arthur Leff, in casual conversation, labeled "law-and-economics as a
desert and law-and-society as a swamp") (emphasis added).
18
Posner, supra note 14, at 1699 ("The concept of a 'norm' is slippery, and scholars use it in
different ways."); Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You
Don't Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2003)
[hereinafter Stout, Proper Motives] ("[I]f we want to understand how boards of directors work, we
need to develop a better understanding of the sorts of internal pressures encompassed by terms like
'honor,' 'integrity,' 'trustworthiness,' and 'responsibility.' Yet how can we gain a firm grasp on such
soft and slippery concepts?"); see also Gambetta, Foreword, supra note 3, at ix (referring to "trust"
as an "elusive notion"); Lee, supra note 6, at 575 ("The terms 'morality' and 'justice' may raise red
flags for readers skeptical of deontology and inclined toward consequentialism.").
19
Unless it may be claimed that because of all the "diffuseness, fuzziness, messiness and
slipperiness," the lack of robust research is not surprising (i.e., academics may simply "get real
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First—and most generally speaking—every economic transaction,
every economic collective action and cooperative activity, has an
indispensable element of trust built into its very core—an observation
already made by Kenneth Arrow four decades ago: "Virtually every
commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any
transaction conducted over a period of time. [M]uch of the economic
backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual
confidence . . . ."20
Second—and relative to the phenomenon of trust in the realm of
fiduciary relationships in general—it is commonly understood that such
relationships are "service relationships, in which fiduciaries provide to
entrustors services that public policy encourages."21 In other words, the
phenomenon of trust is functionally "embedded"22 and centrally instrumental
as an "extra-legal"23 (or protolegal)24 variable within a certain type of
'squirrelly'" about these intersecting issues and are unwilling to even touch them in order to keep
their research/models/theories pure and clean). Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note
11, at 1759; Lawrence Raful, What Balance in Legal Education Means to Me: A Dissenting View,
60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 135, 135 (2010). Certainly, in that regard, corporate governance/law
scholarship follows in the (former) tracks of other academic disciplines in which it is (was) often
claimed that the systematic study of trust is neglected and the phenomenon of trust (including its
relevance for the academic discipline in question) is poorly understood. See, e.g., Annette Baier,
Trust and Antitrust, 96 ETHICS 231, 232 (1986) ("Moral philosophers have always been interested in
cooperation between people, and so it is surprising that they have not said more than they have about
trust."); Child, supra note 1, at 275 (stating that in the context of the globalization of business in the
modern world, "trust remains an undertheorized, under-researched, and therefore poorly understood
phenomenon"); Dasgupta, supra note 1, at 49 ("Trust is central to all transactions and yet economists
rarely discuss the notion."); Gambetta, Foreword, supra note 3, at x ("[I]n the social sciences the
importance of trust is often acknowledged but seldom examined, and scholars tend to mention it in
passing, to allude to it as a fundamental ingredient or lubricant, an unavoidable dimension of social
interaction, only to move on to deal with less intractable matters."); Lewis & Weigert, supra note 13,
at 967 ("There is a large quantity of research on trust by experimental psychologists and political
scientists, which, however, appears theoretically unintegrated and incomplete."); Niklas Luhmann,
Trust: A Mechanism for the Reduction of Social Complexity, in NIKLAS LUHMANN, TRUST AND
POWER 4, 8 (1979) (lamenting the "regrettably sparse literature which has trust as its main theme
within sociology"); Rousseau et al., supra note 14, at 394 ("To date, we have had no universally
accepted scholarly definition of trust.").
20
Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343, 357 (1972); see also
ARROW, supra note 1, at 26 ("It has been observed . . . that among the properties of many societies
whose economic development is backward is a lack of mutual trust."); Baier, supra note 19, at 232
("It seems fairly obvious that any form of cooperative activity . . . requires the cooperators to trust
one another . . . ."); Dasgupta, supra note 1, at 49 ("Trust is central to all transactions . . . .");
Galston, supra note 1, at 129.
21
Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties, in 2 E-O THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 127, 127 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (emphasis added).
22
Belcher, supra note 11, at 161.
23
See Geoffrey P. Miller, Norms and Interests, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 637-38 (2003);
Mitchell, Being Trusted, supra note 11, at 615.
24
By referring to "protolegal variables," an admittedly open-ended and diffuse term, I try to

2013]

DECONSTRUCTING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

111

relationship or affiliation which we see appearing during different times in
history,25 across a wide spectrum of the law (for example, in the laws
governing agents, partners, trustees, investment fund managers, securities
brokers, banks, parent companies and majority shareholders, unions,
attorneys, guardians, physicians, clergymen, etc.),26 and which we label as
"fiduciary."27 The fiduciary is a genuine model citizen: She is "cooperative"
and "other-regarding"28 to a fault; always beneficent;29 she is loyal,30 honest,31
and faithful32 to her entrustor(s); she is diligent,33 confident,34 responsible,35
fair,36 empathic,37 self-sacrificing and altruistic38 in the pursuit of her charges;
distill into one category all those socio-contextual, behavior-oriented and reciprocal normative
implications and foundations of interpersonal cooperation which are based on expectations and
counter-expectations. See Reich-Graefe, supra note 4, at 502-22 (providing a detailed discussion of
"protolegal variables").
25
See Frankel, supra note 21, at 127.
26
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36
J.L. & ECON. 425, 432-34 (1993); Frankel, supra note 21, at 127.
27
See Frankel, supra note 21, at 127. The very word "fiduciary" is a derivative of "fiducia"
or "fidere." See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 465 (11th ed. 2004). "Fides" or
"fede" translate into "trust." See Anthony Pagden, The Destruction of Trust and its Economic
Consequences in the Case of Eighteenth-century Naples, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 127, 129 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988). In contrast, the modern English
word "trust" is etymologically derived from Scandinavian languages; thus, for example, "trust" is the
derivative of the Icelandic "traust," meaning "trust, protection, firmness, confidence" and the
Swedish and Danish "tröst," meaning "comfort [and/or] consolation." See WALTER W. SKEAT, AN
ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 666 (Macmillan & Co., New York
1882). A variant of "trust" derived from the Scandinavian family is "trist" or "tryst," meaning "an
appointment to meet," thus, "[p]roperly a pledge." See id.
28
See Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1739; Stout, Proper
Motives, supra note 18, at 23.
29
See FitzGibbon, supra note 14, at 308 ("A fiduciary must be beneficent.").
30
See Mitchell, Trust and Team Production, supra note 9, at 869; see also Diego Gambetta,
Can We Trust Trust?, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 213, 218 n.9
(Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) ("Loyalty, in this context, can perhaps be seen as the maintenance of
global trust – in a person, a party, an institution – even in circumstances where local
disappointments might encourage its withdrawal.").
31
See Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 1, at 528-29 ("truth-telling"); Robert Cooter &
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and Efficiency in Firms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1717, 1723
(2001); Nadelle Grossman, Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary Duties in a Climate of
Corporate Governance Reform, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 393, 466 (2007); Oliver Hart,
Norms and the Theory of the Firm, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1701, 1701-03 (2001).
32
See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, 56 CATH. U. L.
REV. 1, 25-28 (2006); Michael J. Meurer, Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm, 52 BUFF.
L. REV. 727, 740 (2004); Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L.
REV. 789, 797 (2007) [hereinafter Stout, Mythical Benefits].
33
See Frankel, supra note 21, at 130.
34
See Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 241
(2009); O'Kelley, supra note 5, at 769.
35
See Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 18, at 18.
36
See Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 1, at 529; Hart, supra note 31, at 1703; Meurer,
supra note 32, at 744 ("fair dealing"); Mitchell, Fairness and Trust, supra note 4, at 425-26; Stout,
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and, as a result, she will perform to perfection without any need (and
additionally, often without any possibility—hence, the central agency cost
problem)39 of supervision, monitoring or other forms of control by her
entrustor(s).40 The perpetual model fiduciary is, of course, a legal fiction—a
mere utopian idea. All humans are not model citizens most of the time.
Thus, in order to be able to discriminate efficiently—in the process of
detecting, and engaging with, "fiduciaries"—among all of the other human
beings with whom I must engage, by necessity, for the limited purpose of
some collective cooperative activity at some point in time, I require a good
compass—a good "fiduciary indicator."41 Trust has always fit that bill.42
Third—and more relative to the phenomenon of trust in the realm of
fiduciary relationships within the law of business corporations—the
generally accepted wisdom in such area of the law has always posited that
legally-imposed fiduciary duties of corporate directors (who, in making
business decisions on behalf of the corporation, are required to act on an
informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken is
in the best interests of the corporation)43 are the central "enforcement
Investor Confidence, supra note 1, at 424.
37
See Mitchell, Being Trusted, supra note 11, at 607-08.
38
See Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 1, at 529; Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations,
supra note 11, at 1809-10 ("concern for others"); George W. Dent, Jr., Race, Trust, Altruism, and
Reciprocity, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1001, 1001 (2005); Jones, supra note 7, at 125-26; Stout, Proper
Motives, supra note 18, at 12.
39
See Frankel, supra note 21, at 130 ("Like the duty of loyalty, the duty of care is triggered
when the entrustors' high costs of monitoring the quality of fiduciaries' services might deter
entrustors from entering the relationship.").
40
See id. at 129-30 ("Fiduciary law vests in entrustors the legal right to rely on the honesty
of their fiduciaries by imposing on fiduciaries a corresponding duty of loyalty and other specific
duties to deter dishonesty. . . . Further, fiduciary law vests in entrustors the legal right to receive
quality fiduciary services, commensurate with reasonable expectations of entrustors, by imposing
on fiduciaries a corresponding duty of care in the performance of their services. . . . Fiduciary duties
vary with the costs of specifying and monitoring entrustors' services, the degree of potential risk of
losses from the relationship to entrustors, and the extent to which there are no alternative
mechanisms to protect entrustors from such risks.").
41
Cf. Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 18, at 23 (listing questions that can be asked in
evaluating whether a certain individual is one "whom you want to invite to join your board").
42
Arguably, trust lets me find people that are good fiduciaries because it helps me evaluate
their respective moral compasses and also calibrate their compasses with mine. Cf. Mitchell,
Fairness and Trust, supra note 4, at 430 ("Fiduciary relationships are, characteristically,
relationships of trust and dependency in which the dependent party (the beneficiary) has ceded
control over some portion of her life to the power-holding power (the fiduciary) with the expectation
that the power-holding party will exercise that control for her benefit."); Stout, Proper Motives,
supra note 18, at 23 ("[T]o do a good job on a board an individual needs an 'internal gyroscope'—
something that will keep her steady on her course, despite outside pressures to stray.").
43
See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (2011) ("Each member of the board of
directors, when discharging the duties of a director, shall act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a manner
the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation."); Guttman v. Huang,
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agency"44 and behavioral constraint45 provided by our American law of
corporate governance—indeed, these duties are the single most important
issue in our American corporate law.46 Now, those very fiduciary duties—as
status-based,47 delictual obligations48 imposed on directors as a matter of law
823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) ("A director cannot act loyally towards the corporation
unless she acts in the good faith belief that her actions are in the corporation's best interest."); see
also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 145(a), 145(b), 271 (2011); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) ("In the board's exercise of corporate power to forestall a takeover
bid our analysis begins with the basic principle that corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act
in the best interests of the corporation's stockholders."); Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 142
A. 654, 659 (Del. Ch. 1928) ("The judgment of the directors of corporations enjoys the benefit of a
presumption that it was formed in good faith and was designed to promote the best interests of the
corporation they serve.").
44
Cf. Dasgupta, supra note 1, at 50.
45
See Frankel, supra note 18, at 128 ("The ultimate effect of the law is to provide entrustors
with incentives to enter into fiduciary relationships, by reducing entrustors' risks and costs of
preventing abuse of entrusted power, and of ensuring quality fiduciary services."); Lawrence Lessig,
The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662 (1998).
46
See WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE
LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS xxii (2003) ("In the end, what makes [the law of business
organizations] so interesting (and frustrating) to students, practitioners, and scholars alike is the vital
role played in it by the open-textured concept of fiduciary duty."); Robert B. Thompson, The Story
of Meinhard v. Salmon: Fiduciary Duty's Punctilio, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 105, 105 (J.
Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009) (stating that fiduciary duties constitute "the most important issue in the
law of business associations").
47
See Child, supra note 1, at 276 ("Family membership normally provides the strongest
basis for traditional trust . . . . Many traditional foundations for trust are . . . synonymous with
belonging to the same peer group or culture . . . ."). Cf. Larry E. Ribstein, Close Corporation
Remedies and the Evolution of the Closely Held Firm, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 531, 534 (2011)
("The earliest small firms were partnerships, which began as intimate, usually family,
relationships. They were referred to as 'compagnia,' which means those sharing bread, reflecting
their origins in households. Kinship ties were an important mechanism for controlling agency
costs.") (footnotes omitted); id. at 535 ("[T]raditional partnership fiduciary duties reflect
partnership's intimacy."). The utilization of status-based solutions (i.e., fiduciary duties) to the
fundamental principal-agent problem in corporate governance can, thus, loosely be recognized as a
reversal of Henry Sumner Maine's famous finding in 1861 that the history and evolution of English
law—in terms of legal anthropology—are best understood as a movement from status (as the
controlling feature of interrelations in primitive communities) to contract (as a characteristic and key
determinant of relationships in progressive, developed societies). See HENRY SUMNER MAINE,
ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO
MODERN IDEAS 163-68 (London J. Murray 1861).
48
Fiduciary duties are traditionally seen as "delictual" obligations (i.e., their breach resonates
in tort, not in contract). See ENEA v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1566-67 (2005)
(describing the fiduciary duties involved in the case as "delictual" duties "imposed by law" and that
"their breach sounds in tort"); see also Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of
Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 887-88 (explaining the differences between contract and
fiduciary law). But see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 26, at 427 ("Fiduciary duties are not
special duties; they have no moral footing; they are the same sort of obligations, derived and
enforced in the same way, as other contractual undertakings."); Alces, supra note 34, at 244 ("All
fiduciary relationships are, at some level, contractual."); Alces, supra note 34, at 270-71 ("Even
though all fiduciary relationships are contractual, not all contractual relationships are fiduciary.").
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(or, more precisely, as a matter in equity or in chancery)49—"represent
essential trust relationships."50 These trust relationships were developed and
recognized historically within corporate law (and within the law of business
organizations more generally) through a confluence and gradual adaptation
of the older and more developed laws of partnership and agency51 and the
law of trusts.52 As Frederic Maitland, the English jurist and legal historian,
already observed more than a century ago:
[T]he connection between Trust and Corporation is very
ancient. It is at least four centuries old.53
Suffice it to say here that, whereas law and economics and the
contractarian (or nexus-of-contracts) model of the corporate firm,54 to date,
have extensively demonstrated the thrust of contract theory for purposes of

49

See Frankel, supra note 21, at 127; Lyman Johnson, Enduring Equity in the Close
Corporation, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 313, 316 (2011); L. S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 69.
50
Siebecker, supra note 11, at 118-19. See also Heminway, supra note 11, at 187 ("Trust is
at the heart of the fiduciary relationships that characterize corporate governance . . . ."); Mitchell,
Fairness and Trust, supra note 4, at 430, 475 (describing the role of trust in the corporate context
and stating that "[t]he bedrock of corporate relationships is, I believe, trust.").
51
See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (Cardozo, C.J.) ("A trustee is
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. . . . Only thus has the level of
conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd."); see also
Frankel, supra note 21, at 127; Rock & Wachter, Dangerous Liasions, supra note 15, at 651, 655
56.
52
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 26, at 425; Rock & Wachter, Dangerous Liasions,
supra note 15, at 656-57; Wedderburn, supra note 9, at 203; see also Epstein, supra note 11, at 5
(mentioning "one of the central issues of corporate law: the relationship of contract and trust theory
to the governance and operation of corporations").
53
Frederic W. Maitland, Trust and Corporation, in MAITLAND: SELECTED ESSAYS 141, 214
(H. Hazeltine, G. Lapsley & P. Winfield eds., 1936); see also Wedderburn, supra note 9, at 203.
54
See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 92-93 (1991); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777-78 (1972); Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 26, at 431-32; Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm,
88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 288-89 (1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of
Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 301-02 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). For a discussion and critique of the contractarian (or nexus-of
contracts) model of the firm, see William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation
Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1400-01 (1993); Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 822-23; Oliver
Hart, An Economist's View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 299, 300-01 (1993); Michael
Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779,
784-91 (2006); Reich-Graefe, supra note 6, at 380-87.
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analyzing and explaining the governance and operation of the corporate
endeavor,55 a similarly abundant theoretical inquiry and analysis with regard
to the value of trust theory, for purposes of understanding the behavioral
constraints imposed on corporate managers, has yet to materialize in robust
terms.56 The question that can be asked here is: Why have we not (yet)
developed a broader, non-coercionist57 fiduciarian (or nexus-of-trust)58 model
of the firm59 in which both economic efficiency and economic equity60 inform
(and predict)61 the structures and substance of economic affiliation and
cooperation?62

55
See, e.g., Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1182 (7th Cir.
1990) ("A corporation is not a living person but a set of contracts the terms of which determine who
will bear the brunt of liability."); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 54, at 17 ("All the terms in
corporate governance are contractual in the sense that they are fully priced in transactions among the
interested parties."); Allen, supra note 54, at 1400 ("[A] corporation may be said most
fundamentally to be a contractual governance structure."); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The
Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 767, 770 (1989) ("The most important
conceptual step toward applying the contract clause to the corporation is simply recognizing that
corporate governance arrangements are, indeed, contracts."); Hart, supra note 54, at 306 ("[T]he
firm will rely on implicit contracts to uphold many of its business dealings.").
56
Cf. Bukspan, supra note 11, at 252-58 (explaining that some issues in corporate and
securities law "seem appropriate for further research based on the trust theory of contract and
corporate law").
57
By which I mean a model that is neither "contractarian" nor "anticontractarian" but rather
a model in which legal fiduciary obligations may turn out to be mostly irrelevant (as would be the
long debate about whether and to what extent it should be permissible to opt out of them) and in
which the principal enforcement agency and behavioral constraint on director/manager decisionmaking would derive from moral/social obligations and responsibilities and their related
enforcement mechanisms—among them, it would seem, principally, trust. See also Galston, supra
note 1, at 130 ("High-trust societies can function with fewer regulations and coercive enforcement
mechanisms."); cf. Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1780-82 ("The
conventional nexus of contracts approach to corporate law attempts to explain how firms work, and
the role of law in making them work, solely in terms of market incentives and legal obligations . . .
. [T]here is reason to believe[, however,] that trust may play an important role in the success of
many business firms.").
58
Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 822-23 (preferring the term "nexus of reciprocal
arrangements" over the contractarian terminology "nexus of contracts").
59
The closest model of the firm resembling such a fiduciarian (or nexus-of-trust) model of
the firm is the Blair-Stout team production model of hegemonic corporate governance, which is
based on earlier team-production models developed by economists, in particular, Alchian &
Demsetz, supra note 54, at 779.
60
Cf. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 46, at xxii (referring to the "admixture of morality
and efficiency" undergirding fiduciary obligation law); Peter Smith Ring & Andrew H. Van de Ven,
Developmental Processes of Cooperative Interorganizational Relationships, 19 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 90, 101 (1994) (stating that cooperative interorganizational relationships emerge and grow
when "basic norms of equity and efficiency" are met).
61
Predictive ability and accuracy is, of course, the main criterion by which positive
(descriptive) economic models are evaluated. See Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive
Economics, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 145, 152 (Daniel M. Hausman
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Fourth—with regard to the substance and ultimate purpose or societal
benefit of fiduciary relationships of corporate managers within the law of
business corporations—the perennially unresolved and irresolvable63
shareholder-stakeholder primacy discussion in corporate law (tracing all the
way back to the famous primacy debate between Adolf Berle and Merrick
Dodd in the wake of the Great Depression)64 remains explicitly clothed in
paradigms and structures of trust relationships existing between corporate
directors/managers on the one hand, and both the firm and all of its
participants, collectively, and groups of firm participants, individually (for
example, shareholders as a group), on the other hand.65 Berle and Dodd, of
ed., 3d ed. 2008) ("But economic theory must be more than a structure of tautologies if it is able to
predict and not merely describe the consequences of action; if it is to be something different from
disguised mathematics."); Fred S. McChesney, Positive Economics and All That—A Review of The
Economic Structure of Corporate Law by Frank H. Easterbook & Daniel R. Fischel, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 272, 278 (1992) ("Positive economics submits itself to the rigor of scientific method.
Submission means that the model's value is to be judged not only by its internal consistency and
adherence to accepted principles, but also by its ability to predict the occurrence of events in the real
world. It must be possible to derive from the model behavioral implications, at least some of which
must be empirically falsifiable and therefore testable."); Fred S. McChesney, The "Trans Union"
Case: Smith v. Van Gorkom, in THE ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE LAW 231, 253 (Jonathan R.
Macey ed., 2008); O'Kelley, supra note 5, at 757. See also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 2-3 ("The
predictive power of any model of the corporation must be measured by the model's ability to predict
the separation of ownership and control, the formal institutional governance structures following
from their separation, and the legal rules responsive to their separation."); Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Competing Concepts of the Corporation (a.k.a. Criteria? Just Say No), 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 77,
81 (2005) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Competing Concepts] (stating that Professor Bainbridge's model,
as opposed to Professor William A. Klein's model, "does a better job of explaining and predicting
corporate law"); Mitchell, Being Trusted, supra note 11, at 596 ("[T]he neo-classical model that
dominated law, and economics, for decades, has come to be seen as too limited to explain obvious
and observable social phenomena.").
62
Cf. Belcher, supra note 11, at 154 (referring to a "trust-based framing of the analysis" of
fiduciary and other duties of directors).
63
I have argued elsewhere (focusing on the shareholder primacy model) that such debate is
logically unresolvable within the parameters of corporate (governance) law. See Reich-Graefe,
supra note 6, at 379-80.
64
A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049
(1931) (presenting Berle's thesis "that all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a
corporation . . . are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the
shareholders as their interest appears"); A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are
Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1365-69 (1932) (providing a response to Dodd's
challenge of Berle's theory); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?,
45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1147-48, 1152 (1932) (challenging Berle's theory); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Is
Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L.
REV. 194, 205-07 (1935) (providing a response to Berle's response).
65
Cf. Berle, supra note 64, at 1049 ("[T]he use of [corporate] power is subject to equitable
limitation when the power has been exercised to the detriment of [shareholder] interest . . . . [I]n
every case, corporate action must be twice tested: first, by the technical rules having to do with the
existence and proper exercise of the power; second, by equitable rules somewhat analogous to those
which apply in favor of a cestui que trust to the trustee's exercise of wide powers granted to him in
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course, arrived at different answers but they asked the same questions: For
whose benefit should corporate directors/managers be acting as trustees; and
to whom should they owe resultant fiduciary duties?66 What is the character
and utility of such fiduciary duties?67 Are fiduciary duties only majoritarian
default (i.e., essentially, standard contract) terms which fill in remaining
gaps left after the (implied) contracting by firm participants; or are we
examining a relationship and phenomenon of trust which is sui generis and
independent of the promissory undertakings that have brought the
participants of the firm together to join their economic resources?68 These
questions have formed the core of the debate in corporate legal theory for the
last eighty years.69 However, a discussion and analysis of trust as an integral
(if not, controlling) part of the equation and solution has been prominently
absent in such discussion until fairly recently (and, arguably, even now, it
only occurs in early fits and starts).70
Fifth—even though modern corporate law, as currently written, has
shied away from describing corporate directors explicitly as "trustees,"71
the instrument making him a fiduciary."); Dodd, supra note 64, at 1146-48 ("The directors and other
agents are fiduciaries carrying on the business in the sole interest of the stockholders. [I]t is
undoubtedly the traditional view that a corporation is an association of stockholders formed for their
private gain and to be managed by its board of directors solely with that end in view. [P]ublic
opinion, which ultimately makes law, [however] has made and is today making substantial strides in
the direction of a view of the business corporation as an economic institution which has a social
service as well as a profit-making function . . . ."). For an overview of the Berle-Dodd debate, see
generally William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264-66 (1992); Bratton & Wachter, Corporatist Origins, supra note 7, at
122-35; Fisch, supra note 6, at 646-48; Carlos L. Israels, Are Corporate Powers Still Held in
Trust?, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1446, 1446 (1964); A.A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation
Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 36-39 (1991);
Joseph L. Weiner, The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 1458 (1964). In an interesting twist to today's prevailing views on shareholder primacy, Adolf
Berle explicitly conceded defeat of his shareholder primacy model to Dodd's stakeholder-oriented
model once A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953) was decided. See ADOLF A.
BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 168-69 (1954); Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 561
n.70 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Means and Ends].
66
See supra note 65 (stating Berle and Dodd's respective positions regarding the corporation,
and how fiduciary duties are present in both positions).
67
Id.
68
See supra note 57 (discussing trust and "contractarian" and "anticontractarian" theories).
69
See supra note 65 (providing background of the Berle-Dodd debate).
70
See supra notes 42, 57-62 and accompanying text.
71
For example, neither Section 8.30(a) of the Model Business Corporation Act nor Sections
145(a), 145(b), nor 271 of the Delaware General Corporation Law make any reference to corporate
directors or officers as "trustees." See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 145(a), 145(b), 271 (2011);
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (2011). But cf. Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 405
(1742) (describing the "committee-men" of a corporation as "most properly agents to those who
employ them in this trust, and who empower them to direct and superintend the affairs of the
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contemporary corporate theory has more or less explicitly moved back to the
(original) notion that trust relationships exist between the corporation's
directors/managers and its other participants and factors of production, and
that those trust relationships secure and control the fidelity and diligence of
the former with regard to the firm investment interests of the latter.72 To this
effect, the Blair/Stout team production model73 explicitly recognizes
corporate directors as "trustees"74 (or "fiduciaries"75 or "trusted mediators"76).
Furthermore, the Bainbridge director primacy model77 recognizes board
corporation"); Sealy, supra note 49, at 70 (quoting Charitable Corp.).
72
See, e.g., Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 11, at 408 (discussing the
need "to look beyond the economic literature and consider the extensive work that has been done in
other branches of the social sciences on the phenomenon of intrinsic trustworthiness"); Mitchell,
Trust and Team Production, supra note 9, at 909-12 (discussing "trust in team production").
73
See Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1735; Blair & Stout,
Director Accountability, supra note 11, at 404; Blair & Stout, Introduction, supra note 8, at 743,
743-45; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment and Corporate Law, 7 EUR. BUS.
ORG. L. REV. 473, 473-74 (2006); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment:
Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719, 719-21 (2006) [hereinafter Blair &
Stout, Explaining Anomalies]; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 249 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Team Production
Theory]. See also Stephanie Ben-Ishai, A Team Production Theory of Canadian Corporate Law, 44
ALBERTA L. REV. 299 (2006); Gregory Scott Crespi, Redefining the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate
Directors in Accordance with the Team Production Model of Corporate Governance, 36
CREIGHTON L. REV. 623 (2003); Allen Kaufman & Ernie Englander, A team production model of
corporate governance, 19 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 9, 9 (2005); Lynn M. LoPucki, A Team
Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization, 57 VAND. L. REV. 741 (2004); Mitchell, Trust
and Team Production, supra note 9, at 870; D. Gordon Smith, Team Production in Venture Capital
Investing, 24 J. CORP. L. 949, 950-51 (1999). For a critical analysis and discussion of the team
production model, see Dent, supra note 6, at 1229-33; Alan J. Meese, Essay, The Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1645-46 (2002);
Reich-Graefe, supra note 6, at 387-93.
74
Blair & Stout, Team Production Theory, supra note 73, at 291; Blair & Stout,
Introduction, supra note 8, at 746; see also Belcher, supra note 11, at 161 (stating that "[d]irectors
are . . . in a position of trust"); DeMott, supra note 48, at 880 (stating that "directors occupy a
trustee-like position").
75
Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 11, at 425; Blair & Stout, Team
Production Theory, supra note 73, at 291.
76
Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 11, at 408; see also Benjamin E.
Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution:
A Survey of the Economic Literature, 9 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV. 7, 9-10 (2003)
("Our point of departure therefore is that a board of directors is the equilibrium solution (albeit
possibly second best) to some agency problems confronting the firm.").
77
See BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 8, at 192-93;
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 10-11; Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of
Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts]; Bainbridge,
Abstention Doctrine, supra note 8, at 85-86; Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited
Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 603 (2006); Bainbridge, Competing Concepts,
supra note 59, at 88; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1747 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate
Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794-795 (2002); Bainbridge, Means
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directors in the role of "Platonic guardians"78—a form of trustees similar to
the philosopher kings in Plato's Republic who always seemed to see it fit to
rule "for the public good, not as though they were performing some heroic
action, but simply as a matter of duty."79 In this regard, however, Annette
Baier has reminded us that Plato's Republic was not a well-developed
(political) model from its very start:
Plato in the Republic presumably expects the majority of
citizens to trust the philosopher kings to rule wisely and
expects that elite to trust their underlings not to poison their
wine, nor set fire to their libraries, but neither proper trust nor
proper trustworthiness are among the virtues he dwells on as
necessary in the cooperating parties in his good society.80

and Ends, supra note 65, at 550; Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder, supra note 6, at 46; Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors' Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 1
J. BUS. & TECH. L. 335 (2007); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in
Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board?
Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002). For critical analysis
and discussion of the director primacy model, see Dent, supra note 6, at 1216-20; Brett H.
McDonnell, Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian Moment: A Review of The New Corporate
Governance in Theory and Practice, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 139, 144-61 (2009); Reich-Graefe, supra
note 6, at 393-95.
78
Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 77, at 8 & n.28; Bainbridge, Director v.
Shareholder, supra note 6, at 51; Bainbridge, Means and Ends, supra note 65, at 550-51 & n.21;
see also In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005) (referring to
corporate decision-makers as "faithful servants"); James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the
Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 84 (1985) (stating that the "monitoring model" of director control in
corporate governance "appears to be premised upon the unsubstantiated belief that directors . . . will
be faithful guardians of the corporation's interest . . . .").
79
Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 77, at 8 n.28 (emphasis added) (quoting
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 289-90 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Random House 1991)). This guardianship
concept seems to correlate with "[n]eoclassical [economic] theory [which] views the firm as a set of
feasible production plans . . . over [which] a selfless and compliant manager [presides]." Hart, supra
note 54, at 299. Similarly, "Adolf Berle viewed the emergence of independent corporate managers
as a [beneficial] development . . . [namely], a mechanism for producing truly public-regarding
servants." Romano, supra note 7, at 923-24; see also ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT
PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 2-3, 8 (1959) (describing
"big businessmen" as "a variety of non-Statist civil servant[s]"). Similarly, there is "Frank H.
Knight's mythic entrepreneur," a "free market superhero" (Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 9, at
605), who is the ultimately responsible manager owning and controlling her business and doing
what is right out of sheer self-motivation and self-respect, thus, without any legal mandate being
required or operational. See id; see also KNIGHT, supra note 7, at 271 ("The essence of enterprise is
the specialization of the function of responsible direction of economic life . . . . Under the enterprise
system, a special social class the business men, direct economic activity . . . .").
80
Baier, supra note 19, at 232-33.

120

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

[Vol. 38

Fortunately, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have begun to examine
trust and trustworthiness81— however, it does not appear as an integral and
central tenet of their ground-breaking team production model.82
Sixth—and staying with contemporary corporate theory83 and also my
personal iteration of the same—I have argued in two earlier, related articles84
that the law of fiduciary duties of corporate directors, though considered the
"backbone of modern corporate law,"85 is—for the most part—entirely
vacuous as a regulatory tool in order to ensure accountability of corporate
decision-makers.86 In other words, any value of fiduciary duties for purposes
of controlling the absolute decision-making discretion and authority given to
corporate boards by clear, unison, and specific (state) statutory commands,87
is—from a legal analysis and perspective—strictly fictitious.88 Lamentations
with regard to the non-utility of fiduciary duties for purposes of establishing
an efficient, real-world behavioral constraint on corporate directors have

81

Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1753-59.
They momentarily come close to this integral discussion of trust and team production in
Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 11, at 441-43.
83
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
84
Reich-Graefe, supra note 6, at 341; Reich-Graefe, supra note 4, at 471-74.
85
Siebecker, supra note 11, at 119; see also ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 46, at xxii;
Thompson, supra note 46, at 105.
86
See sources cited supra note 84.
87
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (2011) ("The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.");
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2010) ("All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the
authority of the board of directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation
shall be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors . . .
."); see also ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 141 (1986) (discussing the board's power
and duties); RICHARD W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BLACK LETTER OUTLINES:
CORPORATIONS 505 (5th ed. 2006) ("The role of directors is specified by statute. The board of
directors is entrusted with the power of management of the business and affairs of the
corporation."); Blair & Stout, Introduction, supra note 8, at 746 ("While the board is nominally
elected by the shareholders . . . as a matter of law it remains insulated from the direct command and
control of . . . other corporate constituents."). "Under statutes in all states, business corporations are
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors elected by their shareholders." Dent,
supra note 6, at 1216; see also Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the
Corporate Board of Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 92 (2004) ("American corporation statutes
provide, with minor variations in language, that a corporation shall be managed by or under the
direction of its board of directors."); Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J.
183, 188 (2004) ("[C]orporations are managed by or under the control of a centralized board of
directors. Delegating power to a relatively small group of people enables more efficient decisionmaking than dispersing power among many owners.").
88
Cf. ARROW, supra note 1, at 66 ("Some fifty years ago, it became widely recognized that
the nominal responsibility of corporations to their stockholders was in good part fictitious.").
82
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been legion for a long time.89 However, we always seem to shy away from
saying clearly, loudly, and perhaps brutally that, in the vast majority of
cases, corporate (governance) law—as a mechanism of controlling the
behavior of corporate managers and, thus, overall corporate behavior
effectively—has absolutely nothing to do with corporate governance.90
In this vein, I have previously developed an absolute director primacy
model of the firm and have argued that a well-advised and disinterested
corporate board in a modern Berle-Means corporation is uncontrollable in
absolute terms.91 If the board's decision is not inflicted by any non-insulated
or non-sanitized self-interest of the acting directors,92 virtually everything—
every motive and every end underlying untethered directorial decision

89

See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 8, at 226 ("In practice, however,
cases in which the business judgment rule does not shield operational decisions from judicial review
are so rare as to amount to little more than aberrations."); Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations,
supra note 11, at 1791 ("The net result is that, as a practical matter, a negligent director is more
likely to be hit by lightning after leaving her board meeting than she is to pay damages."); Einer
Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 738 (2005)
("Corporate managers have never had an enforceable legal duty to maximize corporate profits.");
Jones, supra note 7, at 117 ("Independent directors face an infinitesimal risk of paying personally for
damages to the corporation caused by their breach of fiduciary duty. They face no real risk of
liability for their acts or omissions as directors."); Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., supra note 8,
at 190 (stating that "directors have largely unlimited power over the corporation and its affairs");
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the SelfGoverning Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1623 (2001) [hereinafter Rock & Wachter,
Islands] (describing the business judgment rule as "assuring that enforcement [of the duty of care] is
almost entirely nonlegal"); Siebecker, supra note 11, at 119 (stating that "[fiduciary duties] remain
frustratingly amorphous as currently applied by courts"); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 18, at 6
("The business judgment rule . . . allows a director who makes even a minimal effort to become
'informed' to make foolhardy decisions all day long, without fear of liability."); id. at at 7 ("[I]t is
only a slight exaggeration to suggest that a corporate director is statistically more likely to be
attacked by killer bees than she is to have to ever pay damages for breach of the duty of care."); see
also Alces, supra note 34, at 242 ("It is dangerous and costly to assume that fiduciary duties
function well in the corporate context. The assumption may give shareholders a false sense of
security or a belief that they are able to discipline management effectively when in fact, because of
the very limited nature of corporate governance duties, they are not.").
90
What it does do is provide the structure and mechanics of the basic internal decisionmaking and governance hierarchy of the corporation. See Ronald J. Gilson, Separation and the
Function of Corporation Law, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 141, 147 (2005) ("The point is that markets
encourage a management and governance structure that fits the corporation's business. Corporate
law has nothing to add to the process."); see also Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The
Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2001)
("This paper casts doubt on the extent to which legal regulation matters in the corporate governance
context.").
91
See infra Part II.A.
92
Which board decision corporate law would then invalidate for breach of the fiduciary duty
of loyalty if unfair to the corporation. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, Introduction, supra note 8, at 746
(stating that the board is "precluded by law from using [its] control for [its] own personal benefit").
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making power—can become a permissible purpose in order to justify the
board's decision as long as judicial review, within the parameters of the
business judgment rule presumption,93 can devise a minimum proper
rationale for the decision being made in good faith and with a reasonable
belief in the best interests of the corporation.94
If we assume, for the sake of discussion, that this argument is correct,
every rational firm participant can now be expected to ask the same question:
"Why invest?"95 Why completely expose concrete financial interests,
resources, and chances of future wealth and financial well-being to corporate
decision-makers, who are uncontrollable and can destroy those interests,
resources, and chances by incompetence, by negligence,96 by blatant
opportunism, by shirking their managerial duties, or even by ill will97 and get

93
The business judgment rule—as the central instrument of judicial review of alleged
violations of director fiduciary duties (care, loyalty, obligation of good faith) and, arguably,
corporate law's principal response to so-called "Knightian uncertainty," see KNIGHT, supra note 7, at
231—holds that "[t]he judgment of the directors of corporations enjoys the benefit of a presumption
that it was formed in good faith and was designed to promote the best interests of the corporation
they serve." Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 142 A. 654, 659 (Del. Ch. 1928); see also
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 8, at 109-10 ("Courts often refer to the business
judgment rule as 'a presumption' that the directors or officers of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company."); JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS 483-84 (2d
ed. 2003) ("Taken to its most cynical light, the business judgment rule means that management's
position is vindicated."); STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES
OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 11-15 (6th ed. 2009) (describing the business judgment rule); Blair &
Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1790 ("[W]hether or not the business judgment
rule applies will usually turn on whether a board's act was 'informed.'").
94
See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) ("A board of
directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its decisions will not be disturbed if
they can be attributed to any rational business purpose."); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66
(Del. 2000) (explaining the familiar Delaware rule); BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 8,
at 114 (discussing the "rationality" behind the rule).
95
Cf. Cook et al., supra note 2, at 122 ("[M]onitoring and sanctioning are usually too costly,
even in specific organizational settings. Under these conditions, few rational people would engage
in exchange . . . .").
96
Today, in Delaware—as a direct result of the aftermath of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 871-74, 893 (Del. 1985)—most claims for director incompetence or negligence encounter
an absolute bar and are, by law, judicially nonreviewable because the corporation in question has
adopted a so-called "section 102(b)(7) provision" in its certificate of corporation. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011); Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1790-91.
97
Again, in Delaware, good faith violations of corporate directors are—for all intents and
purposes—(virtually) unreviewable. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del.
2009) (stating that "'[i]n the transactional context, [an] extreme set of facts [is] required to sustain a
disloyalty claim premised on the notion that disinterested directors were intentionally disregarding
their duties.'") (alteration in original) (quoting In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 654
55 (Del.Ch. 2008)); Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 243-44 ("Only if [directors] knowingly and completely
failed to undertake their responsibilities would they breach their duty of loyalty."); In re Walt Disney
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away with it without personal recourse or incurring liability to firm
investors?98 In other words, if profit-maximizing is not enforced by
corporate law,99 why does it nonetheless happen as a matter of almost
overwhelming routine in today's corporate reality?100 Or formulated
differently one more time: The question is not "why do shareholders in
public companies have so little power?",101 but why do shareholders in public
companies who have so little power still invest?102 Why do investors who
know that they have almost no power over their investment ex post (other
than complete investment exit, where possible, with a predictable loss of
value) still confidently decide to invest without any ex ante bargained-for
accountability of corporate managers in place?103 The developing answers to
Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (defining a fiduciary's bad faith to include "where the
fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the
corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the
fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious
disregard for his duties.") (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch.
2005)); Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (limiting further—at least, in the board
oversight context—imposition of liability for fiduciary bad faith by "requir[ing] a showing [by the
plaintiff using particularized facts] that the directors knew that they were not discharging their
fiduciary obligations. Where directors fail to act in the face of a known duty to act, thereby
demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibilities, they breach their duty of loyalty by
failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good faith.") (footnote omitted).
98
See Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1788 ("But why would any
beneficiary ever want to make herself categorically vulnerable to someone who had no external or
internal incentive to protect her interests?").
99
See supra note 89, and accompanying text.
100
For example, the average daily trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange for
NYSE-listed companies in 2012 totaled 4,072,202 trading transactions per diem (based on 250
trading days), comprising an average of 1,147,182,027 shares traded for a total average
consideration of $35,093,813,628. Dataset available at Facts & Figures, NYSE TECH.,
http://www.nyxdata.com/Data-Products/Facts-and-Figures (last visited April 15, 2013). These
figures can be calculated by visiting this website and clicking "Market Activity" on the left side of
the page. Afterward, click "Daily NYSE Group Volume in NYSE Listed," download the historical
data of daily averages in Excel spreadsheet format, and elminiate 2010, 2011 and 2013 trading
days. The resulting table will show the 2012 data. Running the Excel 'Count' function (for the
"Trade Date" column) and the Excel 'Average' function (for the columns "NYSE Group Shares,"
"NYSE Group Trades," and "NYSE Group Dollar Volume," respectively) will yield the daily
average numbers as set forth above. For a discussion of the internal reasons for investing, see also
Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1737 ("[I]ndividuals who participate in
corporations often expose themselves to great risk of loss from other participants' failures and
misbehavior. Yet investments are made, companies are built, and value is created from complex
joint production.") (footnote omitted).
101
Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 32, at 792.
102
See Mitchell, Fairness and Trust, supra note 4, at 431 ("[W]hy would anybody invest
money in a corporation, an entity over which she has no control?"); see also Duggin & Goldman,
supra note 11, at 256-57 ("Without some level of trust in corporations and those who manage their
affairs, hiding money under the mattress would be more attractive than investing in stocks and
bonds.").
103
See Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 32, at 801 (pointing out "an often overlooked
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these questions in the field of (corporate) legal theory bring us to my last
point.
Seventh—with regard to the phenomenon of trust in the realm of
corporate governance in the face of absent legal enforcement mechanisms to
effectively ensure diligence and faithfulness of corporate directors104—if the
purported behavioral constraint of corporate governance law (namely,
fiduciary obligations of care and good faith) is vacuous and, as a matter of
law, meaningless, we need to look (and should have looked long ago)
carefully and systematically at particular social norms—one after the other—
in order to determine their respective value for purposes of explaining why
corporate directors seem to "do the right thing"105 most of the time and at
sufficient minimum levels of "rightness," thereby allowing firm participants
to make, on average, billion dollar investments in large, publicly-held
corporations and confidently see those investments work out successfully.106
Social norms are powerful behavioral controllers within an overall hybrid
and complex system of social control107 which relies on the interplay of legal,
market and social norm mechanisms for purposes of establishing efficient
fact of business life: investors are not forced to purchase shares in public corporations at gunpoint");
id. at 803 ("Is it possible that shareholders, like Ulysses, sometimes see advantage in 'tying their own
hands' and ceding control over the corporation to directors largely insulated from their own
influence?") (quoting Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on
Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 670
(2003)); see also Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 76, at 9 ("Yet one does not have to hold a
Chicago Ph.D. to ask, if boards are so bad, why hasn't the market caused them to improve, or even
replaced the corporate form with less problematic forms of organization?"); Simon Kuper, The real
special ones: In Britain, football managers are modern celebrities but most appear not to add value
to their teams, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 28, 2012, at 20 ("Generally speaking, the key assets in
football aren't managers but players. The market in footballers, unlike the market in managers, is
frighteningly efficient."); supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
104
See Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1780 ("Legal sanctions and
market forces often cannot bind corporate participants tightly enough to restrain all opportunistic
behavior . . . ."); Elhauge, supra note 89, at 740 ("[O]ptimal regulation of behavior has always
required supplementing necessarily imperfect legal sanctions with social sanctions and internalized
moral norms."); Lessig, supra note 45, at 662 ("Behavior is regulated by four types of constraint.
Law is just one of those constraints.") (footnote omitted).
105
Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 11, at 439; Grossman, supra note 31,
at 465-66; Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law: Introduction, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 1607, 1608 (2001) [hereinafter Rock & Wachter, Introduction]; Stout, Proper Motives,
supra note 18, at 8-9, 23; Tung, supra note 11, at 1175; see also Meurer, supra note 32, at 740 ("If
managers were all faithful agents intent on maximizing firm profit, then adjustment in response to
unforeseen contingencies should be less costly inside the firm, but this begs the question of how a
firm gets managers to be pure profit maximizers.").
106
See supra note 100 and accompanying text; cf. Belcher, supra note 11, at 168 (suggesting
that it "must . . . be important to have laws and governance provisions in which the consequences for
trust and the trust requirements are properly thought through").
107
ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 131-32 ("[D]ifferent controllers can combine their efforts in
countless ways to produce hybrid systems of social control.").
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constraints on the future (in-)actions of individual participants in cooperative
endeavors.108 Such a hybrid system, therefore, also casts a regulatory net
over director decision-making behavior and, thus, allows for behavioral
constraints on corporate directors for purposes of achieving sufficient levels
of board accountability in corporate governance.109 This Article starts the
long-neglected analysis of the intersection of norms and director primacy
with one of the central social norms and behavioral controllers in corporate
governance and economic cooperation in this regard: trust.110
II. TRUST AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The road to the junction of trust and corporate governance (at least, as
travelled by me) begins with the latter—the law of corporate governance—
and, in particular, "absolute director primacy," a (partially incomplete)
model of corporate governance which I have previously developed in two
earlier articles.111 The road then winds through the areas of social norms and
(corporate) law, and further follows along the outlines of all related avenues
of legal and non-legal academic scholarship—scholarship which informs,
nurtures, and maps out the intersections between trust and corporate
governance. The discussion in this Part II is intended only to provide a brief
overview of the ambient environment in which the phenomenon of trust
structurally and functionally arises as a controlling feature within the modern
theory of corporate governance. Only after such discussion does it seem
meaningful to venture into an analysis of the phenomenon of trust itself.
A. Absolute Director Primacy
My absolute director primacy model from earlier works has led me to
After an in-depth survey of current
a fundamental dilemma.112
microtheoretical models of the firm,113 I have come to the conclusion that the
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Lessig, supra note 45, at 662-64.
Cf. ELLICKSON, supra note 7, at 131-32; Lessig, supra note 45, at 663.
110
Cf. Heminway, supra note 11, at 194 ("If there is a locus of trust in the corporation, it is
the board."); Siebecker, supra note 11, at 159 ("[T]he well established hierarchical structure of the
corporate form makes the officers and directors of the corporation the obvious locus of our trust.").
For other social norms—for example, fairness, honesty, faithfulness or empathy—see references in
Reich-Graefe, supra note 4, at 506-08.
111
See Reich-Graefe, supra note 6, at 341, 395-404; Reich-Graefe, supra note 4, at 471,
523.
112
See supra note 111.
113
The four main models in today's academic discussion can be labeled as "shareholder
primacy," "contractarian," "team production," and "director primacy." See Bainbridge, Director v.
109
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board of directors of a typical Berle-Means corporation can be characterized
as the private-sector equivalent of a modern Leviathan.114 The board itself,
not shareholders on aggregate or the corporation as a whole, is the sole
corporate sovereign—both de facto and de jure. The board's decisionmaking is by fiat,115 and its decision-making authority to run the corporation's
business and affairs as it sees fit is absolute,116 original,117 infinite118 and, thus,
sui generis.119 I have argued that the corporate entity is inescapably and
Shareholder, supra note 6, at 46 (discussing shareholder-primacy and director-primacy models);
Reich-Graefe, supra note 6, at 361-404 (discussing all four models as well as my absolute director
primacy model); Verret, supra note 6, at 315-26 (discussing all four models as well as "agency
theory" and "progressive corporate law theory"). See generally Coates, supra note 6 (discussing
team-production models); Dent, supra note 6 (discussing team-production and director-primacy
models); Fisch, supra note 6 (discussing shareholder-primacy models); Lee, supra note 6 (discussing
shareholder primacy and team production models).
114
The term means "a sea monster often symbolizing evil in the Old Testament and in
Christian literature." See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1301 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 3d ed. 1981). The term "leviathan state"
means "an all-powerful state . . . held to be characterized by a vast bureaucracy and machinery of
coercion and exercising totalitarian control over its citizens." Id. "[T]he use of the word Leviathan
to designate the state [was introduced] in the book Leviathan (1651) by Thomas Hobbes . . . ." Id.
115
Such authoritative decisional determination by the board is, in the genuine meaning of the
term "fiat", both dictatorial and, ipse dixit, valid. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 700, 905 (9th ed.
2009). It is non-reviewable and, ipso facto, irrebuttably assumed to be right (which, of course, is
exactly the effect of the courts' applications of the business judgment rule). See, e.g., Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) ("The business judgment rule exists to protect and promote
the full and free exercise of the managerial power grant to Delaware directors.").
116
See HOWARD HILTON SPELLMAN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW GOVERNING
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 4-5 (1931) ("[M]odern decisions tend toward an emphasis of the directors'
absolutism in the management of the affairs of large corporations; the board of directors has
achieved a super-control of corporate management and of the corporation's legal relations . . . .")
(emphasis added); Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate
Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 214 (1985) ("But modern corporate legislation, passed during the
first quarter of the twentieth century, ratified a new 'absolutism' that courts themselves had already
begun to bestow upon corporate directors.") (emphasis added).
117
See Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (N.Y. 1918); cf. Burrill v. Nathant Bank, 43
Mass. (2 Met.) 163, 166-67 (1840); CLARK, supra note 87, at 22 ("The model behind corporate
law's treatment of authority is one of a unilaterally controlled flow of authority from a single
wellspring of power rather than a bubbling up and flowing together of many individual sources of
personal power. The state has power; it chooses to delegate it to the board of directors of a
corporation.").
118
See Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., supra note 8, at 190 ("The power and control that
are present in all fiduciary relationships is exaggerated in the corporation where the indeterminate
length of the enterprise and the practically infinite array of investment opportunities for the
corporation make any possibility of specified limitations on directors' power or ongoing control by
the stockholders unrealistic.").
119
Loizos Heracleous & Luh Luh Lan, Agency Theory, Institutional Sensitivity, and
Inductive Reasoning: Towards a Legal Perspective, 49 J. MGMT. STUD. 223, 231 (2012). Sui
generis (defined as "[o]f its own kind or class; unique or peculiar," in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1572 (9th ed. 2009)) decision-making authority of corporate directors means that their decisionmaking power is non-derivative. In particular, shareholder primacy models incorrectly assume that
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insolubly characterized by perpetual conflicts among self-interested and
opportunistically motivated120 corporate constituents. To manage those
conflicts—which present a perennial, systemic risk to the internal cohesion,
adaptability and, thus, prosperity and ultimate survival of the firm—
corporate law is necessarily called upon to allocate infinite and absolute
decision-making authority within one core group of corporate constituents.121
American corporate law is unmistakably clear as to the identity of this single
core group of corporate constituents: the board of directors.122 As a result, I
have argued that the well-advised, disinterested board of a Berle-Means
corporation is uncontrollable in absolute terms.123 In other words, my
absolute director primacy model, unlike all other microtheoretical models of
the firm, explicitly denies that any meaningful measure of director
accountability exists in American corporate law.124 Such a conclusion with
the decision-making authority of corporate boards is derivative, i.e., delegated to corporate boards by
the shareholder franchise—at least, through the mechanism of board elections during which
shareholders vote. See Mike Martin, The Crisis of Shareholder Primacy, UNIV. OF CAMBRIDGE
(Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.cam.ac.uk/research/discussion/the-crisis-of-shareholder-primacy/. This
assumption ignores the de lege lata reality of board authority. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a)
(2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011).
120
Williamson, supra note 13, at 458 (differentiating opportunism from mere (plain-vanilla)
self-interest by describing "opportunistic agents [as] given to self-interest seeking with guile").
121
See ARROW, supra note 1, at 69 ("Under conditions of widely dispersed information and
the need for speed in decisions, authoritative control at the tactical level is essential for success.");
Allen, supra note 54, at 1400; Bainbridge, Means and Ends, supra note 65, at 552; Dooley, supra
note 8, at 466.
122
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2011)
("All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors of the
corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the
direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors . . . ."). Under the corporation
statutes of all states, corporations are managed by or under the direction of a board of directors as
the statutory default rule. See, e.g., Gevurtz, supra note 87, at 92 ("Th[e] board-centered model of
corporate governance is not only the universal norm in American corporate law, it is also the
prevailing model of corporate governance around the world.").
123
Reich-Graefe, supra note 6, at 358, 400.
124
It should be noted that this statement is only made with regard to the agency (cost)
problem of directorial shirking, not the more controlled and controllable agency (cost) problem of
directorial stealing. In other words, directors are granted full discretion to act opportunistically—
unfettered by any ex-ante or ex-post legal constraint—and to favor any particular cause or firm
participant interest over any and all others at any point in time as long as (i) no controlling economic
self-interest of directors is actualized (and remains unsanitized) in the decision, (ii) very minor and
basic process due care is complied with, and (iii) some rudimentary (and, possibly, entirely
hypothetical) rational basis and explanation can be construed as to why the prevailing consensus at
the time of the board action might have been that the corporation could ultimately benefit in some
(tangible or intangible) shape or form. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 8, at
110 (concluding that pursuant to the effects of the business judgment rule, corporate directors are
given "carte blanche to make decisions that might turn out badly, but no discretion to make selfish
decisions"); Blair & Stout, Introduction, supra note 8, at 746 (stating that "as a matter of law [the
board] remains insulated from the direct command and control of [shareholders and management] or

128

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

[Vol. 38

regard to the authority of corporate directors, of course, begs the question of
how we ensure that corporate directors nonetheless remain accountable for
their exercise of authority (i.e., their institutionalized power granted by
statute). As has been articulated in a different context: "[t]he key is that
unless there is accountability, we will never get the right system. As long as
there are no consequences . . . we're playing a game as to who has the
power."125
Given the daily phenomenon of general investor confidence preinvestment in the face of absent director accountability post-investment126
(and also, for the sake of this discussion, setting aside the question of
whether we have gotten the system "right"), it is a simple and rather obvious
deduction that some fairly effective enforcement agency restraining (and,
where necessary, disciplining) absolute directorial decision-making power
must somehow exist. No rational investor would otherwise participate in a
firm knowing that its central decision-maker can always act opportunistically
(and, thus, shirk on performance at random) and, nonetheless, always get
away with it.127 Significantly less simple and obvious, however, is the
explanation behind the observable daily phenomenon of investor confidence.
I have posited in this regard that a robust theoretical explanation of this
phenomenon (and dilemma) is still missing from our current corporate
governance debate:
Neither current corporate law nor our microtheoretical models
of the firm do (or, logically, can) explain the daily phenomenon
of general investor confidence ex-ante-investment in the face of
absent director accountability ex-post-investment—other than

any other corporate constituents"); Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in
Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1470 (2006); Stout, Proper Motive, supra
note 18, at 6 (stating that "[t]he business judgment rule . . . allows a director who makes even a
minimal effort to become 'informed' to make foolhardy decisions all day long, without fear of
liability").
125
Joel Klein, The Failure of American Schools, ATLANTIC, June 2011, at 8, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/06/the-failure-of-american-schools/308497/
(quoting Albert Shanker from his speech to the Pew Forum on Education Reform in 1993). In other
words, only power coupled with sufficient and efficient measures of accountability can be
legitimate. See id.
126
See supra note 100.
127
See Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., supra note 8, at 191 ("Why would anybody
invest money in a corporation, an institution over which she has no control?"); Stout, Proper
Motives, supra note 18, at 9 ("Rational investors would never cede control of tens of trillions of
dollars of assets to purely self-interested boards, given the tissue-paper thin protection offered by the
rules of fiduciary duty, and the limits of social sanctions.").
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to assume ultimate control by some firm participant interests
(for example, shareholder value), which is entirely illusory.128
We really have no good explanation (yet) as to how corporate
directors, faced with almost limitless opportunities, make selections from a
complete set of non-reviewable substantive options that are available to them
pursuant to their absolute, sui generis decision-making power granted by
corporate law. Neither do we have a good explanation (yet) as to how
corporate directors are incentivized to repeatedly select available options
"properly" and (supposedly) "do the right thing."129 Accordingly, the
explanation of the daily phenomenon of general investor confidence preinvestment in the face of absent director accountability post-investment
remains the central, although unresolved, issue and dilemma in modern
corporate governance theory.130 I posit that any attempt of an explanation of
this dilemma should focus on directorial moral behavior, i.e., on the dialectic
confrontation of a limitless range of opportunities in the reality of corporate
practice with preexisting normative directorial preferences.
Such
internalized normative preferences seem to make all the difference and
effectively motivate and, thus, control for "responsible" directorial
behavior.131 Which has brought me to the final question: What shapes and
influences the internalization of normative directorial preferences?
I argue that such preferences are tightly controlled by largely
unexplained and, thus, unaccounted for protolegal—even protonormative—
behavioral constraints, by which I mean all those socio-contextual,132
behavior-oriented, and reciprocal (normative) implications and foundations
of interpersonal cooperation which are based on expectations and counter
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See Reich-Graefe, supra note 4, at 524; see also Reich-Graefe, supra note 6, at 395-98
("[T]he absolute director primacy model—for the time being—not only results in a complete lack of
ex-post accountability but, because of such lack of an accountability mechanism, also results in total
ex-ante indeterminability."); cf. Thomas Lee Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market)
Failure, and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REV. 273, 274 (1991).
129
See Grossman, supra note 31, at 465-66; Rock & Wachter, Introduction, supra note 105,
at 1608; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 18, at 9.
130
See Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 18, at 9 ("[I]f we want to understand how boards
of directors work, we need to develop a better understanding of the sorts of internal pressures
encompassed by terms like 'honor,' 'integrity,' 'trustworthiness,' and 'responsibility.'").
131
See Jones, supra note 7, at 124.
132
See Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1768-69 (discussing how a
given person's levels of trust may differ depending on the "social context" of the trust relation);
Heminway, supra note 11, at 181 (discussing the role of gender as a part of the socio-contextual
framework and stating that "the literature indicates with reasonable consistency that women are more
trustworthy than men in a variety of test situations").
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expectations.133 All of this has brought me squarely to the co-existence of
corporate law and social norms as enforcement agencies over the directorial
decision-making behavior in Berle-Means corporations.
B. Social Norms and Corporate Governance
In general, four different types or categories of external regulatory
constraints which influence and control human behavior can be
differentiated and classified: law, markets, "architecture," and social
norms.134 The first three of those are not relevant for our current purposes.
Law (including corporate governance law) is merely one of the available
regulatory constraints on human behavior.135 As has been explained above,
corporate governance law—to the extent it applies to this inquiry—is
vacuous and non-instrumental for purposes of directing and constraining
corporate boards in their decision-making behavior.136
A second modality of regulation often referred to in the context of
director primacy is markets, in particular "the market for corporate
control."137 Markets regulate and influence corporate decision-making
behavior through the price mechanism.138 When corporations are managed
poorly, their stock prices will negatively reflect such underperformance.139
Thus, the market for corporate control (i.e., the hostile-takeover market140), as
a post-investment corrective mechanism, will effectively address agency
costs in the form of wasteful managerial shirking and/or rent-seeking by
forcing corporate managers to run companies successfully (enough) so that
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See Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1796; Miller, supra note 23
at 641; Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., supra note 8, at 191; Stout, Investor Confidence, supra
note 1, at 415-20.
134
Lessig, supra note 45, at 662-63.
135
Id. at 662.
136
See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
137
See Lessig, supra note 45, at 663; Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for
Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965); see also Bainbridge, Means and Ends, supra
note 65, at 562; Blair & Stout, Explaining Anomalies, supra note 73, at 724; Blair & Stout, Team
Production Theory, supra note 73, at 252; Jones, supra note 7, at 119-20; David Millon, Theories of
the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 230; Arthur R. Pinto, An Overview of United States
Corporate Governance in Publicly Traded Corporations, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 257, 276 (2010). See
generally Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate Governance:
Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making Groups, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
489, 489 (1999) ("Further evidence of interest in board behavior can be seen in the increased level of
legal scrutiny to which boards are subjected and in the growing competitiveness of the market for
corporate control.").
138
Lessig, supra note 45, at 662.
139
See Manne, supra note 137, at 112.
140
See Pinto, supra note 137, at 276-79.
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they do not become takeover targets because of mismanagement and ensuing
underperformance.141 In other words, it is claimed that "market forces
adequately discipline [corporate] directors."142
In my judgment, however, this ex post market corrective does not help
in any way regarding particular, specified firm investments to be made
confidently ex ante. The reason for this is that the corporate-control-market
corrective may help encourage some normative agenda across a wide
spectrum of listed corporations ex ante (and, thus, incentivize firm
managements across the same spectrum on average to comply with such
agenda),143 but it does not help the particular investor who ends up with
particular, disincentivized, or "non-incentivizable" firm management and
who is forced to (financially) suffer through the corrective market
mechanism(s) coming to the "rescue" in her particular case in an attempt by
the market to reinforce the normative agenda across the spectrum. In other
words, the corporate-control-market corrective distributes highly inefficient
monitoring costs asymmetrically and is therefore, at best, an inefficient
constraint on corporate management behavior. Unless our investor hedges
against such particularized risk with a widely diversified portfolio, why
would she confidently invest ex ante in any particular company?
Furthermore, the availability of the takeover-market corrective is, at best,
extremely spotty.144 Any such market is always dependent on a minimum
number of other market players (i.e., established competitors or new market
entrants, for example, private equity firms) which could become interested in
snatching up an underperforming firm.145 Without enough other players, the
market's price mechanism simply cannot go to work.146 Furthermore, even if
enough other market players exist and become interested in principle, going
through with all of the financial, legal, and promotional costs of succeeding
with a hostile takeover may be cost-prohibitive under many conditions—
particularly when the third-party debt and equity markets financing takeovers
dry up during serious bear markets and economic recessions.147

141

See BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 8, at 75; Allen, supra note 54, at 1400;
Blair & Stout, Introduction, supra note 8, at 745.
142
Jones, supra note 7, at 119.
143
See BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 8, at 75.
144
See Pinto, supra note 137, at 276.
145
See id.
146
See id.
147
See id. at 271; Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 32, at 795 ("[S]tock is,
counterintuitively, an illiquid investment. Although a single shareholder may be able to sell a small
number of shares easily, when exploited shareholders try to sell en masse, the result is a predictable
loss of value."). And all of this does not even take into account "the anti-takeover mechanisms
permitted under state law [which] severely weaken the disciplinary power of the takeover
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The third behavioral constraint on human behavior, without any
normative bearing on the accountability of directorial decision-making, is
what Lawrence Lessig has labeled "architecture:" the very basic feasibility
limitations imposed on resources (physical, technological, budgetary, etc.),
in both time and space, by the present circumstances and conditions under
which decision-making and resultant action may only take place.148 I can
only do now or in the future what is physically feasible and subject to my
control and influence at the time of my action.149
That leaves the fourth and last category of behavior constraints which
is the only one of interest here: social norms.150 Social norms differ from
legal ones both with regard to their creation as well as their enforcement.151
"[S]ocial norm[s] . . . [are] rule[s] that [are] . . . neither promulgated by an
official source, such as a court or a legislature, nor enforced by the threat of
legal sanctions . . . ."152 and that are (as are all rules) designed to direct
"desirable"153 behavioral outcomes.154 As "soft" rules (i.e., normative
expectations consolidated and vested over time within a particular
community or sub-group thereof, thus, creating moral obligations among
norm addressees), social norms are nonetheless regularly complied with
since non-compliance would otherwise result in certain forms of social
sanctions (e.g., open critiquing, gossiping, shaming, ostracism, internalized
feelings of guilt, or shame)155 or would otherwise forgo certain forms of
social benefits (e.g., increased esteem, other reputational gains, enhanced
threat." See Jones, supra note 7, at 121.
148
See Lessig, supra note 45, at 663-67.
149
See id. at 663.
150
Id. at 662.
151
See id.
152
RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 288 (2001); Richard A. Posner,
Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 365, 365 (1997); See also
Kaushik Basu, Social Norms and the Law, in 3 P-Z THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 476, 476 (Peter Newman ed., 2002); Jon Elster, Social Norms and
Economic Theory, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 99, 100 (1989); McAdams, supra note 7, at 350-51; Miller,
supra note 23, at 641; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles (Chicago John M. Olin
Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 36 (2d Series), 1995).
153
The "desirability" of certain behavioral outcomes—as an end for which the norm exists in
the first place—can be traced, at least, in general terms to a (majoritarian) normative determination
that the "norm tends to enhance the welfare of the members of a group that adopts it." Ellickson,
supra note 4, at 537, 546.
154
Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach
to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1656 (1996); Posner, supra note
14, at 1699.
155
See Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1095,
1097 (1986); Basu, supra note 152, at 476; Ellickson, supra note 4, at 540; Miller, supra note 23, at
641; see also Jon Elster, Emotions and Economic Theory, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 47, 64-68 (1998)
(describing "[t]he Cost-benefit Model of Emotions").
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opportunities to socialize, network, or trade).156 Given the absence of formal,
institutionalized rule-making processes and of governmental enforcement
agents, the form of ordering in human relationships which is, thus,
(predominately) subject to the influence, operation, and regulation of social
norms can accordingly be characterized as "self-regulated" or "self
enforcing."157
It is this quality of socially-sanctioned, self-enforcing expectation
exercises at the very heart of the operation of social norms that makes the
phenomenon of trust and trusting so seemingly valuable and indispensible
for (transaction-cost) efficient corporate governance and the control of my
absolute directorial primacy model. Any business corporation, as a going
concern, is characterized by a constant process of redistribution of material
resources and information.158 As a result, the balance of power and influence
of firm participants constantly shifts—thereby continually opening the realm
for opportunistic behavior of some (group of) firm participants at the cost of
other firm participants.159 Two principal responses have always existed in
order to keep the ensuing agency costs at a minimum and to establish an
efficient measure of accountability vis-à-vis intra-corporate actors: either, the
corporation implements an ever-increasing formal system of internal control
and regulation of firm participants,160 or it relies on an informal environment
built on trust, mutual support, and the pursuit of mutual interest among firm
participants.161 As has been discussed, the former response is not available
for purposes of controlling absolute director primacy in the standard BerleMeans corporation.162 Corporate boards are not subject to any formal
regulation in their decision-making function.163 Thus, existing measures of
board accountability must be the result of the latter, a self-regulatory
response to the corporation's fundamental principal-agent problem where
social norm mechanisms—in particular, trust—fill in the role of corporate
monitors and enforcers, a role which otherwise would be performed either (i)
internally by hierarchical command-and-control structures or by
contractually assumed responsibilities, or (ii) externally by dominant firm
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See Ellickson, supra note 4, at 540; Jones, supra note 7, at 108.
See supra notes 136, 150-56 and accompanying text.
158
See TODEVA, supra note 1, at 76; Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11,
157

at 1737.
at 1737.

159

See TODEVA, supra note 1, at 76; Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11,

160
Cf. Roger C. Mayer et al., An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust, 20 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 709, 710 (1995).
161
TODEVA, supra note 1, at 76.
162
See supra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
163
See id.
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participants (for example, a majority shareholder in a closely-held
corporation context) or by applicable legal accountability processes (for
example, the fiduciary duty of loyalty).164
C. Related Literature
As has already been mentioned in the opening sketches above, current
research on the intersection of trust and corporate governance (or corporate
law in general) is rather scarce.165 There is, however, a now well-established
academic literature on law and social norms (including trust) as well as a
momentum-gaining, solid interest in the phenomenon of trust itself within a
variety of academic fields outside of law, including philosophy,166 political
theory,167 history,168 economics,169 business administration,170 sociology,171
social anthropology,172 and social psychology.173 The diagram in Figure 1
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at 1737.

165

See TODEVA, supra note 1, at 76; Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11,

See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
See Baier, supra note 19; Annette Baier, Trust and its Vulnerabilities, in 13 TANNER
LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 109, 109-13 (1991); Annette C. Baier, Trusting People, 6 PHIL.
PERSP. 166, 101 (1992); Karen Jones, Trust as an Affective Attitude, 107 ETHICS 4, 4-6 (1996);
Bernard Williams, Formal Structures and Social Reality, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 3 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988).
167
See Lawrence C. Becker, Trust as Noncognitive Security about Motives, 107 ETHICS 43,
43 (1996); John Dunn, Trust and Political Agency, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 73, 73 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988); Russell Hardin, Distrust, 81 B.U. L.
REV. 495, 521-22 (2001) [hereinafter Hardin, Distrust]; Russell Hardin, The Street-Level
Epistemology of Trust, 21 POL. & SOC'Y 505, 505-07 (1993); Russell Hardin, Trustworthiness, 107
ETHICS 26, 28-35 (1996) [hereinafter Hardin, Trustworthiness].
168
See Pagden, supra note 27, at 127-26.
169
See Abigail Barr, Trust and Expected Trustworthiness: Experimental Evidence from
Zimbabwean Villages, 113 Econ. J. 614, 614 (2003); Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 1, at 523;
Dasgupta, supra note 1, at 49; Harvey S. James, Jr., The Trust Paradox: A Survey of Economic
Inquiries into the Nature of Trust and Trustworthiness, at *1 (Jan. 22, 2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=295743; La Porta et al., supra note 1, at 333;
Williamson, supra note 13, at 453.
170
See Child, supra note 1, at 274; Mayer et al., supra note 160, at 709; Daniel J.
McAllister, Affect- and Cognition-Based Trust as Foundations for Interpersonal Cooperation in
Organizations, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 24, 25-26 (1995); Bart Nooteboom et al., Effects of Trust and
Governance on Relational Risk, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 308, 308, 320 (1997); Ring & Van de Ven,
supra note 60, at 93.
171
See FUKUYAMA, supra note 1, at 10; Lewis & Weigert, supra note 13, at 967; Niklas
Luhmann, Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives, in TRUST: MAKING AND
BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 94, 94 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988); Toshio Yamagishi et al.,
Uncertainty, Trust, and Commitment Formation in the United States and Japan, 104 AM. J. SOC.
165, 165-67 (1998).
172
See Ernest Gellner, Trust, Cohesion, and the Social Order, in TRUST: MAKING AND
BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 142, 142-43 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988); Keith Hart,
166
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orders and classifies—not exhaustively, but for purposes of an overview—
the research done to date on the notion of trust from the perspective of, and
starting with, the core focus of this Article in medias res—namely, the
crossroads of trust and corporate governance.

Kinship, Contract, and Trust: the Economic Organization of Migrants in an African City Slum, in
TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 176, 186-87 (Diego Gambetta ed.,
1988).
173
See Peter J. Burke & Jan E. Stets, Trust and Commitment through Self-Verification, 62
SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 347, 347 (1999); Karen Schweers Cook, Networks, Norms, and Trust: The
Social Psychology of Social Capital, 68 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 4, 6 (2005); Cook et al., supra note 2, at
21; David Good, Individuals, Interpersonal Relations, and Trust, in TRUST: MAKING AND
BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 31, 31 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988); Trudy Govier, Self-Trust,
Autonomy, and Self-Esteem, 8 HYPATIA 99, 99 (1993); Toko Kiyonari et al., Does Trust Beget
Trustworthiness? Trust and Trustworthiness in Two Games and Two Cultures: A Research Note, 69
SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 270, 270 (2006).
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Figure 1
The Situs of Trust And Corporate Governance

Corporate
Law

Law

Social Norms
Trust

6.
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4. 1.

2.

3.

5.
6.
Corporate
Governance
Overlaps:
1. Corporate governance and trust
2. Corporate law (other than corporate governance) and trust
3. Law (other than corporate law) and trust
4. Corporate governance and social norms (other than trust)
5. Corporate law (other than corporate governance) and social
norms (other than trust)
6. Law (other than corporate law) and social norms (other than trust)
The six individual overlap areas identified in Figure 1, on aggregate,
constitute the entire intersection of law and social norms. Note that each
overlap area is not in proportion to the actual amount of literature in
(corporate) law that studies the impact of social norms on (corporate
governance) enforcement mechanisms. The general "law and norms"
literature174 (i.e., the six individually numbered overlap areas in Figure 1

174

See Jones, supra note 7, at 121-24; McAdams, supra note 7, at 343-50; Mitchell, supra
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above combined)—which fully emerged in legal academia in the 1990s after
Robert Ellickson's groundbreaking study, Order Without Law, published in
1991175—can be safely claimed to be pervasively well-developed today.176
Within that general trend, less pervasive but still well-developed academic
literatures have also become available in the areas of corporate law and
social norms177 and corporate governance and social norms178 (constituting
note 7, at 194-96.
175
See ELLICKSON, supra note 7; see also Jones, supra note 7, at 121 ("The emergence of
the 'law and social norms' movement can be traced to Robert Ellickson's book, Order Without
Law.").
176
For an overview of the "law and norms" literature, see generally ERIC A. POSNER, LAW
AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); Basu, supra note 152; David Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous
Order: "Norms" in Contractual Relationships, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841 (1996); Robert D. Cooter,
Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law
Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996); Ellickson, supra note 4; Alex Geisinger, A Group
Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its Implications, 78 TUL. L. REV. 605 (2004); Alex Geisinger,
Are Norms Efficient? Pluralistic Ignorance, Heuristics, and the Use of Norms as Private
Regulation, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2005); Russell Hardin, Law and Social Norms in the Large, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1821 (2000); Russell Hardin, Magic on the Frontier: The Norm of Efficiency, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1987 (1996); Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation through Reputational
Cascades, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1998); Lessig, supra note 45; Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning
and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996); Saul Levmore, Norms as Supplements, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1989 (2000); McAdams, supra note 7; Miller, supra note 23; Mitchell, supra note 7;
Posner, supra note 14; Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law,
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765 (1998); Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic
Approach, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 365 (1997); Richard A. Posner, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and
Economic Analysis of Law: A Comment, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 553 (1998); Edward Rock & Michael
Wachter, Meeting by Signals, Playing by Norms: Complementary Accounts of Nonlegal
Cooperation in Institutions, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 423 (2002); Robert E. Scott, The Limits of
Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein,
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996); see also Stewart Macauley, NonContractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963)
("[B]usinessmen often fail to plan exchange relationships completely, and seldom use legal sanctions
to adjust these relationships or to settle disputes.").
177
For an overview of the literature on corporate law and social norms, see generally John
C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2151 (2001);
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253 (1999); Hart,
supra note 31; Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Corporate Law as a Facilitator of Self
Governance, 34 GA. L. REV. 529 (2000); Rock & Wachter, Islands, supra note 89; Rock &
Wachter, Introduction, supra note 105; David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 1811 (2001); Eric Talley, Disclosure Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1955 (2001). Specific
inquiries of the role of social norms in other (non-corporate) areas of the law include Lisa Bernstein,
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Jason Scott
Johnston, The Statute of Frauds and Business Norms: A Testable Game-Theoretic Model, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1859 (1996); Eric A. Posner, Norms, Formalities, and the Statute of Frauds: A
Comment, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1971 (1996).
178
For an overview of the literature on corporate governance and social norms, see
generally Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 31; Cox & Munsinger, supra note 78; Elhauge, supra
note 89; Samuel N. Fraidin, Duty of Care Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Intuition and Social
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combined overlap areas 1., 2., 4. and 5., and aggregated overlap areas 1. and
4. in Figure 1 above, respectively). In contrast thereto, only a few specific
(and far from exhaustive) inquiries have so far been undertaken on the
intersections of law and trust179 in general and corporate law and trust180 in
particular (representing the aggregated overlap areas 1., 2. and 3., and the
combined overlap areas 1. and 2. in Figure 1 above, respectively). This
leaves the final and most on-point intersection between corporate governance
and trust (the overlap area numbered 1. in Figure 1 above) and the dearth of
academic study of such intersection, as already diagnosed at the beginning of
this Article.181
None of the current legal literature on trust "pulls up" the (trans-) plant
of trust in corporate governance by its very roots and undertakes to examine,
investigate, and explain in plain (and perhaps cumbersome) detail the basic,
yet fundamental structure and functional ingredients of trusting and its
resultant effectiveness and value as a behavioral constraint and enforcement
agency for purposes of (cheaply) controlling economic agency costs in the

Psychology Research, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2004); Hazen, supra note 128; Johnson, supra
note 32; Jones, supra note 7; Marcel Kahan, The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate
Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1869 (2001); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of
Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and
Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001); Lee, supra note 6; Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm
Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 2083 (2001).
179
For an overview of the literature on law and trust, see generally Frank B. Cross, Law and
Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457 (2005); George Dent, Lawyers and Trust in Business Alliances, 58 BUS.
LAW. 45 (2002); Dent, supra note 38; Caroline Forell & Anna Sortun, The Tort of Betrayal of Trust,
42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 557 (2009); Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive
Model of Social Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 361 (2001); Hill & O'Hara, supra note 11; Dan H.
Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003);
Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515 (2004); Mitchell, Trust.
Contract. Process., supra note 8; Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and
Gratuitous Promises, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 567.
180
For an overview of the literature on corporate law and trust, see generally Bukspan,
supra note 11; Dean, supra note 11; Epstein, supra note 11; Ide & Yarn, supra note 11; Gregory
Todd Jones, Trust, Institutionalization, & Corporate Reputations: Public Independent Fact-Finding
from a Risk Management Perspective, 13 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 121 (2005); Mitchell, Being
Trusted, supra note 11; Mitchell, Trust and Team Production, supra note 9; Ribstein, supra note 4;
Shleifer & Summers, supra note 11.
181
See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also Blair & Stout, Behavioral
Foundations, supra note 11, at 1754 ("[T]he role of trust behavior is both fundamental and largely
neglected in the legal literature."); Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1758
("[L]egal scholarship largely neglects the role of trust in firms, assuming instead that the best—
indeed, only—way of controlling opportunistic behavior is through legal and market
incentives . . . ."); Mitchell, Fairness and Trust, supra note 4, at 425 ("No matter how strong the
legal rules requiring fiduciary loyalty are, no matter how successfully the market aligns a fiduciary's
self-interest with corporate interest, trust is essential for corporate survival.").
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corporate endeavor.182 How can we utilize trust as a social norm in order to
explain and predict economic behavior when we do not thoroughly
understand how trust works in the first place? Accordingly, the examination,
investigation and explanation of the transplant of trust in corporate
governance—as far as the mechanics of trusting are concerned as well as
their payoffs for trusting parties—will constitute the remaining inquiry of
this Article.
III. THE PROBLEM OF TRUST: MECHANICS
Trust—as a real-world phenomenon, rather than an abstract idea—is a
result of, and often a prerequisite for,183 the process of any kind of human
interaction.184 In particular, trust is a cultivated185 commodity for purposes of
human (economic) cooperation.186 Cultivation includes an element of time.187
Time, and its passing, results in chronology. And favorable outcomes at the
end of a given chronology of trusting (i.e., those outcomes that meet the
preferences, expectations and predictions of cooperating parties at the
beginning of the same chronology188) require process.189
Process over substance is no stranger to corporate law.190 The same
basic approach is taken here with regard to the discussion of the problem of

182
Cf. Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1779-80 ("We treat
individuals as black boxes whose interior workings are unobservable.").
183
See Gambetta, supra note 30, at 234.
184
See Baier, supra note 19, at 231 ("Without trust, what matters to me would be unsafe,
unless like the Stoic I attach myself only to what can thrive, or be safe from harm, however others
act. The starry heavens above and the moral law within had better be about the only things that
matter to me, if there is no one I can trust in any way.").
185
Baier, supra note 19, at 233; Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at
1742 ("[T]rust may be a learned behavior."); Stout, Investor Confidence, supra note 1, at 421
("[T]rust is learned.") (emphasis omitted); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, The Changing Workplace as
a Locus of Integration in a Diverse Society, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 331, 365 ("A workplace
that cultivates long-term relations of cooperation and mutual trust and respect will also foster the sort
of human connections that spill outside the workplace and enrich social life.").
186
See Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1759.
187
Cf. Dasgupta, supra note 1, at 53 ("[T]rust is based on reputation and that reputation has
ultimately to be acquired through behaviour over time . . . .").
188
See Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1772.
189
Cf. Child, supra note 1, at 288 ("[Trust] is a dynamic phenomenon that evolves over a
period of collaboration"); Ring & Van de Ven, supra note 60, at 100-01 (describing the process of
the emergence of "cooperative interorganizational relationships" built on the transactional parties'
"reliance on trust").
190
For example, the writ system developed in medieval English common law made any
judicially-sanctioned recourse against any party first and foremost dependent on the availability of a
particular suit (or writ)—in other words, dependent upon whether a plaintiff was able to plead the
necessary requirements of the writ and thus fit her case into the procedural vessel for redress. See
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trust, namely, by focusing on the mechanics of trusting. Trust—as an
abstract concept as well as a real-world phenomenon—defeats definition by
means of simple prose.191 Trust functions as a Band-Aid, which we humans
use in order to bridge over our "bounded rationality"192 and computational
limitations for purposes of mapping out all possible future contingencies of
our existence.193
If human life were akin to a game of chess,194 "trust would not be a
problem"195 because it would be completely unnecessary and would have
never developed as a central notion of human interaction and cooperation.196
Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic
Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 439 (1998) (discussing the common law writ system). Whether
the plaintiff, in general (and, perhaps, in abstract terms), also had a right to redress was solely a
derivative notion of successfully pleading a writ. See id. Substance only existed once and to the
extent the procedure was met in its entirety. See id. Similarly, it can be stated that derivative
shareholder suits in corporate law to this day follow a somewhat similar pattern and are reminiscent
of the old procedure-over-substance approach of the English common law. Under the so-called
"demand requirement" of corporate law (see Thomas P. Kinney, Stockholder Derivative Suits:
Demand Futility Where the Board Fails to Stop Wrongdoers, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 172, 175 (1994))
in jurisdictions like Delaware and New York, "[a] stockholder filing a derivative suit must allege
either that the board rejected his pre-suit demand that the board assert the corporation's claim or
allege with particularity why the stockholder was justified in not having made the effort to obtain
board action." See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 (Del. 1996) overruled for different
reasons by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 244 (2000); Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1063
(N.Y. 1996). "The shareholders must plead with particularity that they did not make demand
because it would have been futile." Kinney, supra, at 175. No concern is given (or even allowed)—
at this procedural demand-futility/summary-judgment stage—as to whether the corporate directors
indeed violated any rights of the corporation in question. See id. at 175-76 ("Judicial economy is
achieved by ending the need for a lawsuit."); see also Mitchell, Fairness and Trust, supra note 4, at
472 (discussing procedure over substance in the courts' fairness review of corporate director
decision-making).
191
Cf. Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1735; Kiyonari et al., supra
note 3, at 270 ("Beyond the acknowledgement that trust is important in social and personal life,
however, there is not much consensus on the specific nature of trust and its functions in society.");
Rousseau et al., supra note 14, at 394 ("To date, we have had no universally accepted scholarly
definition of trust.").
192
See Williamson, supra note 13, at 458 (defining "bounded rationality").
193
See Gambetta, supra note 30, at 218; Good, supra note 173, at 46-47.
194
See Good, supra note 173, at 46-47.
195
Gambetta, supra note 30, at 218; see also Child, supra note 1, at 276 ("Trust is vital for
any relationship, business or otherwise, when there is insufficient knowledge and understanding of
the other person or group."); Dean, supra note 11, at 465 ("Trust is a matter of acting on imperfect
information."); Dooley, supra note 8, at 465 ("If there were no bounded rationality, including no
limitations on human foresight or the ability to acquire and process information, individuals could
write completely specified contingent contracts."); Ide & Yarn, supra note 11, at 1118 ("Trust is not
necessary when you can calculate how others will act accurately—the more accurate the calculation,
the less trust required."); Lewis & Weigert, supra note 13, at 968; Rousseau et al., supra note 14, at
395 ("Trust would not be needed if actions could be undertaken with complete certainty and no
risk.").
196
See Becker, supra note 167, at 49 ("[E]ither I can compute the risk that what you say will
be incorrect or I cannot. If I can, then what more do I need . . . ."); Cook et al., supra note 2, at 121
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In a game of chess, there is always (i) only a finite total number of moves
possible for purposes of the immediately next move, and (ii) only a finite
total number of moves possible, counting all possible constellations of future
moves, until the end of the game after the immediately next move.197 Thus,
in theory,198 it would be possible, before each move, for players to quantify
all remaining moves and to compute and consolidate the respective risk and
reward probabilities for each remaining next move.199 As such, players are
able to discriminate among present possible moves (i.e., present behavior
options) based on an optimal prediction of the remaining possible (since
finite) moves in the future (i.e., future behavior options)—both of other and
of self.200 If every chess player sticks with the mathematically optimal next
move (and makes no moves that are mathematically suboptimal, i.e., based
on such player's personal preferences and appetite for higher-risk strategies
than mathematically optimal),201 one can always predict, before any such next
move, the future contingencies, including their attendant quantitative
probabilities, of all remaining moves until the end of the game.202
Human life—unlike a game of chess (or any other game for that
matter)—however, offers a (perhaps cruel)203 ingredient which—in a fit of
(existential) circular reasoning—may be called the very raison d'être of our
human existence. By this I mean the ineluctable condition of human
mortality (i.e., our finite existence) under conditions of "Knightian
uncertainty"204 which (mercifully) destroys any meaningful computation of
risks and rewards and with it, any purely utilitarian human orientation and
sense-making in a world of limited resources, limited opportunities, and
limited lifespan:205

("In the absence of monitoring and the sanctioning of opportunistic behavior, trusting always
involves some risk."); Mayer et al., supra note 160, at 711 ("The need for trust only arises in a risky
situation.").
197
Cf. Good, supra note 173, at 46-47.
198
Of course, this is under the (flawed) "assumption that computation is cost-free . . . [and]
that decisions are made in a world where all problems have a close set of solutions . . . ." See id.
199
See id.
200
See id.
201
A game strategy which—together with the computational limitations of the human brain
(i.e., bounded rationality) (see Gambetta, supra note 30, at 218; Good, supra note 173, at 46-47;
Williamson, supra note 13, at 458)—thankfully makes chess an interesting (repeat) game.
202
See Good, supra note 173, at 46-47.
203
In that the ingredient destroys the possibility for any meaningful mathematical
computation of the utility of human existence (if any). See id.
204
See Belcher, at 24-25 (explaining "Knightian uncertainty").
205
Cf. Lewis & Weigert, supra note 13, at 968 (elaborating on the "temporal aspects of
social life" which result in social complexity which, in turn, is decreased by trust).
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[T]here is no possibility of forming in any way groups of
instances of sufficient homogeneity to make possible a
quantitative determination of true probability. Business
decisions, for example, deal with situations which are far too
unique, generally speaking, for any sort of statistical tabulation
to have any value for guidance. The concept of objectively
measurable probability or chance is simply inapplicable.206
Since trust—as a substitute for the (impossible) objective
quantification of the probability of future contingencies and, thus, their
impact on present preferences and choices—is therefore such a universal
device of human orientation in a world of absolute uncertainty,207 it seems
prudent to begin the analysis of trust—in the context of regulating
(directorial) behavior for purposes of controlling socially beneficial
behavioral outcomes—with the process of trusting208 before venturing into a
(rough) definition of "trust" and, thus, the substance of trusting itself.209
A. The Process of Trusting
Trusting—or, more precisely, the process, means and methods of
reciprocally and efficiently signaling trustfulness and trustworthiness to
others for purposes of enabling individual and specific instances of trusting
to factually occur and work out successfully210—is, at best, a rather
mysterious undertaking. For one thing, real-world trust is always dynamic211
and never static. And what does not sit still is more difficult to observe and
to study.212 That being said, it is analytically possible (and necessary) to
break down the process of trusting and to observe and explain three phases
in the evolution of a trusting relationship: First, the phase of pre-trusting,
when the parties to a future trust relationship get themselves ready and
prepared to cooperate with each other; second, the phase of in-trusting, when
the parties are in the process of consummating their trust relationship; and,

206

KNIGHT, supra note 7, at 231; see also Belcher, supra note 7, at 24-25.
Cf. Luhmann, supra note 171, at 97.
208
See infra Part III.A.
209
See infra Part III.B.
210
Cf. Siebecker, supra note 11, at 150 ("[T]rust remains tethered to specific situations.").
211
See Belcher, supra note 11, at 153; Child, supra note 1, at 288 (describing trust as a
"dynamic phenomenon"); Colombo, supra note 11, at 837; Mayer et al., supra note 160, at 728
(mentioning the "dynamic nature of trust").
212
A fact which, for example, every birdwatcher can attest to only too well. Cf. Cook,
Networks, Norms, and Trust, supra note 173, at 9 ("Trust relations are not easily studied in the
laboratory . . . because they are inherently ongoing relations.").
207
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third, the phase of post-trusting, during which the parties individually
compare and evaluate their respective personal costs and benefits arising
from trusting and cooperating.213 During such post-trusting phase, the parties
will also signal to each other their respective satisfaction (or dissatisfaction)
with regard to their trust bonding with each other for purposes of
cooperation.214
1. The Trust Exchange—Take 1
Trust is often misunderstood to (merely) involve a dyadic,215
unidirectional216 relationship consisting of (i) A having trust (in B) and,
accordingly, being trusting (vis-à-vis B) on the one hand, and (ii) B being
trustworthy (vis-à-vis A) and, accordingly, being trusted (by A) on the other
hand.217 To this, sometimes, is introduced a third element (but without
changing the basic dyadic relationship between the trusting parties): the
(tangible or intangible) object or matter (C) which is entrusted by A to B
during an instance of consummated trusting.218 Notwithstanding such

213
See Child, supra note 1, at 279-84 (distinguishing among three phases in the evolution of
trust labeled (1) "Calculation" ["The Start"]; (2) "Understanding" ["Working Together"]; and (3)
"Bonding" ["Building on Liking Each Other"]).
214
See Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 1, at 538 ("If I interact with you and you do not let
me down, I may raise my estimate of your trustworthiness, giving me an interest in interacting with
you again.").
215
See Russell Hardin, Trust, in 3 P-Z THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW 623, 623 (Peter Newman, ed., 2002); cf. Burke & Stets, supra note 173, at 348
("Self-verification leads to positive self-evaluations and positive other-evaluations in the form of
dyadic trust, and trust facilitates attachment to the other."); Mayer et al., supra note 160, at 711;
Oliver E. Williamson, The Evolving Science of Organization, 149 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON.
36, 56 (1993) ("Transaction cost economics mainly works out a dyadic setup.").
216
Rather than reciprocal. See Mayer et al., supra note 160, at 729-30 ("[T]rust as
considered in this model is unidirectional: from a given trustor to a given trustee."); Blair & Stout,
Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1779 ("There may be some risk in assuming that the
same variables that influence two-way trust necessarily apply to 'one-way' trust as well."); Hill &
O'Hara, supra note 11, at 1729-30 ("[T]rust and distrust are assumed to lie along a unidimensional
continuum."); Toshio Yamagishi & Karen S. Cook, Generalized Exchange and Social Dilemmas,
56 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 235, 245 (1993).
217
Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 1, at 525 ("In this paper we investigate the meaning of
trust, separating it into two elements: trusting (by A) and trustworthiness (of B)."); Blair & Stout,
Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1745-46 ("[T]rust involves at least two actors—the actor
who trusts and the actor who is trusted."); Ide & Yarn, supra note 11, at 1118 ("If A trusts B, A
expects or believes that B will behave in an other-regarding manner that will not exploit A's
vulnerability.").
218
Baier, supra note 19, at 236 (discussing trust as "a three-place predicate (A trusts B with
valued thing C)"); Russell Hardin, Do We Want Trust in Government?, in DEMOCRACY AND TRUST
22, 28 (Mark E. Warren ed., 1999) ("A trusts B to do x (or with respect to x)."); Jones, supra note
166, at 17-18.
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characterization of trusting as a three-part relationship,219 the trusting of A in
B with regard to C is always a two-party relationship (even if C is a person,
for example, a baby to be baby-sat by B).220 A and B are the (only) subjects
that engage in, and consummate, the trusting relationship.221 C is solely the
object (and never a subject) of the trusting relationship between A and B.222
This basic dyadic cause-and-effect trusting process and undertaking
between two parties is, however, only the beginning of the procedural
structure of trusting which is significantly more intricate and complex:223
Not only does B signal trustworthiness to A (in the sense of "I am willing to
be trusted and worthy of being trusted."); A also signals to B trustfulness (in
the sense of "I am willing to give trust and worthy of being trusted to
trust.")—an often overlooked aspect of the central reciprocity that undergirds
the process (and substance) of trusting.224 Trustworthiness and trustfulness
are signaled and exchanged between A and B before, during, and after the
consummation of any actions that include an actual, mutual instance of
trusting.225 Through the process of trusting and the resultant juxtaposition
and quantification of (i) pre-trusting trustfulness of A (by B) as well as pretrusting trustworthiness of B (by A) on the one hand, and (ii) post-trusting
trustfulness of A (again, by B) as well as post-trusting trustworthiness of B
(by A) on the other hand, each of A and B can individually compare and
evaluate their respective personal utilities arising from the trusting
relationship, once lived, in terms of either increases (net gains) or decreases
(net losses) of trust and, thus, of respective increases or decreases of
trustworthiness and trustfulness.226

219
Siebecker, supra note 11, at 149 ("[T]rust represents a three-part relationship."); Hardin,
supra note 215, at 623 ("[T]rust is a three-part relation: A trusts B to do, or with respect to, X.").
220
See Ermisch et al., supra note 3, at 751.
221
See id.
222
It is, of course, possible for C to simultaneously have her own binary trusting
relationship(s) with A and/or B in addition to A trusting B—even with regard to herself as the object
(for example, C trusting A with regard to C). Cf. Hardin, supra note 215, at 623 ("[T]rust is a threepart relation: A trusts B to do, or with respect to, X.").
223
Cf. Lewis & Weigert, supra note 13, at 967 (describing "trust as an irreducible and
multidimensional social reality"); Rousseau et al., supra note 14, at 394 (referring to the "complex
(one might say 'multiplex') character of trust").
224
Cf. Ide & Yarn, Fact Finding, supra note 11, at 1119 ("If A cannot trust B to reciprocate,
then either A will not cooperate and will forfeit the potential benefits or A will expend resources to
monitor and control B to ensure B reciprocates.").
225
Cf. Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1745-46 ("Trust and
trustworthiness accordingly are closely linked, with the former depending upon an expectation of the
latter.").
226
Cf. Ide & Yarn, Fact Finding, supra note 11, at 1119 (describing how a trust relationship
is either built or not consummated).
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But that is still far from all: If the process of trusting constitutes an
exchange transaction in which A and B trade existing pre-trusting levels of
trustfulness and trustworthiness for post-trusting gains or losses of
trustfulness and trustworthiness,227 each signal and exchange of
trustworthiness by each party must also logically include a signal and
exchange of trustfulness by the same party—and vice versa—even if only on
a higher level of abstraction.228 Accordingly, three (somewhat chronological)
stages of reciprocity can be distinguished for each of A and B with regard to
any discreet exercise of trusting occurring in such a binary, two-party
relationship. The following Figure 2 more schematically describes the basics
of the resultant six separate structural positions existing among the
reciprocities of pre-trusting ("Stage-1 trusting"), in-trusting ("Stage-2
trusting") and post-trusting ("Stage-3 trusting").

227

Cf. Cook, Networks, Norms, and Trust, supra note 173, at 10-11 ("[T]rust is viewed as a
'by-product' of dyadic commitment. The commitment emerges as individuals in the exchange setting
find partners they view as trustworthy—those who reciprocate or who negotiate fair deals,
depending on the form of exchange involved.").
228
Cf. Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1750 ("If Ann believes that
Beth's desire to behave trustworthily is strong enough to deter Beth from taking advantage of Ann,
Ann may conclude it is safe to make herself vulnerable to Beth—that is, to trust Beth."); id. at 1772
73 ("[P]layers look to others' behavior as a signal in a novel and otherwise ambiguous social
situation of what the appropriate norm of conduct is, and whether the context calls for primarily
cooperative or competitive behavior."); Ide & Yarn, Fact Finding, supra note 11, at 1121 ("[P]eople
are more likely to be trustworthy when other people trust them."); Lewis & Weigert, supra note 13,
at 970 ("Each trusts on the assumption that others trust.").
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Figure 2
The Procedural Reciprocities of Trusting

A
Stage-1
Reciprocity

a.

c.
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Reciprocity
(post-trusting)

e.

b.

Entrusting with Trustfulness
Entrusting with Trustworthiness

(in-trusting)

B

Signaling Trustfulness
Signaling Trustworthiness

(pre-trusting)

Stage-2
Reciprocity

Trusting Relationship

d.

Signaling Trustfulness
Signaling Trustworthiness

f.

The claim made in Figure 2 with regard to a three-stage chronology of
trusting only posits that (i) it is possible to differentiate those three stages of
reciprocity and to conceptually treat them as separate from each other; (ii)
the three stages occur in succession to each other; and (iii) each succeeding
stage builds on the strength of the trusting reciprocity of its preceding
stage(s)229 so that all three stages are necessarily interconnected with, and
interdependent of, each other. No claim is made that each stage requires
completion before the next stage may begin. Furthermore, no lockstep exists
between stages.230 Thus, each stage can merge seamlessly into the

229

Cf. Ide & Yarn, Fact Finding, supra note 11, at 1119 ("The more A can trust B to
reciprocate, the less A must spend to ensure reciprocation or to punish B. One way interpersonal or
mutual trust develops between individuals is through repeated interactions that allow the actors to
generalize the expectation of continued cooperative behavior in subsequent interactions. Distrust
arises when behavioral expectations are violated in one interaction so as to create a generalization to
subsequent interactions, giving the violator a reputation for being untrustworthy.") (footnotes
omitted).
230
See Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1774 ("[T]he costs and
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immediately next (or immediately preceding) stage. In addition, trust parties
may decide—after commencing Stage-2 trusting (or Stage-3 trusting)—to
return (temporarily) to Stage-1 (or Stage-2) trusting in order to shore up the
likelihood of net increases at Stage-3 trusting. Finally, all three stages can
(and often will) occur in extremely rapid succession, blending and merging
together instantly. Still, for purposes of a theoretical understanding of the
process of trusting, all three stages of trusting can be separated and
distinguished from each other in order to show the inevitable and
fundamental procedural element and character of trusting.
a.

Procedural Reciprocity—Stage 1: Pre-Trusting

In their pre-trusting stage (Stage-1 trusting), before any consummation
of their trusting relationship has begun, A is signaling trustfulness to B (= a.
in Figure 2 above) and B is signaling trustworthiness to A (= b. in Figure 2
above). Since each signal and exchange of trustworthiness by each party
also includes a mutual signal and exchange of trustfulness by the same
party,231 this preparatory Stage-1 reciprocity (of A and B getting ready to
engage in consummating a trusting exercise with each other) can be further
described separately (and differently) by focusing on the party, A or B, who
engages in reciprocating behavior or—more precisely—who signals its
willingness to engage in such reciprocating behavior at a later point in time
during the process of trusting.
If the focus is on A as the reciprocating party:
1a.
A signaling Stage-1 trustfulness to B (= a. above)
translates into A's Stage-1 trustworthiness of A reciprocating B's
Stage-1 trustworthiness with Stage-2 trusting; and
1b. B signaling Stage-1 trustworthiness to A (= b. above)
translates into B's Stage-1 trustfulness of A reciprocating B's
Stage-1 trustworthiness with Stage-2 trusting.
If we then invert the focus and put it now on B while B is in the
process of signaling B's willingness for future reciprocation:
2a. A signaling Stage-1 trustfulness to B (= a. above)
translates into B's Stage-1 trustworthiness of B reciprocating A's
Stage-2 trusting with Stage-2 trustworthiness; and

benefits of trust behavior do not march in lockstep.").
231
See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
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2b. B signaling Stage-1 trustworthiness to A (= b. above)
translates into A's Stage-1 trustfulness of B reciprocating A's
Stage-2 trusting with Stage-2 trustworthiness.
Similarly, if the focus is not on the reciprocating party, but on how
Stage-1 trusting appears to each party from its own perspective or vantage
point, one ends up with a flip-side of the situation above: Stage-1 trusting
from A's perspective is now represented by 1a. and 2b. above, whereas
Stage-1 trusting from B's perspective is described in 1b. and 2a. above (in
each case, with the latter reciprocity succeeding and being premised on the
former).
b.

Procedural Reciprocity—Stage 2: In-Trusting

By "procedural reciprocity" during the very stage in which A and B
actually are in the process of consummating their trusting relationship, I
mean that what is (reciprocally) trusted must exist and be observable,
irrespective of the particular factual substance and social context of
trusting,232 and irrespective of the particular object of trusting (i.e.,
irrespective of C). Thus, notwithstanding what the particular (tangible or
intangible) object or matter of trust is which—external to both parties—
gives rise and is subjected to the trusting relationship, A is entrusting A's
signaled Stage-1 trustfulness to B (= c. in Figure 2 above) and B is now
trusting A's trustfulness (including the build-in reciprocities of 1a. and 2b.
above)233—while B is entrusting B's signaled Stage-1 trustworthiness to A (=
d. in Figure 2 above) and A is now trusting B's trustworthiness (including the
built-in reciprocities of 1b. and 2a. above).234 In doing so, A and B have now
agreed upon, committed to, and locked in their step-by-step plan of how
(much) they will trust each other and consummate such trust. They have
established between themselves a "collective cognitive reality"235 that

232

See Siebecker, supra note 11, at 150 ("[T]rust remains tethered to specific situations . . .
[and] requires some attentiveness to particularity, to the circumstances within which people find
themselves situated at any given time.").
233
In other words, with A entrusting A's Stage-1 trustfulness in B, B is now also trusting
(i) A's (continued) Stage-1 trustworthiness of A reciprocating B's Stage-1 trustworthiness with
Stage-2 trusting (= 1a. above), and (ii) A's (continued) Stage-1 trustfulness of B reciprocating A's
Stage-2 trusting with Stage-2 trustworthiness (= 2b. above).
234
Likewise, with B entrusting B's Stage-1 trustworthiness in A, A is now also trusting (i) B's
Stage-1 trustfulness of A reciprocating B's Stage-1 trustworthiness with Stage-2 trusting (= 1b.
above); and (ii) B's Stage-1 trustworthiness of B reciprocating A's Stage-2 trusting with Stage-2
trustworthiness (= 2a. above).
235
Lewis & Weigert, supra note 13, at 970.
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operates (and creates benefits and costs) independent of the objective of their
cooperation (and of the net increase or decrease of value which eventually
accrues to each of them in regard to such objective and its achievement).236
Furthermore, two additional procedural reciprocities occur during the
entrusting exchange of c. and d. in Figure 2 above (again, depending upon
which party's reciprocating behavior the focus is based).
1c. A entrusting Stage-1 trustfulness to B (= c. above)
translates into A's Stage-2 trustworthiness of (i) A affirming B's
Stage-1 trustworthiness as well as (ii) A self-affirming A's own
Stage-1 trustfulness—both, during Stage-2 trusting; and
1d. B entrusting Stage-1 trustworthiness to A (= d. above)
translates into B's Stage-2 trustfulness of (i) A affirming B's
Stage-1 trustworthiness as well as (ii) A self-affirming A's own
Stage-1 trustfulness—both, during Stage-2 trusting.
2c. A entrusting Stage-1 trustfulness to B (= c. above)
translates into A's Stage-2 trustfulness of (i) B affirming A's
Stage-1 trustfulness as well as (ii) B self-affirming B's own
Stage-1 trustworthiness—both, during Stage-2 trusting; and
2d. B entrusting Stage-1 trustworthiness to A (= d. above)
translates into B's Stage-2 trustworthiness of (i) B affirming A's
Stage-1 trustfulness as well as (ii) B self-affirming B's own
Stage-1 trustworthiness—both, during Stage-2 trusting.
It should be noted that what makes trust the powerful "glue"237 (which
so efficiently—and seemingly effortlessly—creates and holds cooperative
relationships together) lies in this crossed-over and intertwined reciprocity of
simultaneous, symmetrical and identical other-affirmation and selfaffirmation in which each party engages. It is as if each party is
simultaneously "dancing" with the other party and with itself (at least, in
abstract terms). When A affirms B's Stage-1 trustworthiness during Stage-2
trusting, B—at the same time and with instant feedback from A—self-affirms
B's own Stage-1 trustworthiness; when B affirms A's Stage-1 trustfulness
during Stage-2 trusting, A—at the same time and with instant feedback from
B—self-affirms A's own Stage-1 trustfulness.

236

See Siebecker, supra note 11, at 150.
Ribstein, supra note 4, at 553; see also Ellickson, supra note 4, at 540 ("Much of the glue
of a society comes not from law enforcement, as the classicists would have it, but rather from the
informal enforcement of social mores . . . .").
237
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Procedural Reciprocity—Stage 3: Post-Trusting

Finally, in their post-trusting stage (Stage-3 trusting), i.e., after the
consummation of their trusting relationship, A is signaling to B (and B is
evaluating) A's trustfulness (= e. in Figure 2 above) and B is signaling to A
(and A is evaluating) B's trustworthiness (= f. in Figure 2 above)—both,
aggregate trustfulness of A and aggregate trustworthiness of B as modified
(increased or decreased) by the process of their Stage-2 trusting in
comparison to their respective ex-ante trustfulness and ex-ante
trustworthiness during Stage-1 trusting. Similar to the discussion of the
Stage-1 and Stage-2 reciprocities above, Stage-3 reciprocity (of A and B
evaluating the benefits and costs resulting from engaging in the
consummation of an instance of trust with each other) can now be further
bifurcated depending on which party, A or B, engages in reciprocating.
1e. A signaling Stage-3 trustfulness to B (= e. above)
translates into A's Stage-3 trustworthiness of (i) A affirming B's
Stage-3 trustworthiness as well as (ii) A self-affirming A's own
Stage-3 trustfulness—both, in result of Stage-2 trusting; and
1f.
B signaling Stage-3 trustworthiness to A (= f. above)
translates into B's Stage-3 trustfulness of (i) A affirming B's
Stage-3 trustworthiness as well as (ii) A self-affirming A's own
Stage-3 trustfulness—both, in result of Stage-2 trusting.
2e. A signaling Stage-3 trustfulness to B (= e. above)
translates into B's Stage-3 trustworthiness of (i) B affirming A's
Stage-3 trustfulness as well as (ii) B self-affirming B's own
Stage-3 trustworthiness—both, in result of Stage-2 trusting;
and
2f.
B signaling Stage-3 trustworthiness to A (= f. above)
translates into A's Stage-3 trustfulness of (i) B affirming A's
Stage-3 trustfulness as well as (ii) B self-affirming B's own
Stage-3 trustworthiness—both, in result of Stage-2 trusting.
Again, if the focus is not on which party engages in reciprocating
behavior but how Stage-3 trusting appears to each party from its own
perspective or vantage point, then Stage-3 trusting, from A's perspective,
comprises 1e. and 2f. above, and, from B's perspective, constitutes 1f. and
2e. above (unlike at Stage-1, however, here the latter reciprocity in each case
occurs simultaneously with, and does not succeed and is not premised on,
the former). Additionally, and as was the case with Stage-2 trusting above,
we can also observe another occurrence of crossed-over and intertwined
reciprocity of simultaneous, symmetrical and identical other-affirmation and
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self-affirmation as Stage-3 trusting takes on a calming effect. When A
affirms B's Stage-3 trustworthiness in result of Stage-2 trusting, B—at the
same time and with instant validation feedback from A—self-affirms B's own
Stage-3 trustworthiness in result of Stage-2 trusting; when B affirms A's
Stage-3 trustfulness as a result of Stage-2 trusting, A—at the same time and
with instant validation feedback from B—self-affirms A's own Stage-3
trustfulness in result of Stage-2 trusting.
2. Payoffs from the Process of Trusting
The (psychological and structural) payoffs from the procedural
reciprocities accruing to each party during the process of trusting are
enormous.238 What started out as a simple dyadic relationship set-up,
involving solely "trusting (by A) and trustworthiness (of B),"239 has resulted
in a total of ten reciprocities (comprising twenty individual reciprocal
premises) between A and B for a single, consummated instance of trusting in
which A and B go through three distinct stages of reciprocal behavior (even
if those three stages may happen at almost the same time).
Here is the full count and summary of the reciprocal premises
described above, which A and B signal to and exchange with each other
during a single instance of trusting:
Stage-1 trusting (reciprocal behavior: A is signaling Stage-1
trustfulness to B and B is signaling Stage-1 trustworthiness to A):
1.1 A can be trusted to reciprocate B's Stage-1
trustworthiness with Stage-2 trusting (= 1a. above).
1.2 B can trust A to reciprocate B's Stage-1 trustworthiness
with Stage-2 trusting (= 1b. above).
2.1 B can be trusted to reciprocate A's Stage-2 trusting with
Stage-2 trustworthiness (= 2a. above).
2.2 A can trust B to reciprocate A's Stage-2 trusting with
Stage-2 trustworthiness (= 2b. above).

238

See Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1774-75 ("The
experimental evidence indicates that it is in exactly these sorts of circumstances—when the
individual cost of cooperation is relatively small and the benefits for others relatively large—that
people are most likely to cooperate in a social dilemma.").
239
Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 1, at 525 ("In this paper we investigate the meaning of
trust, separating it into two elements: trusting (by A) and trustworthiness (of B).").
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Stage-2 trusting (reciprocal behavior: A is entrusting his signaled
Stage-1 trustfulness to B and B is entrusting his signaled Stage-1
trustworthiness to A):
3.1 A can be trusted to reciprocate B's Stage-2 trusting by
affirming B's Stage-1 trustworthiness (= (i) of 1c. above).
3.2 B can trust A to reciprocate B's Stage-2 trusting by
affirming B's Stage-1 trustworthiness (= (i) of 1d. above).
4.1 A can be trusted to reciprocate B's Stage-2 trusting by
self-affirming A's own Stage-1 trustfulness (= (ii) of 1c. above).
4.2 B can trust A to reciprocate B's Stage-2 trusting by selfaffirming A's own Stage-1 trustfulness (= (ii) of 1d. above).
5.1 B can be trusted to reciprocate A's Stage-2 trusting by
affirming A's Stage-1 trustfulness (= (i) of 2c. above).
5.2 A can trust B to reciprocate A's Stage-2 trusting by
affirming A's Stage-1 trustfulness (= (i) of 2d. above).
6.1 B can be trusted to reciprocate A's Stage-2 trusting by
self-affirming B's own Stage-1 trustworthiness (= (ii) of 2c.
above).
6.2 A can trust B to reciprocate A's Stage-2 trusting by selfaffirming B's own Stage-1 trustworthiness (= (ii) of 2d. above).
Stage-3 trusting (reciprocal behavior: A is signaling Stage-3
trustfulness to B and B is signaling Stage-3 trustworthiness to A):
7.1 A can be trusted to reciprocate B's Stage-2 trusting by
affirming B's Stage-3 trustworthiness (= (i) of 1e. above), thus,
also validating B's Stage-1 trustworthiness.
7.2 B can trust A to reciprocate B's Stage-2 trusting by
affirming B's Stage-3 trustworthiness (= (i) of 1f. above), thus,
also validating B's Stage-1 trustworthiness.
8.1 A can be trusted to reciprocate B's Stage-2 trusting by
self-affirming A's own Stage-3 trustfulness (= (ii) of 1e. above),
thus, also self-validating A's own Stage-1 trustfulness.
8.2 B can trust A to reciprocate B's Stage-2 trusting by selfaffirming A's own Stage-3 trustfulness (= (ii) of 1f. above),
thus, also self-validating A's own Stage-1 trustfulness.
9.1 B can be trusted to reciprocate A's Stage-2 trusting by
affirming A's Stage-3 trustfulness (= (i) of 2e. above), thus, also
validating A's Stage-1 trustfulness.
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9.2 A can trust B to reciprocate A's Stage-2 trusting by
affirming A's Stage-3 trustfulness (= (i) of 2f. above), thus, also
validating A's Stage-1 trustfulness.
10.1 B can be trusted to reciprocate A's Stage-2 trusting by
self-affirming B's own Stage-3 trustworthiness (= (ii) of 2e.
above), thus, also self-validating B's own Stage-1
trustworthiness.
10.2 A can trust B to reciprocate A's Stage-2 trusting by selfaffirming B's own Stage-3 trustworthiness (= (ii) of 2f. above),
thus, also self-validating B's own Stage-1 trustworthiness.
A normative analysis of the payoffs from the process of trusting
should probably begin with the observation that the above twenty reciprocal
premises involved in a single instance of trusting are significantly more than
what could perhaps be seen as a tedious, unnecessary, even pedantic
indulgence in semantics and academic over-analysis. Trusting is a mutual
validation exercise in which expectations of trust (trustfulness or
trustworthiness, respectively) and corresponding counter-expectations of
trust (trustworthiness or trustfulness, respectively) are each exchanged
between trusting parties.240 At the same time parties also exchange, along
with those expectations and counter-expectations of trust, built-in
expectations and counter-expectations of other-affirmation and selfaffirmation regarding each party's identity as a trustful, trustworthy, and
trusting human being.241 Thus, trust is, by necessity, an other-regarding
phenomenon242 for the very utility of self-affirmation and self-validation
through (economic) cooperation.243
But trust is not only an extremely valuable commodity in this regard;
it can also be an extremely fickle244 and fragile245 commodity. Each party

240

See Dasgupta, supra note 1, at 50-51; Ermisch et al., supra note 3, at 750.
Cf. Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1741-42 ("[H]uman beings
do not behave in the strictly individualistic and self-interested way that economic theory often
implies they do. Rather, they behave as if they sometimes have a preference or 'taste' for
cooperative, other-regarding behavior generally and for trusting and trustworthy behavior
specifically.").
242
Cf. id.; Heminway, supra note 11, at 179 ("[S]cholars have focused on other-regarding
preferences . . . and risk-aversion as determinants of trustworthiness.") (footnotes omitted).
243
See Ermisch et al., supra note 3, at 750 ("[O]pportunities for mutually beneficial
transactions are lost in societies in which people cannot trust each other.").
244
See Child, supra note 1, at 274 ("No partnership will work without trust, and it is one of
the most difficult things to achieve.").
245
See Baier, supra note 19, at 238 ("One thing that can destroy a trust relationship fairly
quickly is the combination of a rigoristic unforgiving attitude on the part of the truster and a touchy
241

154

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

[Vol. 38

could, in theory, revise its personal bundle of expectations and counterexpectations at any given point in time—in particular, mid-way into a trust
relationship when the other party is potentially in its most vulnerable state.246
As we all know from common experience, what we pejoratively term
"breaches of trust"247 can occur rather ubiquitously under repugnant
conditions.248 Thus, the process of trusting itself in which each party
engages is designed to provide effective safeguards in order to minimize the
risk of trust being breached. The principal tools for minimizing such
downside risk are the ten procedural reciprocities set forth above. Their
utility can be described in procedural terms of bundling, splicing, looping
and autopoiesis.249
a.

Bundling of Trust Expectations

Each of the twenty premises of procedural reciprocity outlined above
is like an individual strand of fiber which gets woven with other strands into
a thicker rope or cable. There is a set of ten reciprocal premises (or strands)
for each A and B. During the process of trusting, each party's set of
individual premises goes through a process of bundling. The premises are
wrapped together by intertwining each party's own set of trust expectations
and counter-expectations with each other. This first-layer process of
twisting, weaving and braiding now results in what is already a much thicker
(and heavier) rope with much more hanging on it—namely, the respective
party's intertwined expectations and commitments (i.e., self-expectations) to

sensitivity to any criticism on the part of the trusted."); Colombo, supra note 11, at 842 ("[T]rust is
often quite fragile, and . . . once broken, trust is hard to regain.") (internal quotation marks omitted);
Gambetta, supra note 30, at 218 ("Trust is a tentative and intrinsically fragile response to our
ignorance, a way of coping with the limits of our foresight . . . .") (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Good, supra note 173, at 46 ("Despite its apparent fragility and our many attempts
to do without it, it is clear that, in many societies where it is well established, trust is remarkably
robust.").
246
See Baier, supra note 19, at 239 ("If part of what the truster entrusts to the trusted are
discretionary powers, then the truster risks abuse of those and the successful disguise of such
abuse."). This is the very dilemma of absolute director primacy discussed in the opening sketches
above. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
247
Sealy, supra note 49, at 69 (defining the same concept also as "breach[es] of
confidence").
248
Indeed, over the ages, the "business models" of con men have regularly involved breaches
of trust vis-à-vis unsuspecting, trusting parties as the key ingredient to their functionality and
success. Cf. Baier, supra note 19, at 234 ("Criminals, not moral philosophers, have been the experts
at discerning different forms of trust.").
249
Or "self-production." See Arthur J. Jacobson, Autopoietic Law: The New Science of
Niklas Luhmann, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1647 (1989).
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other-affirmation and self-affirmation via the trusting process with the other
party.250
b.

Splicing of Bundled Trust Expectations

Each party's interwoven bundle of trust expectations and counterexpectations (which constitutes their set of ten reciprocal premises of
trustfulness and trustworthiness) could now be simply tied together with the
other party's respective bundle by making a knot (or a series of knots). After
tying a knot, however, there are still two pieces of rope. Depending on the
kind of knot, untying can be a simple process and may even occur by
unilateral action. Furthermore, knots have a tendency to break or to
otherwise come apart before each of the individual pieces of rope will give
way and rip apart.251 Usually, the knot is the weakest point in a structure or
relationship.252
Trusting knows no knotting. Knots are often not strong enough for
successful (long-term) cooperation. Given (i) the thickness (i.e., complexity)
of each party's braided bundle of interwoven trust expectations and counterexpectations and (ii) the shortness of such bundle (i.e., the amount of time
parties may have to prepare, engage in, and evaluate their trusting), making a
(proper) knot may not even be feasible.253 Trusting, therefore, follows
another, much more powerful and efficient technique (and metaphor):
splicing. Splicing means to unite254 the parties' ropes of expectations through
a similar, second-layer process of twisting, interweaving, and interbraiding
the strands of each party's bundled trust expectations—over the full length of
whatever external and internal distance exists between the two parties. In
other words, whatever length of rope each party can make available (with
one end of such rope fastened to such party's very identity and existence)

250

Cf. ARROW, supra note 1, at 41 ("Thus, it will be difficult to reverse an initial
commitment in the direction in which information is gathered.").
251
See Dario Meluzzi et al., Biophysics of Knotting, 39 ANN. REV. BIOPHYSICS 349, 357
(2010), available at biophys.annualreviews.org ("[I]t was shown that a linear polyethylene molecule
with a trefoil knot breaks at a bond just outside the entrance of the knot, where the strain energy is
highest, but is still only 78% of the strain energy needed to break an unknotted chain."); Piotr
Pieranski et al., Localization of Breakage Points in Knotted Strings, 3 NEW J. PHYSICS 10.1, 10.2
(2001), available at http://iopscience.iop.org/1367-2630/3/1/310 [hereinafter Pieranski et al.,
Localization of Breakage Points] ("[A] rope is weakest just outside the entrance of the knot.")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
252
See Pieranski et al., Localization of Breakage Points, supra note 251, at 10.2.
253
The shorter and thicker the individual rope bundles, the less likely that they can be
physically knotted together.
254
Unite ≠ untie.
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will be used for purposes of splicing. Therefore, if both parties' individual
ropes are about the same length, their individual ropes will now become one
single, spliced rope with double the diameter and many times the strength
and resistance of each individual bundle.
As a result, commitments of other-affirmation and self-affirmation are
now no longer simply intertwined (in each party's individual bundle or rope);
they are interwoven and interconnected within the same bundle. There is
fusion, a new whole that is of a different quality compared to its constituent
parts. Expectations mature into predictions of other and self-behavior.255
Predictions of positive (i.e., favorable since desired) outcomes further allow
for (mutual) confidence256 and, thus, overcome Knightian uncertainty.257 The
result is that trust—in particular, in its noncognitive form258—is a much
stronger (and more intimate) connector between parties than any formal act
of contracting could ever be.259 Indeed, every formal contract will require a
good (additional) measure of (undocumented, unspoken and unpromised)
trust in order to be consummated.260 Promises may easily be broken (and

255

Cf. Barr, supra note 169, at 627 ("[T]rusting behavior is motivated by expectations of
trustworthiness."); Becker, supra note 167, at 45 ("Once we have beliefs and expectations about the
trustworthiness of others, we can convert uncertainties about their behavior into an estimate of the
risks of dealing with them.") (emphasis added); Ermisch et al., supra note 3, at 751 (mentioning "the
expectation that the trustee will do X, framed in terms of a probability").
256
See Burke & Stets, supra note 173, at 352 ("Trust also generates feelings of confidence
and security in the relationship."); Child, supra note 1, at 275; Dunn, supra note 167, at 74-75
("[T]rust as a modality of action may . . . convert a policy of trust into a condition of confidence.");
Jones, supra note 180, at 133.
257
Id. at 276 ("[T]rust is . . . a way of dealing with ignorance and uncertainty . . . ."). Such
confidence that overcomes Knightian uncertainty appears to overlap significantly, if not, to equal the
fundamental baseline of trusting which Eric Erickson has termed "basic trust" in developmental
psychology (see ERIK H. ERICKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 247-48 (1963); see also Belcher,
supra note 11, at 156) and which Lawrence Becker refers to as "noncognitive trust" in his political
philosophy. Becker, supra note 167, at 44; see also Luhmann, supra note 171, at 97-98 ("[T]rust
can revert to mere confidence . . . ."). In other words, this (constant repeat) experience of baseline
confidence in how we look at this world and expect it to (not) change is existentially necessary
because any complete exposure to Knightian uncertainty (which exposure would destroy any and all
expectations about any and all future events) would likely be an irreversibly traumatic event for the
human psyche. Cf. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust, supra note 4, at 432 ("Without trust, we would be
overwhelmed by the world around us.").
258
See Becker, supra note 167, at 44.
259
Cf. Yongmin Chen, Promises, Trust, and Contracts, 16 J. L. ECON. ORG. 209, 227
(2000) ("There has been evidence that the lack of trust and thus the diminished role of incomplete
contracts has been a cause of the slow economic development in some societies. There has also been
evidence that trust promotes cooperation in large organizations where reputation effects tend to be
weak.") (citations omitted).
260
See Belcher, supra note 11, at 161. In other words, it can be claimed that every formal
contract requires a congruent, contemporaneous "psychological contract" for purpose of successful
consummation. See Ring & Van de Ven, supra note 60, at 100 ("Psychological contracts, as
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breaching a promise may even be efficient261)—trust never is. "I trust you" is
a powerful manipulator of others and of self (and their respective future
behaviors).262 At the splicing-stage, trust can be described as a full-body
embrace263 (as compared to the contractual metaphor of a handshake).264 And
in an embrace, each party not only embraces and, thus, binds the other, but
also—by necessity—is embraced and, thus, binds itself.265 This process is an
indispensible condition and prerequisite for the final layer of affirmation and
self-affirmation of trusting to occur.
c.

Looping of Spliced Trust Expectations

The embrace of trusting is not only external (i.e., around the party,
manipulating its behavior crudely), but internal as well (i.e., within the party,
manipulating its preferences and motivations which, in turn, manipulate its
choices and behavior much more effectively).266 In other words, trust, as
shown in Figure 2 above, is a symbiotic process. And the reason for this can
be described as the important "looping" aspect in the process of trusting.
The starting point here is an examination of each party's interwoven bundle
of trust expectations and counter-expectations from both ends. One end
constitutes such party's five reciprocal premises of trustfulness. The other
end comprises such party's five premises of trustworthiness. And, now,
splicing does not happen just once, but twice: Each party's five premises of
trustfulness are spliced together with the other party's five premises of
trustworthiness—and vice versa.
No longer is one end of each party's rope fastened to the party's very
identity and existence. Rather, both ends are fused together with the two
opposed to most legal contracts, consist of unwritten and largely nonverbalized sets of congruent
expectations and assumptions held by transacting parties about each other's prerogatives and
obligations.").
261
Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Why No "Efficient Breach" in Civil Law? A Comparative
Assessment of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of Contract, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 726, 722 (2007)
("[T]he theory of efficient breach of contract states that in some instances breaching a contract will
be so profitable for the party who breaches that he will be able to compensate the other party so that
neither will be worse off economically than if the contract had been performed.").
262
See Kurt T. Dirks & Donald L. Ferrin, The Role of Trust in Organizational Settings, 4
ORG. SCI. 450, 456 (2001) [hereinafter Dirks & Ferrin, Trust in Organizational Settings] ("[T]rust
affects how one assesses the future behavior of another party with whom one is interdependent.").
263
Cf. Baier, Trusting, supra note 166, at 146 (i.e., "hugging").
264
Cf. id., at 147 ("The handshake, that sacred sealer of deals, is a nice example of a gesture
that combines trust and caution. It is the remnant of a mutually disempowering gesture, a mutual
putting out of full action of the strong manipulative right hand.").
265
Cf. id.
266
Cf. Dirks & Ferrin, Trust in Organizational Settings, supra note 262, at 456-57
(describing how trust influences purpose which influences response).

158

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

[Vol. 38

ends of the other party's rope, creating a single seamless and continuous loop
between the two trust parties. The loop runs through each party's entire
identity, picking up core personal commitment for the process of trusting—
that is, again, just the process irrespective of the particular substance and
context of trusting and irrespective of the particular object of trusting (i.e.,
irrespective of C).267 Each party's identity, therefore, becomes exposed and
vulnerable to, but also intimately connected with, and vested in, the other
party's identity.268 Each party is irreversibly invested in the other—even to
the extent that "if subsequent information suggested that the initial choice [of
trusting] was wrong, it would not pay to reverse the decision [to trust] later
on."269 Both parties' identities can now cross-nurture each other.
Predictions mature into validations of other and self-behavior.270 The
potential fickleness and fragility of trusting discussed above are finally (and
almost irreversibly) overcome.271
Furthermore, trust becomes self-enforcing. The perfectly reciprocal
and interbraided other-validation and self-validation that forms the very core
of the process of trusting has found its magical umbilical cord. Irrespective
of substance, context, and object of trusting, the process of trusting has
found its own end: to provide balanced cohesion and stability to a given trust
relationship.272 Cohesion here means that the structure of trusting established
between the parties is holding steadily together internally and demonstrates a
mutual, collective attachment and orientation towards the established
relationship of trusting—any volatility of the constituent parts of the
structure of trusting caused by (future) changes and resultant pressures in the
preferences or tastes of the trusting parties is severely restrained.273 In
comparison thereto, stability means that the entire structure of trusting itself
remains "firm" (i.e., constant, durable, well-established, and secure274)

267

See supra Part III.A.1.b (stating that the process of trusting is irrespective of trusted

object C).

268

See Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1739-40.
ARROW, supra note 1, at 41.
270
Cf. Burke & Stets, supra note 173, at 348 ("Self-verification leads to positive selfevaluations and positive other-evaluations in the form of dyadic trust, and trust facilitates attachment
to the other. This attachment should reveal itself not only in commitment to the other but also in
positive feelings for the other and, we anticipate, in a collective orientation to the relationship.").
271
See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
272
Cf. Becker, supra note 167, at 58 ("A proper sense of security is a balance of cognitive
control and noncognitive stability.").
273
Cf. Burke & Stets, supra note 173, at 347 ("We suggest that the processes of establishing
and maintaining self-verification contexts, and the positive self-feelings that result, lead to the
development of interpersonal or group cohesiveness in the form of commitment, emotional
attachment, and a collective orientation.").
274
Etymologically, the word "firm" (from the Latin "firmare" [= to make firm] and "firmus"
269
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externally vis-à-vis (future) changes and resultant pressures in both its very
object of trusting (C) and its particular factual substance and social context
in which the process of trusting is situationally embedded275 (i.e., the
behavioral macro-constraint of "architecture" described above276).
d.

Autopoiesis277

The process of trusting and the cohesion and stability of the trust
relationship that is the result of this process still serve yet a larger purpose.
(Economic) cooperation often requires extremely low transaction costs—
otherwise, the particular cooperative behavior will not occur at all.278 If
cooperating parties were to be constantly told that the principle of caveat
emptor controls their respective investments in the cooperative undertaking
at issue, more inter-party monitoring, advance contracting, as well as
renegotiation or litigation (in order to address incomplete contracting when
faced with new, unforeseen conditions)279 would be the likely result.280 Such
[= chair, throne]—similarly, for example, in German "Firma") has exactly that reifying, stabilizing
and solidifying meaning. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 471-72 (11th ed.
2003). It also means "the name or title under which a company transacts business," another distinct
and exclusive way to denote the idea of something autonomously and independently existing in the
marketplace above and beyond the existence of the individual firm participants. See id. at 472; see
also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) ("A corporation is, after all, but an association of
individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity."); HENRY HANSMANN, THE
OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 18-19 (1996) ("[The] firm is in essence the common signatory of a
group of contracts. In small firms organized as sole proprietorships, the individual proprietor signs
these contracts. In a corporation or a partnership, the party that signs the contracts is a legal
entity.").
275
Cf. Dirks & Ferrin, Trust in Organizational Settings, supra note 262, at 456 (discussing
trust correlates with how humans assess how others will act, assumedly regardless of externalities).
276
See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
277
See supra note 248 for a definition.
278
Cf. Jean-François Hennart, The Transaction Costs Theory of Joint Ventures: An
Empirical Study of Japanese Subsidiaries, 37 MGMT. SCI. 483, 484 (1991) (describing how
transaction costs can be lowered through the use of joint ventures).
279
Complete contracts do not exist. See Lewis & Weigert, supra note 13, at 968 ("It is not
possible to develop plans of action which take into account all possible contingent futures.").
(Complete) factual uncertainty with regard to the future always remains because of the "lack of
knowledge of what the future will bring, [i.e., because of the lack of knowledge] of all stochastic
variables." Richter, supra note 8, at 175 n.22. Discussing the "gaps" in contracts, see also Alces,
supra note 34, at 241-42; Bainbridge, Means and Ends, supra note 65, at 556 n.44; Meurer, supra
note 32, at 739; see also Dooley, supra note 8, at 465 ("If there were no bounded rationality,
including no limitations on human foresight or the ability to acquire and process information,
individuals could write completely specified contingent contracts."); Gambetta, supra note 30, at 218
("If we were blessed with an unlimited computational ability to map out all possible contingencies in
enforceable contracts, trust would not be a problem.") (reference omitted).
280
Cf. Dooley, supra note 8, at 464-65 (explaining that there is no such thing as no
transaction costs).
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transactional techniques, however, would often be unavailable because
cooperative parties could not procure them efficiently under the limitations
built into the nature of their cooperative undertaking. In other words,
transaction costs would become too prohibitive and the entire transaction,
the entire cooperative undertaking, would not occur since no party could
satisfactorily deal with its individual downside risks resulting from engaging
in the transaction.281
Enter caveat emptor plus trust: The magic of trust is that it is
available at an extremely low transaction cost282 (and further lowers overall
transaction costs in terms of time and effort),283 that it exists,284 and that it
works.285 Why trust works—at least, from the perspective of the process of
trusting—has been demonstrated above in the analysis of the bundling,
splicing, and looping of trust expectations and counter-expectations.286 The
availability of trust at extremely low transaction costs is a result of a (final)
process which has been described in terms of autopoiesis: trust creates itself.
Trusting breeds more trusting.287 When trusting occurs under favorable
conditions (as far as substance, context, and conditions of trusting are
concerned), the mechanics of trusting also ensure, in their final consequence,
that trust becomes self-referential and self-perpetual.288 Trust, when
successfully exercised, self-affirms that trusting is existent, valuable,
efficient, available at minimum transaction costs, and that it works (at least,
most of the time).289 Trusting parties mutually affirm to each other, and
reciprocally self-affirm to themselves, that cooperation resultant from trust is

281
Cf. id. at 465-66 ("[T]ransaction costs, unless controlled, will frustrate achievement of the
coalition's objectives.").
282
Duggin & Goldman, supra note 11, at 257; Ermisch et al., supra note 3, at 749.
283
Galston, supra note 1, at 130 ("The more trust, the lower the transaction costs."); Ring &
Van de Ven, supra note 60, at 110 ("[T]he greater the ability to rely on trust, the lower the
transaction costs (time and effort) required of parties to negotiate, reach agreements, and execute a
cooperative [interorganizational relationship]."); Rousseau et al., supra note 14, at 394.
284
Stout, Investor Confidence, supra note 1, at 421; see also Blair & Stout, Behavioral
Foundations, supra note 11, at 1738 ("[T]rust is a reality.").
285
Cf. Dunn, supra note 167, at 73 ("Trust is . . . a modality of human action: a more or less
consciously chosen policy for handling the freedom of other human agents or agencies."); Rousseau
et al., supra note 14, at 395 ("[R]isk taking buttresses a sense of trust when the expected behavior
materializes . . . .").
286
See supra Part III.A.2.a-c.
287
Dasgupta, supra note 1, at 56.
288
Cf. id. ("[T]rust, like other moral resources, grows with use and decays with disuse[.]");
Child, Fundamental Bond, supra note 1, at 274 ("Of course, trust is itself likely to be reinforced by a
successful relationship. This virtuous circle is an ideal one, if it can be obtained.").
289
Cf. Child, supra note 1, at 274 ("[I]t is not surprising that people engaged in all areas of
business and industry, and in every country, say they value trust and trustworthiness. At the same
time, they recognize that it is not an easy thing to obtain.").
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(morally) "good" and its fruits are, indeed, shared "values" (or shared
individual "utilities") that each party is (morally) entitled to care about in an
egocentric manner.290 Trust, then, is the common denominator for attaining
the equilibrium position of mutual (economic) cooperation among repeat
players who could otherwise "punish defection in continual iterations of the
game [of trusting] over time."291
The process of trusting which has developed from expectations (and
commitments) to predictions and validations has finally arrived at (self
referential) repetitions and experience.292 The consummation of a single,
one-shot trusting relationship has already built into such relationship
multiple repetitions of reciprocal exchanges of trustworthiness and
trustfulness and multiple repetitions of reciprocal validations of
trustworthiness and trustfulness. In other words, one successful trusting
experience is already repetitively self-referential and creates a self-generated
preference for future trusting (as opposed to future distrusting).293 Thus, any

290
Cf. Galston, supra note 1, at 130 ("[Trust] is the expectation that arises within [a]
community of regular and honest behavior based on shared norms, such as truth-telling, good
intentions, reciprocity, and competence.").
291
Siebecker, supra note 11, at 118; see also Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra
note 11, at 1742 ("Defecting remains the optimal strategy for the self-interested player."); Blair &
Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1762 ("Defection is the only sensible strategy for
the rationally selfish player in . . . a 'one-shot' game."); Williamson, supra note 13, at 473.
292
Cf. Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1767 (discussing how
willingness to trust can be influenced "by the weight of accumulated past experiences"); Ermisch et
al., supra note 3, at 751; Hardin, Trustworthiness, supra note 167, at 27 ("Experience molds the
psychology of trust.").
293
It should be noted that one single trusting experience also already deals with what has
been described as "a classic 'Catch-22': each party must induce her or his partner to be trusting
before actually proving her own trustworthiness." Cook et al., supra note 2, at 122. Given the
reciprocal signaling of both trustworthiness and trustfulness already in Stage-1 trusting as discussed
herein, such process of pre-trusting effectively addresses the deadlock dilemma in initiating trust
relations—viz., who will make the first move unilaterally and expose herself to the risk of
vulnerability. More properly conceptualized, it is not the "unilateral act of trust by one partner, . . .
[which] is required to break the deadlock of a mutual lack of trust." Id. Rather, it is only the
unilateral act of signaling trustworthiness and trustfulness during Stage-1 trusting and the (now
much smaller) risk that such unilateral signaling act is rebuffed by the other side through a lack of
reciprocal signaling of trustworthiness and trustfulness by such other side. This risk is now
relatively small given that the consummation of the trust relation, i.e., Stage-2 trusting or in-trusting
has not yet commenced. In addition, resultant vulnerability which is the probability of any
materialization of such risk is also already vastly reduced by the self-verification of trustworthiness
and trustfulness through earlier (successfully consummated) trust experiences. See supra note 292
and accompanying text. As a result, Stage-1 trusting significantly minimizes the uncertainty of
reciprocation by the party to be trusted (which, as explained herein, in Stage-1 trusting means
already both parties to the trust relationship reciprocally) and, thus, mitigates, if not, marginalizes the
dilemma of any Catch-22. In this way, the mechanics of trusting also explain why trusting is a
genuinely autopoietic exercise and why, in final analysis, trust always creates itself—through the
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repetition of the process of trusting is already pre-validated by the trusting
experience of the past.294 All repetitions, on aggregate, form a normative
coral reef where each deposit produced by successful trusting shores up,
stabilizes, and makes cohesive, the overall intrinsic value of trust as a
"mechanism"295 to reduce the social complexities296 and (perceived) pitfalls of
cooperative behavior and interaction.
The only remaining risk (or pitfall) that cannot be controlled by the
process of trusting itself is the risk of betrayal297 (or deceit;298 or fraud;299 or
cheating;300 or "being exploited";301 or bad faith; or "ill will;"302 or—simply—
lying303). Here, (at least) one party to a purported trust relationship
unilaterally schemes in order to exploit the vulnerabilities that the process of
trusting exposes or creates in the other party (or parties) to such relationship
by giving the impression of trustfulness, trustworthiness, and trusting (i.e.,
by faking to engage in a genuine process of trusting). This constitutes a
direct assault, targeted at trust, and an abuse of the process of trusting. It
means that trust—as a symbiotic process—is clandestinely changed by (at
least) one party into a parasitic304 process.
However, it is important to keep in mind with respect to autopoiesis of
trusting that, empirically, the process of trusting successfully happens
literally thousands of times more often every single day for every single
person (i.e., there are literally thousands of repetitions of trusting across the
entire spectrum of such person's daily activities) than any individual instance
or scheme of betrayal would harm the same person during the same day.305
very process of trusting—and, amazingly, already in just one single exercise of trusting. See Blair &
Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1768 ("If trust has proven adaptive for [an
individual] in the past, she is likely to opt for trust again in the present . . . ."); Cook et al., supra
note 2, at 139 ("We found some indication that allowing participants to signal their level of trust
improves cooperation at least temporarily . . . ."); see also Kiyonari et al., supra note 3, at 282 ("In
one-shot interactions, individuals have no way to build trust."); Yamagishi & Cook, supra note 216,
at 240 ("The successful continuation of the system, however, requires that people already have a
high level of mutual trust . . . .").
294
Cf. Child, supra note 1, at 276.
295
Cf. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust, supra note 4, at 432.
296
In particular, the complex future contingencies of preferences, altered choices, and
resultant behavior of others and self. See Luhmann, supra note 19, at 8, 24.
297
See Baier, supra note 19, at 234; Williamson, supra note 13, at 482.
298
See Burke & Stets, supra note 173, at 348.
299
See Good, supra note 173, at 46.
300
See Ermisch et al., supra note 3, at 751; Williamson, supra note 13, at 471.
301
Ermisch et al., supra note 3, at 751.
302
See Baier, supra note 19, at 238.
303
See Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life 242 (1978).
304
See Hardin, supra note 215, at 624 ("For example, when a teenager says 'Trust me' with a
grin, the phrase is parasitic on the theoretically interesting notion of trust, not an instance of it.").
305
We might not be consciously aware all of the time of the fact that we are trusting, but we
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Trust and successful instances of trusting are, by far, the empirical norm.306
Trust, therefore, has significant benefits accruing to it.307 The empirical
exception of betrayal rarely materializes (at least, in its pure form of
intentional deceitfulness targeted at abusing vulnerabilities of other parties
which are exposed, or even created, by such parties because they were
tricked into trusting).308 Foregoing trusting entirely in order to avoid the risk
of such exception materializing has significant costs associated with it—if it
is even possible at all. The value of the benefits of trusting (even at low
magnitude), when multiplied with the (very high) probability of their
materialization, give trust and trusting an overwhelming competitive
advantage as compared to the value of the potential costs of trusting (even at
high magnitude) multiplied by the (extremely low) probability of their
materialization. In other words, trust pays off309 most of the time, if not
always. Accordingly, people have an acquired preference310 and path
dependency311 for living their lives in an all-pervading ambience312 of trusting
take for granted every day that the world around us continues to work pretty much as it did
yesterday. We trust all the technologies we use around the clock (for example, alarm clocks, cell
phones, credit card and other electronic financial systems, coffeemakers, refrigerators, any form of
other electrical circuit, heating, stoves, cars, computers, internet, water supply, emergency services,
etc.) and the people we encounter daily (for example, the drivers on the road, the colleagues at work,
the friends and acquaintances we meet for lunch, for tennis after work, etc.) or whose services we
use (for example, all those maintenance people who keep all the telephone, public transportation,
public roads, financial, water, safety, heating, cooling, food distribution, building, trash removal,
broadcasting, computer, internet and other services which we have become accustomed to and
depend on dearly every single moment of our lives)—and that all of those technologies and all of the
people behind them live up to our trust expectations of continuing to do what they are supposed to
do. Modern human life and interaction without some basic form of trust is impossible. See Duggin
& Goldman, supra note 11, at 256 ("The very act of living requires a basic level of faith in our
ability to perceive the physical world and to understand both intellectual concepts and the complex
interactions that comprise our social environment."); see also Lewis & Weigert, at 968-69
(discussing how the reduction of complexity through trusting becomes "possible if the cognitively
expected probabilities of most of the contingently possible future events are thought of as zero for all
practical purposes").
306
See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
307
See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
308
See supra notes 297-303 and accompanying text.
309
See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 1, sc. 4 ("The service and the loyalty I owe,
In doing it, pays itself."); see also Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 1728 (stating that
"insightful subordinates are more likely to attach themselves to superiors with good firm character,
who will repay their trust"); Gambetta, supra note 30, at 234 ("Trust, even if always misplaced, can
never do worse than [sustained distrust], and the expectation that it might do at least marginally
better is therefore plausible."); Ribstein, supra note 4, at 553 ("Trust is a kind of social glue that
allows people to interact at low transactions costs.") (footnote omitted).
310
Cf. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 11, at 439 ("[P]eople's behavior
sometimes 'reveals a preference' for taking account of others' interests in making decisions.").
311
Cf. Rousseau et al., supra note 14, at 395 ("The path-dependent connection between trust
and risk taking arises from a reciprocal relationship: risk creates an opportunity for trust, which leads
to risk taking.").
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and trust and will prefer to engage in trusting, accordingly, instead of being
stuck with constant suspicion, distrust, and worry of being let down or
manipulated.313 Given the choice, people distrust distrust314 and are
selectively fatalistic315 towards the benefits (and associated risks) of trusting
and the costs (and associated returns) of distrusting.316 In the words of the
late Niklas Luhmann:
You cannot live without forming expectations with respect to
contingent events and you have to neglect, more or less, the
possibility of disappointment. You neglect this because it is a
very rare possibility, but also because you do not know what
else to do. The alternative is to live in a state of permanent
uncertainty and to withdraw expectations without having
anything with which to replace them.317
B. The Substance of Trusting
As has been expounded above, the notion and substance of trust and
trusting defeats any attempts at snippet definition by means of simple
prose.318 Oftentimes, scholarship on trusting will also breach into what I call
the "normative sphere" of trust in that it limits any discussion of trust and
trusting to a virtuous, civil society-minded perspective of the same.319 In this
312

See Baier, supra note 19, at 234 ("We inhabit a climate of trust as we inhabit an
atmosphere and notice it as we notice air, only when it becomes scarce or polluted.").
313
See id. ("Of course we are often disappointed, rebuffed, let down, or betrayed when we
exhibit such trust in others, and we are often exploited when we show the wanted trustworthiness.
We do in fact, wisely or stupidly, virtuously or viciously, show trust in a great variety of forms, and
manifest a great variety of versions of trustworthiness, both with intimates and with strangers.").
314
Cf. Gambetta, supra note 30, at 234 ("Once distrust has set in it soon becomes impossible
to know if it was ever in fact justified, for it has the capacity to be self-fulfilling, to generate a reality
consistent with itself. It then becomes individually 'rational' to behave accordingly, even for those
previously prepared to act on more optimistic expectations.").
315
See Cass R. Sunstein, Selective Fatalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 799, 799 (1998) ("Human
beings are selectively fatalistic. Some risks appear as mere 'background noise' and do not create
much concern even if their magnitude is relatively high."); see also Baier, supra note 19, at 234
("We put our bodily safety into the hands of pilots, drivers, doctors, with scarcely any sense of
recklessness. We used not to suspect that the food we buy might be deliberately poisoned, and we
used to trust our children to day-care centers.").
316
Or, according to Kenneth Arrow, "the random accidents of history . . . play a bigger role
in the final equilibrium" of the personal investment in trusting and trust. See ARROW, supra note 1,
at 41.
317
Luhmann, supra note 171, at 97.
318
See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
319
See, e.g., Galston, supra note 1, at 130 ("The seedbeds of [trust] . . . are neither economic
nor political institutions but, rather, the voluntary associations of civil society, starting with (but
extending beyond) the family.").
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vein, trust has been described with "the expectation that arises within [a]
community of regular and honest behavior based on shared norms, such as
truth-telling, good intentions, reciprocity, and competence."320
The following discussion of definitional elements of trust and of the
substance of trusting does not follow this normative perspective or approach.
Trust itself is a value-neutral,321 if not, a normatively, morally vacuous
phenomenon.322 It is entirely dependent on its actors and their respective
preferences and motivations.323 Morally "good" and morally "bad" forms of
trust exist.324 Trust can be wed to shared virtues and can enhance "good"
results (= moral trust); it can be used to further mutual vices and "bad"
values (= immoral trust).325 Accordingly, a discussion of the substance of
trusting can be (and, arguably, first must be) divorced from the values or
norms that trust is regularly employed to support. In other words, it can be
divorced from the morality of trust relationships, thus, from a moral theory
of trust.326

320

Id.
Cf. Gambetta, supra note 30, at 213-14 ("The unqualified claim that more cooperation
than we normally get would be desirable is generally sterile, is often characterized by irritating
rhetorical flabbiness and, if preached too extensively, may even have the effect of making
cooperation less attractive . . . . We may want less cooperation (and trust) rather than more,
especially among those who are threatening us, and whose cooperation is a hindrance to ours.")
(footnote omitted).
322
Cf. Hardin, Trustworthiness, supra note 167, at 28 ("Independently of whether there is
something moral about being trustworthy or untrustworthy, however, trust might be fully explicable
as a capability or as a product of rational expectation without any moral residue.").
323
Even further, cognitive trust may only be conceived as a purely positive phenomenon. In
that regard, trust is similar to knowledge and, thus, independent of actors' preferences and choices.
One either knows (trusts) or does not know (trust). See Hardin, supra note 215, at 624 ("If trust
turns on expected incentives of others, then trust is in a cognitive category with knowledge. I do not
choose to trust. Rather, once I have relevant knowledge, that knowledge constitutes my trust or
distrust.").
324
Baier, supra note 19, at 231-32 ("Exploitation and conspiracy, as much as justice and
fellowship, thrive better in an atmosphere of trust.").
325
See Baier, supra note 19, at 232 ("There are immoral as well as moral trust relationships,
and trust-busting can be a morally proper goal."); Baier, Trusting, supra note 166, at 137 ("Those
who are worthy of the trust of their co-workers in say the drug business, or are loyal gang members,
are not necessarily the better for their trustworthiness, and those who put their trust in those who
perpetuate exploitation or domination are not to be admired for their willingness to trust."); Mark
Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC.
481, 492 (1985) ("Force and fraud are most efficiently pursued by teams, and the structure of these
teams requires a level of internal trust—'honor among thieves'—that usually follows preexisting lines
of relationship."); Ring & Van de Ven, supra note 60, at 110 ("[T]he seeds for disintegration of
relationships are contained in the very governance structures, safeguards, and processes that lead to
their formation and growth.").
326
See Baier, supra note 19, at 232 ("If we are to tell when morality requires the preservation
of trust, when it requires the destruction of trust, we obviously need to distinguish different forms of
321
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This Article is only concerned with the (positive or descriptive)
mechanics of trusting (as a social norm and enforcement mechanism in
itself)—not the normative virtues327 of trusting from a perspective of overall
social utility—and with the insights that may be gained from the mechanics
of trusting to better predict the confidence of firm participants investing in
firms that allow and guarantee their principal decision-makers absolute
discretionary power over the investments made by others. Of course, we
want those decision-makers to be competent, honest, regular in their
behavior, to have good intentions and share norms of prudent and ethical
business practices. But that is not the inquiry of this Article. Rather, the
question is: why do we regularly engage in forms of trusting with respect to
such virtues—why do we trust such virtues to exist within others and to
guide their future behavior? Why do we—through our use of the notion of
trusting others—voluntarily328 make ourselves vulnerable to potential
(financial) harm caused by those very same other people acting
opportunistically after our investment of trust? Part of the answer has
already been provided by the prior discussion of the process of trusting and
its payoffs,329 specifically the autopoietic and self-referential reinforcement
of trusting as a process which is beneficial and meaningful in and of itself.330
What remains to be discussed in this Part is how the value-neutral substance
of trusting—i.e., the preferential and motivational drivers behind the
mechanical parts of the phenomenon of trusting—help provide a more
complete answer to the above question(s).
1. Trust (Mechanically) Defined
To use Kaushik Basu's language, "like cows, [trust is] easier to
recognize than to define. Most existing definitions are suggestive rather than
exact."331 Heeding such warning, it seems prudent for purposes of the
trust, and to look for some morally relevant features they may possess.").
327
Cf. Arrow, supra note 20, at 345 (listing trust among "what are in a slightly old-fashioned
terminology called virtues").
328
See Baier, supra note 19, at 240 (stating that trust has a "voluntarist . . . character"); Blair
& Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1746; Galston, supra note 1, at 130; Stout,
Mythical Benefits, supra note 32, at 801.
329
See supra Part III.A.2.
330
See Child, supra note 1, at 275 (defining trust as "the willingness of one person or group
to relate to another in the belief that the other's actions will be beneficial rather than detrimental,
even though this cannot be guaranteed"); Mayer et al., supra note 160, at 712.
331
Basu, supra note 152, at 476. Cf. Miller, supra note 23, at 641 ("The recent scholarship
has failed to coalesce around a precise definition of the term 'social norm.'"); Posner, supra note 14,
at 1699 ("The concept of a 'norm' is slippery, and scholars use it in different ways. I will begin by
offering some definitions, and if they seem arbitrary, it at least can be said that this is a defect shared
by all writings on this subject."); Siebecker, supra note 11, at 148 (diagnosing a "fundamental lack
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following discussion to separate and individualize certain central and
structural tenets (or ingredients) of the substance of trusting (i.e., the
substance of what A and B reciprocally exchanged in their three-staged
process of trusting as trust, trustfulness, and trustworthiness)332 and to
analyze each such individual ingredient (or set of ingredients) first, before
attempting to draw a more collective and inclusive picture of the substance
of trusting.
a.

Exposure to, and Acceptance of, In-Trusting Vulnerability

Cooperation is guided by mutually or reciprocally shared ends or
objectives.333 Ends, however, may not be met. Accordingly, cooperation
inescapably requires cooperators' exposure to failure—both individual and
collective failure (in the sense of failing to meet the objective(s) of
cooperation). Failure to meet the ends of cooperation can have many causes.
A critical cause of potential failure for purposes of trusting, however, is
moral hazard.334 Included in the shared benefits of cooperation from the
trusting relationship are, of course, the payoffs from the process of trusting
discussed previously.335 In particular, I am referring to the autopoietic
validation that trusting can be trusted, that trust, by itself is good, and that as
a trustful and trustworthy person, one is good because one trusts (because
one has trusted) and can be trusted (because one could be trusted).336
Each party to a trust relationship, in trusting, is therefore self-creating,
accepting,337 and exposing to the other(s), its vulnerability to ex-post
of consensus … with respect to what trust entails"); Williamson, supra note 13, at 453 ("'[T]rust' is a
term with many meanings.").
332
See supra Part III.A.
333
Cooperating parties share the same objectives of cooperation mutually (e.g. car-pooling
for a certain road trip). They share different personal objectives of cooperation reciprocally when
those ends are non-identical but complementary to each other (e.g., buying and selling a house). In
such a case, cooperating parties mutually share that which they share reciprocally, (i.e., they
mutually share the same objective of achieving their reciprocal, complementary, non-identical ends
as a result of the same cooperation with each other, meaning that they both want to achieve the sale
of the house, even though their individual goals are different).
334
By which I mean the post-investment opportunistic behavior of cooperative counterparties which unilaterally shifts either (i) some of the otherwise shared benefits of cooperation from
the trusting party to the trusted, or (ii) some of the otherwise shared costs of cooperation from the
trusted party to the trusting, or (iii) worse, both. Cf. Ring & Van de Ven, supra note 60, at 92-93
(stating that "adverse selection" and "moral hazard" "deal directly with uncertainty that will be
transaction specific and directly related to a willingness of the parties to rely on each other's
trustworthiness in the face of the specific kinds of circumstances that give rise to the possible
occurrence of either . . . .").
335
See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
336
See supra Part III.A.2.
337
See Baier, supra note 19, at 235; Cook et al., supra note 2, at 140; Rousseau et al., supra
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opportunism,338 which may destroy (some of) the benefits of trusting.339 Not
only could each party lose its respective investment in trusting; each could
(and often will) be even worse off than in the status quo ex ante trusting (at
least, already with regard to its trust in the process and predictive value of
trusting).340 In addition, built into this vulnerability is a further cognitive
exacerbation of exposure to the risk of harm: a special sub-vulnerability
exists that as part of the trusting relationship one will not even notice harm
until it is too late because of the well-disguised ill will and abuse of
discretionary power by the trusted party.341 But even in situations where the
trusting party can perfectly monitor the performance of the trusted party,
trusting will be necessary (and only truly happen) in those situations in
which (as will often be the case) the trusting party has irrevocably given
away (near) absolute discretionary powers342 over what is entrusted before
any action of the trusted party occurs vis-à-vis the entrusted object of trust
(C),343 thereby creating an unresolvable (chrono-)logical dilemma for
potential future injury that is unavoidable in absolute terms (unless one were
to never cooperate with others).344 Thus, the combined downside risks from
the substance of trusting in the form of exposing oneself to in-trusting
vulnerability (i.e., vulnerability created by the very engagement in trusting)
are already rather significant.

note 14, at 395 ("Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based
upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.").
338
Baier, supra note 19, at 235 ("Where one depends on another's good will, one is
necessarily vulnerable to the limits of that good will. One leaves others an opportunity to harm one
when one trusts, and also shows one's confidence that they will not take it."); Richter, supra note 8,
at 179 (stating that the main problem of Williamsonian transaction cost economics is "ex-post
opportunism").
339
Cf. Mayer et al., supra note 170, at 712 ("Being vulnerable . . . implies that there is
something of importance to be lost. Making oneself vulnerable is taking risk. Trust is not taking
risk per se, but rather it is a willingness to take risk.").
340
Cf. Ide & Yarn, Fact Finding, supra note 11, at 1119 (explaining how "distrust" arises).
341
See Baier, supra note 19, at 239 ("The special vulnerability which trust involves is
vulnerability to not yet noticed harm, or to disguised ill will."); Baier, Trusting, supra note 166, at
139-40 ("[Trust] is willingness to give discretionary powers, to postpone checking and
accounting."); Hill & O'Hara, supra note 11, at 1787 ("[D]irectors are not apt to look for, and hence
unlikely to find, evidence of untrustworthiness that causes them to update their trust assessments.").
342
Baier, supra note 19, at 237.
343
See Dasgupta, supra note 1, at 51 ("If I can monitor what others have done before I
choose my own action, the word 'trust' loses its potency.") (emphasis added).
344
See Baier, Trusting, supra note 166, at 139-40; Cook et al., supra note 2, at 121; Lewis &
Weigert, supra note 13, at 968; Ring & Van de Ven, supra note 60, at 92.
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Exposure to, and Acceptance of, Pre-Trusting Vulnerability

There is, however, an even more significant potential downside. In
addition to in-trusting vulnerability (i.e., ex-post opportunism that injures
and (partially) denies the individual benefits of a particular trust
relationship), the substance of trusting for cooperative purposes also has a
deeper, more existential importance and motivation. Trust parties enter into
trust relationships for purposes of cooperation because cooperation—in
particular, where it is not absolutely necessary for purposes of subsistence
and survival of the trust party in question—gives (common) "meaning"345 to
each trust party's (limited) life.346 Each party to a trust relationship will often
have accumulated, during its past lifetime, a diffuse set of pre-trusting
vulnerabilities which are pre-existent to trusting (i.e., which entirely precede,
and exist independently of, the trusting relationship) but which utilize
trusting for purposes of allowing each trust party to better manage, and cope
with, its inevitable (since existential) perennial exposure to those pre-trusting
vulnerabilities.347
To be more specific, trusting ultimately allows each party to a trust
relationship to better manage, and cope with, its own mortality.348 Death is a
certainty, not a risk.349 Its occurrence is inevitable, largely unpredictable and
(not counting the possibility of suicide) ultimately uncontrollable. The risk
of instant or looming death is a constant companion to life. Death, the end
of life, is the only real vulnerability humans have built into themselves as
living beings.350 Every other vulnerability (e.g., an illness, a loss of money, a
loss of a loved one) is ultimately only perceived and a derivative of the
human fear of death and of the constant risk of sudden and instant
materialization of mortality. Most, if not all, humans build up a good
number of personal vulnerabilities over the course of their lives. A common

345

Cf. Rousseau et al., supra note 14, at 393.
See Leslie, supra note 179, at 532 ("Trust is important—often essential—to many
cooperative endeavors. This is true between individuals, between firms, and between governments.
Community cannot exist without trust.").
347
See Ribstein, supra note 4, at 559 (discussing how, under Diego Gambetta's theory, "the
evolution of cooperation depends on . . . a willingness to believe in trustworthiness").
348
See Mitchell, Being Trusted, supra note 11, at 610-11 ("And our recognition of this fact,
even if it is largely subconscious, helps lead us to trust and to cooperate.").
349
Id. at 610.
350
One could argue that—at least, in absolute terms—death cannot be a true vulnerability
since we all die some day. However, I assume that we all are—at least, to some extent—relativists
in this regard because we believe that more of the "good" quality of life that we currently have (or
earlier had) is better (at least, better than to stop right here), so that quantity always immediately
translates into quality.
346
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antidote (or counter-weight) to those vulnerabilities—which are merely
caused by the fear of harm and the fear of pain—can be seen in attempts to
make sense of being alive, to make one's life meaningful, to attempt living an
authentic, genuine life—notwithstanding (and rather because, and in the
face, of) mortality and its derivative vulnerabilities.351 Cooperation with
others, based on trust, is one such very powerful antidote.352 All of this may
(admittedly) appear more than just a bit esoteric at this stage. However, I
will attempt to discuss below the very real psychological payoffs from
exposing oneself to, and exchanging, pre-trusting vulnerabilities which can
be seen as the most intimate and central motivators for why humans engage
in cooperation which is not essential for survival and, thus, engage in the
substance of trusting.
c.

Exposure to Good Will and Vulnerability to Ill Will

At its heart, trust is about beneficence,353 about doing good.354 And it
is genuine, sincere beneficence that matters here: doing good because it is
truly meant and not faking it for appearances sake.355 To be truly meant,
beneficence requires trust parties to act with bona fides, to act (literally
translated) in good faith.356 And good faith requires that one is oriented

351

See generally RICHARD G. BENTON, DEATH AND DYING: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES IN
PATIENT CARE 28 (1979) ("Philosophical considerations of death generally flow from larger
conceptualizations that try to articulate mankind's purpose, goals, and role in a created universe, in
an accidental universe, or in a mechanical universe."); id. at 29 ("Existentialism has generally treated
death as the total end of man: a resolution into nothing. Existentialism has thus treated death as
entry into a complete void or an unknowable phenomenon—as nonexistence. The existentialist
emphasizes coming to terms with one's inevitable nonexistence.").
352
See Mitchell, Being Trusted, supra note 11, at 610-11 ("[W]e are only human. And our
recognition of this fact, even if it is largely subconscious, helps lead us to trust and to cooperate.").
353
FitzGibbon, supra note 14, at 308 ("A fiduciary must be beneficent.").
354
"Benefic" comes from the Latin roots "bene" and "facere," and is defined as
"beneficent." See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 106 (10th ed. 1993).
"Beneficent" is defined as "doing or producing good." Id.; see also Mayer et al., supra note 170, at
718-719 ("A number of researches have included characteristics similar to benevolence as a basis for
trust."). I should note that I do not use the term "good" here in any absolute (thus, normative) sense
but only in mere relative (thus, descriptive) terms. In such latter terms, "doing good" is about
improving or maintaining the well-being of others irrespective of whether such improved or
maintained well-being is morally right or wrong.
355
Mayer et al., supra note 170, at 718 ("Benevolence is the extent to which a trustee is
believed to want to do good to the trustor, aside from an egocentric profit motive. Benevolence
suggests that the trustee has some specific attachment to the trustor.").
356
See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 106 (10th ed. 1993); Lewis &
Weigert, supra note 13, at 968 ("[Trust] is the mutual 'faithfulness' on which all social relationships
ultimately depend.").
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towards another with goodwill (i.e., benign intent or benevolence)357 and is
willing and prepared to exercise such goodwill to the other person—even at
some personal cost and, perhaps, sacrifice. In other words, it requires that
one is genuinely "other-regarding."358 The person who acts beneficently, in
good faith, and exercises goodwill towards others is considered authentic.
The substance of trusting therefore involves reliance359 by trusting
parties "on another's good will, perhaps minimal good will."360 Accordingly,
and as already discussed more broadly above, trust is about making oneself
dependent on another and giving such other person (discretionary) power to
harm us, but in the (relative) confidence that such other person will (i) not
exploit such power against us and harm us, and (ii) rather protect us from
downside risk and, thus, use the power for purposes of mutually beneficial
cooperative ends.361 In other words, trust is "accepted vulnerability to
another's possible but not expected ill will (or lack of good will) toward
one"362 together with a measured (and not necessarily reasonable), but
confident expectation363 that the other will exercise general goodwill towards
one, in particular, already by reciprocating the goodwill of oneself exercised
in first signaling and then extending trustfulness and trustworthiness to the
other.
Combining everything that has been discussed so far for purposes of
defining trust, it can be said that trust is a crucial sedative to overcome the
fear of harm. All fear of harm is ultimately derivative of the fear of death.
Thus, trust is not only a Band-Aid. It is also a powerful pain-killer. It

357
See Burke & Stets, supra note 173, at 347-48; Jones, supra note 166, at 4; Mayer et al.,
supra note 170, at 718-19.
358
See Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1742 n.10, 1743; Stout,
Proper Motives, supra note 18, at 23.
359
Hardin, supra note 215, at 623 ("All standard accounts of trust assume that it involves
reliance on someone or some agency."); see also ARROW, supra note 1, at 23 ("Trust is . . .
extremely efficient; it saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people's
word.").
360
Baier, supra note 19, at 234; see also Burke & Stets, supra note 173, at 348 ("[T]rust is a
belief that the other holds both goodwill and benign intent toward us."); Jones, supra note 166, at 4;
Ring & Van de Ven, supra note 60, at 93.
361
See Child, note 1, at 275; Jones, supra note 166, at 6 ("At the center of trust is an attitude
of optimism about the other person's goodwill.").
362
Baier, supra note 19, at 235 (emphasis added); Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations,
supra note 11, at 1739-40; Heminway, supra note 11, at 177; Mayer et al., supra note 170, at 712
(defining trust as "the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on
the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of
the ability to monitor or control that other party"); Rousseau et al., supra note 14, at 395.
363
Dasgupta, supra note 1, at 51 (defining trust as "correct expectations about the actions of
other people that have a bearing on one's own choice of action when that action must be chosen
before one can monitor the actions of those others"); Rousseau et al., supra note 14, at 395.
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subdues the pain of certain mortality (and sends it back into the
subconscious). Mortality is, thus, the antithesis of trust. Upon death,
everything falls apart. The cohesion and stability provided by the process of
trusting (as discussed above)364 disappear in an instant. The cohesion of life
(i.e., the human being as a biological, non-interactive system) and the
stability of life (i.e., the human as a social, interactive being) both
permanently end.365 Trust is the sedative that gives us a (false) sense366 of
holding ourselves together, of being cohesive, stable, and firm so that we do
not feel paralyzed367 and are able to take "rational action in the present."368
d.

Expectations, Information and Confidence

The expectations and counter-expectations of goodwill which are built
into a trust relationship and exchanged by the trusting parties must be wellgrounded and embedded in the factual and situational reality of the
substance of trusting. Each trusting party will need to signal and receive
minimum sets of expectations and counter-expectations of trustfulness and
trustworthiness with regard to future goodwill of other and self in order to
take the leap into the unknown369 which is at the heart of trusting. Unless it
were to occur blindly (in which situation we would call the trust extended
"blind"370 and irrational371), such a leap will only occur—under normal

364

See supra notes 273-80 and accompanying text.
See supra note 351 and accompanying text.
366
ANDREW J. WEIGERT, SOCIOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE 82 (1981) ("The trust which
undergirds our everyday lives is a pure social construction which answers to our need for security by
seeming to be a fact when it is always a projected assumption."). In this regard, one may also argue
that trusting is always neurotic because it is driven by a need for security (i.e., the absence of harm
from certain mortality) which is permanently unattainable and its unattainability is known in toto.
367
See Luhmann, supra note 19, at 4 (stating that the only alternatives to trusting would be
"chaos and paralyzing fear").
368
Lewis & Weigert, supra note 13, at 968 ("If all possible future events were accorded
equal probability, the future would appear with such enormous complexity as to preclude rational
action in the present.").
369
See Child, Fundamental Bond, supra note 1, at 276 ("[T]rust involves something like a
leap of faith over and above any basis that we have for certainty."); Dean, supra note 11, at 465
("Trust is a matter of acting on imperfect information."); Lewis & Weigert, supra note 13, at 970
("The cognitive element in trust is characterized by a cognitive 'leap' beyond the expectations that
reason and experience alone would warrant—they simply serve as the platform from which the leap
is made.").
370
Blind trust is not to be confused with unconscious trust, i.e. trust that remains
unconscious to both parties (for example, two drivers on a road going in opposite directions; each
driver trusts that the other will follow—under normal circumstances—basic traffic rules that regulate
which side of the road to use). Unconscious trust is real trust in that it is based on (some) rational
(though not conscious and openly communicated) expectations. Blind trust has no rational
footing—it is based on a neurotic expectation horizon. See Dasgupta, supra note 1, at 50-51 ("[W]e
365
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circumstances372—once a party has gathered, received and communicated
sufficient levels of information373 about the goodwill of other and self374 so
that she has developed a basis for trusting others and will feel sufficiently
confident about the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of certain future
contingencies which the process of trusting and its resultant cooperative
activity will manage to enable, if not manage to control.375
2. The Trust Exchange—Take 2
Having discussed the basic definitional elements of the substance of
trusting, it is now possible to explain the interdependency of trust parties376
and the exchange of trusting premises—as far as the substance of trusting is
concerned—in three different kinds or levels of substantive reciprocities of
trusting. Figure 3 below provides an overview in this regard.

like to distinguish 'trusting someone' from 'trusting someone blindly', and think the latter to be illadvised."); Dent, supra note 179, at 50 ("To some, trust excludes all calculation; it is what is
commonly called blind trust."); Gambetta, supra note 30, at 218; see also Lewis & Weigert, supra
note 13, at 972; Luhmann, supra note 19, at 81 ("Love and hate make one blind.").
371
Cf. Child, Fundamental Bond, supra note 1, at 276 ("To trust blindly would be extremely
naive and is not a prescription for survival in business."); Hardin, supra note 215, at 623; Yamagishi
et al., supra note 171, at 190 ("Being highly trustful, expecting benign treatment from 'strangers,' in
such an environment makes a person unrealistically optimistic."). Irrational trust could also be
termed "faith" in its strictest sense. Cf. Lewis & Weigert, supra note 13, at 972 ("Taken to
extremes, if all cognitive content were removed from emotional trust, we would be left with blind
faith or fixed hope, the true believer or the pious faithful."); Siebecker, supra note 11, at 151
("While encapsulated trust may indeed depend on rational expectations of a certain sort, nothing
beyond rational expectation (such as blind hope, belief in God, etc.) can sustain trust.").
372
There can often be situations where reaching confidence will not be possible, given the
restrictions of time, space and the human capacity to sort and process information. In those
situations, the leap can still happen if the trusting party calculates that the benefits of trusting
outweigh the cost of the current status quo ex ante trusting. For example, I will not be confident that
my 18-year-old son could single-handedly carry me down the stairs and out of a second-floor
apartment, but if the apartment were on fire and I cannot remove myself from the apartment on my
own (since, for example, I am injured), I would have relatively more confidence in letting him try to
carry me out (and would have confidence that he would try his best in order to succeed at it)
compared to my confidence (or lack thereof) that without trusting him I could still manage to remain
safe in the apartment.
373
Cf. TODEVA, supra note 1, at 89 ("Communication and exchange of information are an
intrinsic part of a dyadic relationship and take place between already connected actors.").
374
Cf. Hardin, supra note 215, at 623 ("Whether I should trust you, distrust you, or be
neutral is typically a matter of prudence.").
375
See Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1767 ("[P]sychologists and
sociologists posit that trust is a generalized expectancy or belief about others' behavior formed on the
basis of accumulated experience.").
376
Cf. Rousseau et al., supra note 14, at 395 (explaining that "interdependence" is the idea
that "the interests of one party cannot be achieved without reliance upon another.").
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On a first level of substantive reciprocity, the substance of trusting
involves a reciprocal, almost entirely symmetrical exchange of goodwill
between the trusting parties. Each party to a trust relationship exposes itself
to vulnerabilities—both in-trusting and pre-trusting vulnerabilities as
discussed above—and may, accordingly, be harmed because of the ex-post
opportunistic behavior of the other party.377 The entrusting party, ceding
discretionary power to the entrusted party, may become injured because the
entrusted party could abuse the discretionary power over the object or matter
entrusted (i.e., C) by the entrusting party.378 But, in addition and as discussed
in the procedural reciprocities involved in the process of trusting above, each
party—entrusting and entrusted—may be injured during the process of
trusting because the other party is not meeting the pre-trusting expectations
and counter-expectations of the first party whose expectations became part
of the trusting relationship.379

377
378
379

See supra Part III.B.1.c.
Id.
See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
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Figure 3
The Substantive Reciprocities of Trusting

A

Trusting Relationship

B

Good Will
In-trusting
= controlled
vulnerability

Dependency; exposure to harm;
exposure to (absolute)
discretionary power

Pre-trusting
= uncontrolled
vulnerability

Acceptance through avoidance
of harm; affirmation of
controllability of risk of harm;
other- & self-verification
Dependency; avoidance of harm;
exercise of (absolute)
discretionary power
Acceptance through delegation of
power to harm; confidence in
controllability of risk of harm;
other- & self-verification

In-trusting
= controlled
vulnerability

Pre-trusting
= uncontrolled
vulnerability

Each party's trustfulness and trustworthiness is at risk. Each party's
reputation380 as a trustful, trustworthy and trusting party is at risk.381 Each
party's belief and personal investment in trust—that one, in general, can trust
trust and that trust works—is at risk.382 All of those in-trusting
vulnerabilities (i.e., those created by engaging in a particular process of

380
Dasgupta, supra note 1, at 53 ("[T]rust is based on reputation and that reputation has
ultimately to be acquired through behaviour over time in well-understood circumstances . . . .").
381
For example, each party—post-trusting—could make misrepresentations to others about
the quality of the other party's trustworthiness/trustfulness, about the success of their trusting
relationship (or lack thereof), and about the reasons for such success (or lack thereof). Cf. Blair &
Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1750 (explaining the role of reputation).
382
See supra note 380 and accompanying text.
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trusting) are put on the line by each party to the trusting relationship in
perfect (reciprocal) symmetry with each other and independent of whether
the party is entrusted or entrusting.383 As a result, each party to a
consummated trusting relationship extends goodwill to the other party as part
of the substance of trusting.384
On the second level of substantive reciprocities involved in the
substance of trusting, each party will give and receive "self-relevant [and
other-relevant] meaning:"385 A—assuming here to be the entrusting party
(but the same applies vice versa to B as the entrusted party) creates its own
dependency and in-trusting vulnerability by exposing itself to potential harm
through its voluntary grant of, and resultant exposure to, (often absolute)
discretionary power to B and B's subsequent (ab-)use of such power.386 As a
substantive reciprocity on this second level, assuming that the trust
relationship will be consummated between A and B successfully, A must
receive something in return for B's receipt of A's trust. That something—the
"meaning" part387—begins with B accepting A as another human being whom
B is willing to interact with, even to the extent that such acceptance involves
assumed responsibility to exercise discretionary power for the benefit of, or
the avoidance of harm to, A's interest. B is essentially affirming and
representing to A that A and A's interest are important (enough) for B to care
about and to go out of B's way in order to benefit, or to avoid harm to,
them.388 Furthermore—and most importantly—B is also affirming to A that it
is possible to control the risk of harm—even if (or particularly because) one
gives absolute power of discretion to another human being.389 If a person
trusts carefully, others will verify to her and, at the same time, she will selfverify to herself that trust works, that it is a good thing to trust, that her

383
Because, as has been demonstrated above, each is both—trusting and trusted—as part of
the reciprocal process of trusting. See supra Part III.A.1.
384
See supra III.B.1.c.
385
See Burke & Stets, supra note 173, at 349.
386
See Baier, supra note 19, at 240 (mentioning the "voluntarist . . . character" of trust);
Galston, supra note 1, at 130; Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 32, at 801.
387
See Burke & Stets, supra note 173, at 349.
388
See Hardin, supra note 215, at 623; Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and the Overlapping
Consensus, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1918, 1924 (1994) ("In order to sustain trust in the face of . . .
vulnerabilities there must be some basis for believing that the trusted party understands and accepts
as legitimate the trusting party's interests or goals.").
389
Cf. Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1785 ("[I]f one assumes
that the contracting parties are purely selfish, trying to control opportunistic behavior by asking
individuals to adopt an other-regarding preference function makes about as much sense as trying to
change the dietary habits of wolves by telling them to like vegetables instead of meat. Yet the
empirical evidence on trust . . . demonstrates that people behave as if they do change preferences—
and they do so on a regular and predictable basis.").
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interests are important because others care about them, and that she is
important enough to be cared about—by both others and herself.390 It is
good391 to be trusting because others are trustworthy and she will be better off
being trustful. It is equally good to be a trusted person who can be trusted.
Being good in the way one acts (and, if acting genuinely, in the way one is),
means that one does not have to change as a person.392 Not having to change
as a person is prima facie good because it is often painfully difficult to
genuinely change oneself.393
As a mirror-image to this A-focused view of the second-level
substantive reciprocity of trusting, B likewise creates its personal
dependency and in-trusting vulnerability by exposing itself to the
commitment to, and exercise of, absolute discretionary power and the
avoidance of harm to A's interest.394 Even with the best intentions, B's
exercise of discretionary power might not bring about the expected result for
A's interest and may even hurt A's interest. In this situation, B has not done
anything "wrong" (i.e., has not "failed" A) but has committed and exposed
itself so that A may still blame B for the reduced benefit or even injury to A's
interest. Even if B exercised discretionary power perfectly under the
circumstances and achieved the best possible result for A's interest,
information about both of these facts might be scarce395 (even to A and B),
and A may (knowingly or unknowingly) hurt B's reputation as a trustworthy
party by disseminating incorrect information to others about A's
disappointment in B and the lack of B's (apparent) trustworthiness.396 Thus,
B voluntarily assumes the responsibility to A which comes with discretionary
authority and exposes himself to the vulnerability of being blamed later on
(incorrectly) for non-beneficial outcomes. Thus, exercising absolute power
in order to benefit, or to avoid harm to, A's interest can be a tall order.
Similarly to A, B must receive some beneficial self- and other-relevant
"meaning" in return for making himself responsible for beneficial outcomes

390

Cf. id. at 1750 (describing "internalized trust").
Or "efficient." Cf. id. at 1753 ("Social scientists have long argued that evolution can
favor the development of a capacity for altruism in social organisms such as homo sapiens.").
392
Cf. id. at 1785 (describing how people are not "purely selfish").
393
Cf. Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1785; Burke & Stets, supra
note 173, at 349 ("People feel efficacious and good about themselves when they are able to verify
themselves.").
394
See supra note 388 and accompanying text.
395
Cf. TODEVA, supra note 1, at 89 (stating the importance of "[c]ommunication and
exchange of information").
396
Cf. Reich-Graefe, supra note 4, at 516-17 (stating that trusting parties "neither like to be
shamed nor framed.").
391
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to A's interest and for shouldering A's trust.397 That meaning again begins
with A accepting B as another human being whom A is willing to interact
with by delegating discretionary power of benefit and harm. A is now
affirming and representing to B that B and B's qualities as a human being
(including, of course, trustworthiness) are important enough and sufficiently
well developed within B for A to put B in charge—to some extent, at least—
of A's destiny and well-being notwithstanding (or particularly because of) B's
power to harm A.398 Similarly, A affirms to B that it is possible to be
confident in the controllability of the risk of harm by delegating
discretionary power to the "right" other human being(s). Again, if a person
does so carefully, others will verify that trust works, that it is a (now
common) good thing to be trusted, that the person's qualities are important to
others, and that the person herself is important enough to be cared about by
other and herself.399 It is good to be trusted because others are trustful and
one will be better off by being trustworthy. To be trusted is good and to trust
others' trustfulness is good. As a result, A and B—in a single selfconfirming, self-verifying,400 self-fulfilling and self-strengthening exercise of
trusting—have now also produced a common good401 and, thus, a modicum
of "meta-trust," that is "trust in trust-involving relationships and forms of
cooperation."402

397
Which may often be more of a burden than a gift. See Mitchell, Being Trusted, supra
note 11, at 599 ("[T]o be told that we are trustworthy demands that we behave at a level that reflects
that gift."); Reich-Graefe, supra note 4, at 516 (asking whether trust "is is indeed a 'gift' or whether it
is rather a curse"). See also Baier, supra note 19, at 235 ("[T]here is such a thing . . . as unwanted
trust, as forced receipt of trust."); Jones, supra note 166, at 9 ("We do not always welcome trust.
Sometimes someone's trust in us can feel coercive.").
398
Cf. Baier, supra note 19, at 235 ("Where one depends on another's good will, one is
necessarily vulnerable to the limits of that good will. One leaves others an opportunity to harm one
when one trusts, and also shows one's confidence that they will not take it. Reasonable trust will
require good grounds for such confidence in another's good will, or at least the absence of good
grounds for expecting their ill will or indifference."). B's delegated power to harm A makes A's
acceptance of B more meaningful. If A would not accept B, A would not delegate power to B in the
first place.
399
See supra note 390 and accompanying text.
400
Cf. Burke & Stets, supra note 173, at 349 ("In self-verification, individuals seek to
confirm their self-views, often by looking at the responses and views of others. In this way, selfverification and self-confirmation are the same process." (citations omitted)).
401
Cf. Mitchell, supra note 388, at 1924.
402
Baier, Trusting, supra note 166, at 137; see also ERIK H. ERICKSON, CHILDHOOD AND
SOCIETY 247 (35th Anniversary Ed., 1963) ("basic trust"); Becker, supra note 167, at 43 (presenting
"the importance of . . . a sense of security about other people's benevolence, conscientiousness, and
reciprocity"); Becker, supra note 167 at 44 ("[A] particular form of noncognitive trust . . . ought to
be of central interest to political philosophers."); Yamagishi et al., supra note 171, at 170 (describing
the theory of "general trust" (i.e., "trust in others in general"); Yamagishi et al., supra note 171, at
171-72, 189-90 (characterizing "general trust . . . as an emancipator of people from the confines of
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Finally, on the third level of reciprocities involved in the substance of
trusting, each of A and B exchange within each other—in complete
symmetry and harmony and as a result of a successful consummation of trust
and of the two prior levels of substantive reciprocities—uncontrollable pretrusting vulnerabilities (i.e., those that pre-exist their trust relationship within
each of them) with controllable in-trusting vulnerabilities (i.e., those created
by them pursuant to the trust relationship itself). As discussed on the second
level of substantive reciprocities, each party affirms to the other the
controllability of the risk of future harm as part of the substance of trusting.
In other words, the exchange of goodwill at the heart of the substance of
trusting reduces uncertainty-bearing for each party engaged in trusting with
regard to the future.403 Each party exchanges an absolute, uncontrollable,
permanent, non-created, and entirely diffuse pre-trusting vulnerability
(namely, the absolute certainty of its mortality combined with the absolute
Knightian uncertainty of the time, place and circumstances of its ultimate
death404) with a relative, controllable, limited, self-created, and very concrete
in-trusting vulnerability (transforming any uncertainty about such
vulnerability materializing into a quantifiable, perhaps only minimally
quantifiable, and voluntarily accepted risk).
Trusting, therefore, is an exercise of controlling absolute pre-trusting
vulnerability through creating relative in-trusting vulnerability. Trusting
constitutes the incremental metamorphosis and reduction of Knightian
uncertainty into measurable and calculated risks.405 The trust exercise
exchanges one set of (potentially overwhelmingly large406) vulnerabilities
with another, smaller set, thereby exchanging the risk of looming mortality
with much smaller, non-traumatic, and voluntarily self-imposed risks of
potential harm (which risks are, thus, controllable and survivable even when
they should materialize). Trusting can therefore be described as a controlled
gamble (or bet, or hedge)—a limited-downside-probability leap into the
relative unknown which comes with mostly upside probability.407 And that
safe but closed relationships").
All individual accounts of common-good meta-trust can be seen as contributory to, and can
be aggregated in, "social trust," a "public good." See Colombo, supra note 11, at 845; Ide & Yarn,
supra note 11, at 1120, 1123-24.
403
Cf. Child, Fundamental Bond, supra note 1, at 276; Dunn, supra note 167, at 73 ("Trust .
. . is essentially concerned with coping with uncertainty over time . . . .").
404
See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
405
Cf. Burke & Stets, supra note 173, at 349 ("[T]rust [is] . . . more than a rational
expectation and calculation; it involves social and emotional bases as well."); Cook et al., supra note
2, at 121 ("We define trust building as the process through which social interaction opportunities
involving risk are transformed into trust relations . . . .").
406
Cf. Luhmann, supra note 171, at 97 ("[Trust] presupposes a situation of risk.").
407
See Gambetta, supra note 30, at 234 ("Trust, even if always misplaced, can never do
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upside probability does not even have to include any net benefit to any trust
party's interest. Both parties are immediately better off when trust works,
even if the actual net value of their instance of trusting and of cooperating is
neutral. This is because each party reduces its uncertainty-bearing in regards
to the future and affirms and verifies the (ultimately incorrect) outlook of the
other party—as well as self-affirms and self-verifies its symmetrical
outlook—that Knightian uncertainty is escapable, at least, within small
increments or measures of lived trust.408 In most general terms, it can
therefore be said that engaging in trust works as a strategic409 solution to the
existential dilemma of human mortality and the resultant meaning of life.
Neither party is self-sufficient in this regard.410 The verification of self and
other which accrues to each party of a successful trust relationship can only
happen through the other party's counter-verification of self and other.411
Each party's interest in trusting, in the fulfillment of trusting, and in the
achievement of the payoffs of trusting, logically "encapsulates" the other
party's reciprocal and symmetrical interest in the same.412 Trust, therefore,
involves the codependent validation of encapsulated self-interest. Trust
parties simultaneously and symmetrically validate self and other internally
and externally because they are never able to do so individually and
independently of each other. The benefits (if not, the virtues) of trusting are
embedded in the logical symbiosis of other and self.

worse than [sustained distrust], and the expectation that it might do at least marginally better is
therefore plausible.").
408
See supra note 257.
409
Dunn, supra note 167, at 74 ("[T]rust is ineluctably strategic, however blearily its adopter
may conceive the circumstances in which he or she comes to adopt it.").
410
See Child, Fundamental Bond, supra note 1, at 276 ("[T]rust is a characteristic of
interpersonal relationships . . . ."); Lewis & Weigert, supra note 13, at 968 ("From a sociological
perspective, trust must be conceived as a property of collective units . . . , not of isolated
individuals."); Lewis & Weigert, supra note 13, at 970 ("Although there are individual differences
relevant to the trust factor, the cognitive content of trust is a collective cognitive reality that
transcends the realm of individual psychology . . . ."); see also John Donne, DEVOTIONS UPON
EMERGENT OCCASIONS 108 (1624) ("No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of
the continent, a part of the main.").
411
See supra note 400 and accompanying text.
412
Cook, Networks, Norms, and Trust, supra note 173, at 6; Hardin, Distrust, supra note
167, at 496-97; Hardin, supra note 215, at 624; Charles Tilly, Book Review, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1293,
1293 (2007) (reviewing KAREN COOK ET AL., COOPERATION WITHOUT TRUST? (2007)). For a
discussion of "encapsulated trust," see Siebecker, supra note 11, at 148-58.
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3. Payoffs from the Substance of Trusting
Apart from situations where trusting is absolutely necessary for
purposes of subsistence and survival, no one is ever forced to trust.413 Thus,
the question of payoffs from the substance of trusting discussed prior can be
rephrased into a much simpler, but also much more potent question: "Why
trust?" Why accept vulnerability? Are there any further, maybe even more
fundamental, quid pro quos—and, thus, "positive externalities" (i.e., arising
not immediately within but as a secondary product of the trusting
relationship)414—for one's exposure to in-trusting vulnerability? Arguably, a
general answer to this question is not only an affirmative one but,
quantitatively speaking; the amount and range of possible specific answers to
such question are rather immense and enormously varied. Accordingly, the
following discussion is only meant as a first-impression, and thus
impressionistic cross section and selection of three specific answers that
immediately seem to come to mind (at least, given a research trajectory that
arrived at the analysis of the mechanics of trusting by starting with an outline
of the theoretical shortcomings of corporate governance research with regard
to properly modeling board behavior).
a.

Affinal Reciprocity, Bonding, and Group Identity

For trusting parties, the symmetrically shared and symbiotic
experience of trusting generates its own common identity (even if only as
trustful and trustworthy parties after successfully consummating a single
one-shot trusting relationship). Trust (re-)affirms to trusting parties that they
(co-dependently) create and distribute (i.e., share) a common good—viz., the
successful trusting relationship itself as well as all of its immediate
internalized payoffs discussed above. Inextricably, the trusting parties
therefore also create and distribute the maximized wealth which is accruing
to each of them because of their success at (past) trusting and success in
(present) trusting. This commonality of both their interaction and resultant
identity reciprocally increases affinity for each other415—meaning that the

413

See Lewis & Weigert, supra note 13, at 968 ("We would not have to accept [the] risk
[created by trusting] if there were some functional alternative to trust."); Mitchell, Fairness and
Trust, supra note 4, at 479 ("[T]rust at some level is not a matter of choice; to live in society, we
require some trust."); see also Hardin, supra note 215, at 624 ("If trust turns on expected incentives
of others, then trust is in a cognitive category with knowledge. I do not choose to trust. Rather,
once I have relevant knowledge, that knowledge constitutes my trust or distrust.").
414
See Colombo, supra note 11, at 845 ("[T]here are positive externalities to trust.").
415
Cf. Siebecker, supra note 11, at 147.
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(individualistic) A-centric and B-centric mirror-image views of the substance
of trusting discussed above are now transformed from mirror-images of each
other to congruent, and thus exact projections of each other (at least, with
regard to the limited common identity of being trustworthy and trustful
individuals).416 The individual (and individualizing) differences between A
and B disappear, their self- and other-relevant meaning derived from the
substance of trusting matches, and they experience an instance and "sense of
unity or 'we-ness'."417
In other words, A and B also create—qua trusting—a joint, collective,
and unitary participatory identity.418 Their cognitive shift from individual
focus to "global unity"419—based on their interaction of trusting and the joint
perception of their similarities—creates more than just a mere aggregation
(i.e., an aggregate of two trusting individuals). Rather, it creates an
additional body, unit, or entity420 of trusting which is conceptually separable
from its constituent (trusting) parts.421 That entity of trusting—bonded
together by the trusting experience as well as the resultant belief of its
constituents in their connection and attachment to and with each other—is
usually defined by sociologists and social psychologists as the group422
(here—among two trusting parties—in its minimum-member, and thus most
nuclear form). Finally, with the establishment of group (id-)entity comes not
only (group-internal) attachment to the other and some additional measure
of commitment to the group, but also a collective orientation vis-à-vis the
group-external world.423 In this regard, the theory of "groupthink" developed

416
A mirror-image is never an exact "match" of the image—in fact, it is its structural
opposite. No matter what the spatial or conceptual position of the mirroring device is in relation to
the image, the mirror-image is always a (horizontally or vertically) reverse projection of the image
rather than a congruent, i.e., exact projection of the image. Think of holding a paper bearing a
written word in front of a mirror. One sees the word reflected backwards at her.
417
Burke & Stets, supra note 173, at 352; see also Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations,
supra note 11, at 1803 (defining "projection" as "the human tendency to assume others are like
oneself").
418
Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1742 ("[E]xperimenters have
found that cooperation in social dilemmas is dramatically enhanced when the experimenter states (or
even hints) that the players ought to cooperate, when the players share a sense of group identity, and
when the players expect their fellows to behave cooperatively.").
419
Burke & Stets, supra note 143, at 362 (describing "a global unity—a 'we'").
420
See Toshio Yamagishi & Toko Kiyonari, The Group as the Container of Generalized
Reciprocity, 63 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 116, 116 (2000) (discussing how "the essence of the group exists
in the perception of its group 'entitativity'").
421
See id.
422
See id. ("The defining feature that makes a group distinct from a simple aggregation is the
existence of actual or imaginary interactions."). Corporate theorists would probably use the term
"team" instead.
423
Burke & Stets, supra note 173, at 347 ("We suggest that the process of establishing and

2013]

DECONSTRUCTING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

183

in organizational psychology and its interrelation to trust and trusting will
require further cautionary attention.424 In particular, when taking into
account—as Burke and Stets posit—that "[t]he greater the trust for others
involved in the self-verification context, the greater will be a group
orientation."425
b.

Sense-Making and Trust as a Psychological Contract

The development of, and commitment to, (group) identity as part of
the bonding/attachment process of trusting functionally addresses an even
more fundamental layer of the trusting parties' very existence and
psychological well-being (and sanity) in a world of Knightian uncertainty.
As Ring and Van de Ven have pointed out, the process of trusting can be
viewed as a psychological contract between the parties of a trust relationship
that is the result of, as well as made in pursuance to, the process of
"sensemaking" in an uncertain world.426 Through the process and transaction
of trusting, each party is offered a (vicarious) opportunity to shape, clarify
and reinforce (i) its own personal identity as it is interacting vis-à-vis and
maintaining self-verification contexts, and the positive self-feelings that result, lead to the
development of interpersonal or group cohesiveness in the form of commitment, emotional
attachment, and a collective orientation."); id. at 348 ("Self-verification leads to positive selfevaluations and positive other-evaluations in the form of dyadic trust, and trust facilitates attachment
to the other. This attachment should reveal itself not only in commitment to the other but also in
positive feelings for the other and, we anticipate, in a collective orientation to the relationship.").
424
Groupthink has been described as the dynamic process by which group members
unconsciously forgo their respective abilities to make realistic and internally validated individual
adaptive decisions for the sake of conformity with, and commitment to, a group mode of thinking
and deciding which will then often morph—for purposes of group cohesion and collective
orientation—into a group esprit de corps and rapport and into what has been described as
"homosocial reproduction." See ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE
CORPORATION 63 (1977) (coining the term "homosocial reproduction"); Marleen A. O'Connor, The
Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1238-39 (2003); see also Cox &
Munsinger, supra note 78, at 92 ("When an individual perceives a group, such as his colleagues on
the board, as agreeable, not only is he attracted to continued association with the group, but also
because of this attraction he conforms his actions to the group's views."); Donald C. Langevoort,
The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of
Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 797 (2001) ("Invitations to the board are based
heavily on matters like compatibility and 'fit.' The work of the board prizes consensus, not
conflict.").
425
Burke & Stets, supra note 173, at 353; see also Blair & Stout, Director Accountability,
supra note 11, at 440-41 (discussing the dynamic relation between other-regarding behavior and
perceptions of group identity); Cox & Munsinger, supra note 78, at 99 ("Ingroup bias is generated
by the tendency to raise or reinforce one's own self-worth by magnifying differences between a
person's ingroup and a threatening outgroup.").
426
Ring & Van de Ven, supra note 60, at 100 ("Psychological contracts, as opposed to most
legal contracts, consist of unwritten and largely nonverbalized sets of congruent expectations and
assumptions held by transacting parties about each other's prerogatives and obligations.").
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with itself (i.e., its self-view of its own internal world—for example, as a
trustworthy and trustful person), as well as (ii) its own social identity as it is
interacting vis-à-vis and within membership-based groups and society (i.e.,
its view of its outside world and its participation therein—for example, that
the world around it is generally trustworthy and trustful).427 Such
opportunity—as consummated simultaneously through the trust
relationship—allows each trust party a self-referential appreciation and
grounding of its own entire self-worth428 and being429 and, thus, provides
wholistic understanding and meaning, a posteriori, to the way such party
constructs its internal (idiosyncratic) and external (participatory) selves.
As an example of the immediate payoffs in this regard, it may be
noted that (most likely) everyone likes a trusting party, and in particular, a
high trusting party.430 If, as mentioned earlier, people have an acquired
preference and path dependency for living their lives in an all-pervading
ambience of trusting and trust, and will prefer to engage in trusting and
trust,431 a high truster will reap a significant amount of reputational gains
(and group memberships) in her trusting interactions, be exposed to an
almost constant positive feedback loop of self- and other-validation as a
"good" person,432 and, thus, be (self-)constructing—one trust relation at a
time—an ever-consolidating identity and worldview in which not only her
actions and thoughts, but her entire life, is lived right and therefore, limited
as it inevitably is, will (gradually) make overall and lasting sense. In this
regard, trust is not only a social reality but also a pervasive and existentially
meaningful, if not, critical psychological event and coping mechanism
within each trusting party and, thus, crucial in shaping each trust party's
individual (moral) destiny.433

427

In this regard, trust and trusting are immediately linked with, and relevant to, a field of
study in psychology research summarized as "social identity theory." See Blake E. Ashforth & Fred
Mael, Social Identity Theory and the Organization, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 20, 20-21 (1989); Usha
Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1291-92 (2011).
428
See Cox & Munsinger, supra note 78, at 94 ("Through attachment to a group . . .
individuals satisfy their needs to validate their self-worth, particularly by the group's feedback.").
429
Cf. Ring & Van de Ven, supra note 60, at 100.
430
Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1765.
431
See supra note 358 and accompanying text.
432
See Burke & Stets, supra note 173, at 347-48 (discussing how self-verification leads to
further positive self-evaluation and positive other-evaluation—which, of course, will lay even more
of a foundation for further trusting to occur as a process perceived to be beneficial in which to
engage).
433
See Lewis & Weigert, supra note 13, at 967-68.
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Flexibility and Low-Transaction Cost Regulation

The open-textured, "open-ended"434 concept of trust as a one-size-fits
all-conditions device of human orientation allows cooperative parties access
to another "key ingredient of economic success—flexibility."435 Flexibility is
necessary for successful economic cooperation for two reasons: Business
relationships, economic climates, and the ever increasing globalization and
competitiveness of our national and international economies—they all
require economic actors to respond and adjust quickly and efficiently to the
ever-more rapid structural changes and the acceleration in technological and
organizational metamorphoses of entire industries which come with them.436
The flexibility and versatility of today's mutual trust in business relationships
is crucial in this regard for purposes of ensuring the parties' continued
successful adaptation and innovation to the way their commercial activity
today may need to be conducted differently tomorrow.437
Flexibility, however, is also extremely important because of the
shortness of human foresight. Complete contracts (i.e., contracts that
include all terms necessary for their future performance as well as cover all
possible future contingencies that have a bearing on the parties future
performance) simply do not exist.438 Even if they might be theoretically
possible under the very limited and short-term nature and circumstances of a
particular commercial undertaking, no commercial party will bear the
prohibitive transaction costs of writing a complete contract.439 The reason
behind this is easy to spot: what is understood does not need to be
discussed.440 It would be plain stupid to write a complete contract in the face

434

Id. at 972.
Galston, supra note 1, at 130.
436
See id. at 130-31 ("In contemporary circumstances, global competition requires rapid
changes in organizational structure and mission.").
437
See Child, Fundamental Bond, supra note 1, at 279.
438
See Colombo, supra note 11, at 843-44; Ermisch et al., supra note 3, at 750; Lewis &
Weigert, supra note 13, at 980; Ring & Van de Ven, supra note 60, at 105 ("Many transactions are
never completely formally specified because the informal processes serve as substitutes for formal
transaction processes. Frequently, it is impossible for parties to foresee all possible states of nature
that might arise in a cooperative [interorganizational relationship]."); Williamson, supra note 13, at
458 ("An immediate ramification of bounded rationality is that impossibly complex forms of
economic organization (such as complete content-claims contracting) are infeasible.") (footnote
omitted).
439
See Ermisch et al., supra note 3, at 750.
440
Cf. Child, Fundamental Bond, supra note 1, at 274 ("Informal understanding, based on
trust, often proves to be a more powerful factor [than formal contracts] in determining how the
collaboration works out."); Ring & Van de Ven, supra note 58, at 100 ("Psychological contracts, as
opposed to most legal contracts, consist of unwritten and largely nonverbalized sets of congruent
435
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of a (in terms of transaction costs) vastly cheaper as well as readily and
universally available alternative: trust.
Trust will provide meaning to a contractual undertaking where either
(express or implied) contracting is absolutely silent, or is either
underinclusive or overinclusive. The exchange of expectations and counterexpectations of future (economic) behavior of other and self which lies at the
heart of trust will fairly exactly circumscribe the parameters of acceptable
behavior at an unforeseen future point in time in the parties' dealings with
each other—all without words; without negotiation; without necessarily even
the parties' consciousness about the impact of trusting on their respective
behavior; sometimes also against the precise and unequivocal written words
of the contract (which were not intended to cover such future contingency
but cover it incorrectly in the overinclusive plain meaning of the contractual
construction); and with an understanding that—if push comes to shove—the
concrete, short-term benefits of ex-post opportunism (created by the gap in
contract terms) are always better sacrificed441 on the altar of the supreme
efficiency (if not, the virtue) of the Golden Rule442 and, thus, in support of
the more diffuse, long-term benefits accruing from the "joint contractual
egotism"443 of the cooperating parties.444
IV. CLOSING SKETCHES AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
This Article's approach to trust in the realm of corporate governance
can be described as a movement back to basics. It meant to break up the
phenomenon and mechanics of trusting into component parts whose
functionality could, thus, become understood, measured and, ultimately,
applied in the absolute director primacy context. It is still far too early (and
clearly would exceed the space limits of this Article) to discuss in detail the
intricate implications of the mechanics of trusting on absolute director
expectations and assumptions held by transacting parties about each other's prerogatives and
obligations."); Ring & Van de Ven, supra note 60, at 105 ("The remaining issues [not covered in
legal contracts] become taken-for-granted assumptions in the psychological contracts that parties
develop in relation to each other through repeated interactions.").
441
See Basu, supra note 152, at 477 (describing how a "'rationality-limiting norm' . . . stops
us from doing certain things or choosing certain options, irrespective of how much utility that thing
or option gives us" and that those certain things are 'simply not done'"); Dasgupta, supra note 1, at
71 ("There are certain things, while feasible, that are 'not done'."); see also Lewis & Weigert, supra
note 13, at 974 ("Personal trust involves an emotional bond between individuals, and the emotional
pain that each would experience in the event of betrayal serves as the protective base of trust even
where other types of short-term gains could be realized by breaking the trust.").
442
See Barbara A. Noah, The Role of Race in End-of-Life Care, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL'Y 349, 376-77 (2012) (explaining meaning and origin of the Golden Rule).
443
Epstein, supra note 11, at 10.
444
See Child, Fundamental Bond, supra note 1, at 274.
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primacy. Similarly, a thorough analysis of the impact of trust on corporate
governance will require an additional examination and discussion of trust as
a virtue rather than as a mechanism. Once recognized as (moral) virtues,
trust and trustworthiness become preordained with broad societal approval
and institutionalized expectations. They develop into collective and
impersonal (even anonymous) manifestations of behavioral expectations as
well as mechanisms of mutual behavioral affirmation and validation. In
doing so, they operate entirely independent, and exist a priori, of the
individual, inter-personal trust relationship established between two or more
human beings (which has been the sole focus of this Article's investigation
of the mechanics of trusting). Thus, it remains necessary to further explain
in toto how trusting works as an institution of social ordering before safely
engaging in the predictive utility that may be derived from a positive account
of trusting both as a mechanism as well as a virtue for purposes of coupling
absolute director primacy with a generally understood and measurable
quantum of director accountability.445
That being said, the outlines of certain applications, caveats, and
complications may already be worth mentioning here with regard to trust in
the context of absolute director primacy. For example, it is obvious that
trust between firm participants and board directors is structurally more
complex as compared to the simple dyadic trust relationship set-up between
two individual persons in a face-to-face transaction.446 Even if we consider a
particular corporate board as an aggregation of its individual members447 and,

445
One possible avenue for, and aspect of, this future explanation should be the connection
between trust and commitment. If commitment is seen as the tie that binds an individual to
something else (i.e., task, identity, individual, group, organization, or relationship), it will depend on
the (relative) strength of the commitment in order to prevent the individual from opportunistically
pursuing other self-interests in the face of suboptimal personal returns from the current, "committed
to" structural connection, thus, from exploiting, defecting from and destabilizing such connection.
See, e.g., Burke & Stets, supra note 173, at 348 (discussing trust and commitment); cf. Cook,
Networks, Norms, and Trust, supra note 173, at 7 ("Th[e] potential exchange of favors is sustained
by expectations of reciprocation in the future, forming the bedrock of social life. It is in such a
context that trustworthiness matters, and the ability to assess who is and who is not a trustworthy
potential exchange partner becomes important."); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 18, at 23 ("[T]o
do a good job on a board an individual needs an 'internal gyroscope'—something that will keep her
steady on her course, despite outside pressures to stray.").
446
See Belcher, supra note 11, at 161 ("The exchanges of game theory would not normally
qualify as fiduciary relationships"); Blair & Stout, Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1777
(warning about "the potential pitfalls of relying on [social dilemma/trust] experiments to predict
human behavior in the far more complex environment of the corporation").
447
See Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 76, at 20 (describing studies on boards of directors
where "the board is being modeled as a monolithic entity[,]" yet "[i]n reality, a board consists of
individuals who are unlikely to share a common agenda on all matters."). Obviously, this is not the
case in real life, and there exists an additional trust universe between individual board members and
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thus, as a single trust party, we still have a large multitude of diverse firm
participants with whom such board establishes separate trust relationships in
the course of directing the affairs of the company in question.448 Also,
instead of the occurrence of a single, one-shot trust transaction between two
parties, the trust relationships established by (or with)449 the corporation's
board of directors are long-term, multi-faceted and recurrent trust
transactions in which the dynamic and repetitive stages of trusting—both as
to its process and its substance—take on an additional quality and
equilibrium that has been left unexamined herein.
Furthermore, many of the board's trust relationships are not the result
of any direct and personal interactions of the trusting parties. Rather, they
are automatically imposed by the structure that each firm participant's
investment takes and almost automatically spring into existence because of
such investment. In other words, most investments are tied to pre-existing,
firm-specific channels and structures for such types of investments.
Therefore, each investment already comes with a pre-existing, ready-made,
(mostly) standardized and, thus, (largely) unalterable firm-specific size,
quality, fabric, and network of intra-firm trust relationships which typically
accompany this type of investment.450 Firm participants are accordingly
limited in their exercise of trusting to the times of investment entry and
investment exit as conscious, individual, and personal exercises of trusting.
Finally, there is the additional complication given that no corporation
is an island of economic cooperation and of functional trusting in pursuance
thereof. For example, shareholders in publicly-held companies will often
evidence a type of generic, institutionalized, and diffuse meta-trust which
reaches across a wide spectrum of corporate investments and, thus, across a
wide spectrum of corporate boards. As such, instead of investing and
among all members of the board (which universe could be labeled as a realm of "parallel trust" or
"in-tandem trust"). See Belcher, supra note 11, at 164. This realm of intra-board trusting is, of
course, a constituent part and feature of "small-group dynamics" and "thick social ties." See Tung,
supra note 11, at 1178-80; see also Yamagishi & Cook, supra note 216, at 246 (discussing how
"network ties may generate bonds of obligation that are more difficult to generate in groups without
a system of norms or sanctioning").
448
See Belcher, supra note 11, at 164.
449
To note the obvious, the board's trust relationships with other firm participants will, of
course, occur in both directions (i.e., trust being reposed in the directors by particular firm
participants as well as the directors themselves reposing trust in particular firm participants). See
Belcher, supra note 11, at 162-64.
450
In this regard, one could describe such trust relations as "trusting by adhesion" or as "trust
of adhesion"/"adhesion trust." In other words, the standardization of pre-existing, firm-specific trust
channels and structures provides transaction-cost savings to both trusting parties, and the beneficial
nature of those trust channels and structures—because they are implemented and consummated
successfully at very high repetition rates—validates their standardization and utility without (much,
if any) need for personal trust "negotiation" (i.e., for "negotiated trust").
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evidencing personal trust in the particular group of individual directors of a
particular corporation (i.e., trusting ad personam),451 firm participants will
often evidence and invest what can be called "system trust" (as a form of
social capital) in that any given board will "do the right thing" without the
need of personal interaction, communication, or scrutiny (i.e., trusting ad
rem).452 This complication then also means that one feels strangely returned
to square one in this entire inquiry. It feels as if corporate actors are only
operating with and under the influence of ("double-blind")453 imitations of
real trust and trustworthiness (at least, as real as analyzed herein), utilizing
such normative values as mere signals in order to trigger acceptable series of
semi-automated behavioral mo(ti)ves of other and self. All of which, in the
end, appears to give trust—as a mechanism—a certain automatizing,
reductionist, even puppeteering kind of quality.454
Given such fundamental differences in the structure and quality of
trusting by Berle-Means firm participants in the board context and by two
individuals in the archetypical case of trusting involving their face-to-face,
personal interaction and communication with each other which has been at
the center of attention herein, it must remain a continuing mystery how trust
works as an efficient mechanism of corporate governance. "If part of what
the truster entrusts to the trusted are discretionary powers, then the truster
risks abuse of those and the successful disguise of such abuse."455 This
finding is merely a restatement in different language (i.e., in trust language)

451

Ermisch et al., supra note 3, at 751-52.
Regarding the differentiation between "personal trust" and "system trust," see Lewis &
Weigert, supra note 13, at 973-74; see also Becker, supra note 167, at 44 (preferring the term
"noncognitive trust" and defining it as "fundamentally a matter of our having trustful attitudes,
affects, emotions, or motivational structures that are not focused on specific people, institutions, or
groups"). A similar distinction is usually made in organizational psychology between cognitivebased trust (which is based on the knowledge and recognition of the fiduciary's reliability,
dependability, and competence) and affect-based trust (which depends on the investment and
reciprocation of the fiduciary's genuine care and concern for the welfare of others). See Burke &
Stets, supra note 173, at 361-62; Colombo, supra note 11, at 834-38; Jones, supra note 166, at 5-6;
McAllister, Affect- and Cognition-Based Trust, supra note 170, at 25-26; Mitchell, Being Trusted,
supra note 11, at 608.
453
Ermisch et al., supra note 3, at 752.
454
See Baier, supra note 19, at 253 ("But what is a trust-tied community without justice but
a group of mutual blackmailers and exploiters?"); Becker, supra note 167, at 61 ("We may be best
served by a trustful disposition that survives perpetual disappointment."); Blair & Stout, Behavioral
Foundations, supra note 11, at 1743 (stating that "[s]ocial 'framing' . . . plays a critical role in
determining whether or not individuals choose to trust and be trustworthy"); Blair & Stout,
Behavioral Foundations, supra note 11, at 1796 ("In other words, fiduciary duty law works through
framing, not shaming."); Ribstein, supra note 4, at 566. For a critical response to "framing"
strategies, see Reich-Graefe, supra note 4, at 516-17 n.261 and accompanying text.
455
Baier, supra note 19, at 239.
452
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of the fundamental dilemma of absolute director primacy as well as of its
underlying agency cost problem.456 If trust, indeed, is to be an accountability
mechanism, i.e., a behavioral constraint for the solution of this dilemma, we,
thus far, have only made partial progress457 in mapping out the crossroads of
trust and corporate governance.

456
"[E]ncapsulated trust represents a special agency relationship. That agency relationship
exists to the extent that we expect those in whom we place our trust to take our interests into account
when determining how to act." Siebecker, supra note 11, at 149.
457
And—perhaps—only in the form of a petitio principii, i.e., by assuming that trust is (part
of) the answer when it rather may only turn out to be (part of) the (broader) question.

